This paper argues that the contemporary “misinformation panic” misdiagnoses the challenges facing democratic societies. While false and misleading information can cause harm, the dominant response—fac...

Abstract. Philosophers tend to treat immoral jokes as best avoided, if not outright condemned. This essay challenges that consensus. I argue that many immo

In psychology it’s known as the gender-equality paradox.

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In psychology it’s known as the gender-equality paradox.

How much the sexes differ psychologically depends on how fair and wealthy a country is. But not in the way you’d think

"For news organizations, our findings are in some ways bitter medicine."

Where on Earth are human sex differences the largest?

The social science literature surprisingly found that gender differences in the choice of and preference for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) study majors are larger in more g...

A wide-ranging engagement with one of contemporary epistemology's most influential thinkers Hilary Kornblith is one of the world's leading philosophers theorizing about knowledge and related issues. A...

A number of philosophers have argued that citizens have an interest in “being understood” by others in the political community (Hannon 2019, Prescott-Couch 2021). However, it is not obvious what kind of understanding this is, and why it should matter in the political context. In this paper, I argue that there are two importantly different epistemic achievements that should go under the heading “political understanding.” One kind of understanding, which I label rational political understanding, concerns a grasp of the rational support structure of others’ social and political opinions, analogous to the kind of understanding we might have of an argument or a theory. The other, which Il call empathetic political understanding, concerns an affect-laden grasp of their emotions and lived experience. These two kinds of understanding are politically relevant for different reasons. Rational understanding is crucial for ensuring that citizens’ views are effectively taken into account in public deliberation, while empathetic understanding is crucial for facilitating identification with others in one’s political community, thereby promoting civic friendship. This distinction is helpful to clarifying normative questions about political understanding—for citizens may be owed rational consideration of their viewpoint without being owed identification. Moreover, attention to it is important for appreciating crucial distinctions between different kinds of projects in journalism and the social sciences aiming to provide “understanding” of other citizens.

Why people are not as gullible as we think

Gamma Chimp

Recognizing and addressing some of the pressing challenges we face as human society, including global health and climate change, requires trust in science. Philosophers of science have argued that people should trust science for its epistemic qualities–its capacity to produce accurate knowledge. Under this premise, the literature on public understanding of science has long sought to explain people’s trust in science by their knowledge of it–with sobering results: While people do tend to trust science, they do not tend to know much about it. If not grounded in knowledge, is public trust in science mostly irrational? In this thesis, I argue that no, not necessarily. From a cognitive perspective, this thesis aims to provide an explanation of the foundations of trust in science at the micro-level. I develop a 'rational impression' account of trust in science, according to which people do not need to understand or remember much about science to trust it. The account builds on two basic cognitive mechanisms of information evaluation: First, if someone finds out something that is hard-to-know, we tend to be impressed by it, if we believe it is true. This impression makes us infer that the person is competent, a crucial component of trustworthiness. Second, if something is highly consensual, we tend to infer that it is likely to be true, and that those who agree are competent. These inferences from consensus are particularly relevant in the context of science, where most people lack relevant background knowledge to evaluate claims for themselves. Scientists agree on hard-to-know findings such as the size of the milky way or the atomic structure of DNA. Although most people do not understand much of how the scientists came to make these findings, nor remember the details of the findings, the consensus provides good reasons to trust the scientists. This account underlines the critical role of education and science communication in fostering trust in science.

PDF | Wang Guowei (1877-1927) was among the first Chinese thinkers to seriously engage with the Western philosophical tradition. He took a particular... | Find, read and cite all the research you need...

The traditional conception of belief in philosophy is that it is an attitude that aims at truth, typically involving high confidence, governed by a strong epistemic norm. Philosophers have recently ch...

How to be taken seriously