it me
@tripledubbel.bsky.social
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🏕️ 🐻 🌲 i’m the kind of g the little homies wanna be like…
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tripledubbel.bsky.social
wait until they find out about all their voters that have Airbnbs and did the same.
tripledubbel.bsky.social
dig Peacemaker’s season 2 intro song by Foxy Shazam? 🦅

their lead singer Eric Nally kills it on Dowtown. great cameos to boot

youtu.be/JGhoLcsr8GA?...
MACKLEMORE & RYAN LEWIS - DOWNTOWN (OFFICIAL MUSIC VIDEO)
YouTube video by Macklemore
youtu.be
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reichlinmelnick.bsky.social
Judge Perry spends four pages going over the history of the debates around the Constitution as to the proper relationship of the President to a state militia, especially after overthrowing the British, who had maintained standing armies in the colonies against their wishes.
A. The Constitution
During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, one topic of hot debate among the
Founders was how to properly scope the federal government's military powers. Indeed, among
the grievances directed against King George Ill by signatories to the Declaration of
Independence was his keeping in Times of Peace, Standing Armies, without the Consent of our Legislatures." Decl. of Independence para. 13 (U.S. 1776). Thus, while the Founders recognized that well-trained soldiers were necessary "for providing for the common defense" of our young nation, they were concerned "that a national standing Army posed an intolerable threat to
individual liberty and to the sovereignty of the separate states." Perpich v. Dept. of Defense, 496
U.S. 334, 340 (1990); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1957) ("The Founders
envisioned the army as a necessary institution, but one dangerous to liberty if not confined within its essential bounds."). Further informing some Founders' suspicion of standing armies was the
fact that local militias of individual states had played a vital role in securing the recent victory in
the Revolutionary War. See Frederick Bemays Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution,
54 Harv. L. Rev. 181, 182-83 (1940).
Another concern among some Founders was the extent of the federal government's
powers to deploy federal military forces-including federalized militia-for purposes of general
law enforcement. For instance, in response to a proposal to add language to the Constitution
which would empower the federal government to "call forth the force of the Union" against states that passed laws contravening those of the union, James Madison moved successfully for its removal, opining that such use of force against a state "would look more like a declaration of
war, than an infliction of punishment." Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces
in Domestic Disorders 1789-1879 8 (citing Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal
Convention,… come within the idea of an insurrection." Id. at 410. To this, Madison replied that "there might be
riots, to oppose the execution of the laws, which the civil power might not be sufficient to quell."
Id. (emphasis added). Patrick Henry pressed the issue, charging that granting power of "calling
the militia to enforce every execution indiscriminately" would be "unprecedented," and a
"genius of despotism." Id. at 412. To this, Madison noted the "great deal of difference between
calling forth the militia, when a combination is formed to prevent the execution of the laws, and
the sheriff or constable carrying with him a body of militia to execute them in the first instance;
which is a construction not warranted by the [Militia] clause." Id. at 415.
Confronted with such concerns, even federalist proponent Alexander Hamilton rejected
the notion that the militia could enforce domestic law, opining that given "the supposition of a
want of power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of colour, it
will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the federal government over the militia is as uncandid as it is illogical." The Federalist No. 29,
at 188 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Ernest Cooke, ed., 1961). To Hamilton, then, it was nothing
more than an "exaggerated and improbable suggestion]" that the federal government would
command one state's militia to march offensively into the territories of another, given how
assuredly such conduct would invite "detestation" and "universal hatred" by the people of the
would-be usurper. Id. at 186-87.
On September 17, 1787, the U.S. Constitution was ratified. Many of the concerns debated
by the Founders reflect in its contours. Regarding the militia, the Founders chose to vest
Congress-not the President—with constitutional power "to provide for calling forth the Militia
to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," U.S. Const. a… disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service
of the United States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. The President, then, would be the
"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2,
cl. 1.
That the Framers understood the Calling Forth Clause narrowly can be seen in
Congress's earliest efforts to put the clause into legislative practice. In 1792, Congress enacted
an Act to "provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections and repel invasions." Act of May 2, 1792, 1 Stat. 264(1792). In 1795, Congress
repealed the 1792 Act and passed an amended version. Act of February 28, 1795, 1 Stat. 424
(1795). In both versions, Congress authorized the President to call upon the militia in response to
invasion or insurrection without much limitation. But for the President to call forth the militia in
cases where "the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof
obstructed," stricter controls were imposed. Id. Specifically, Congress authorized the calling
forth of militia only when the forces of obstruction were "too powerful to be suppressed by the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals" by the Act. Id.
These early efforts demonstrate contemporaneous understanding that military deployment for
purpose of executing the laws was to be an act of last resort, only after other systems had failed.
Beyond the Calling Forth Clause, other Constitutional provisions respond to Founders'
concerns about specters of military overreach. For instance, the Founders chose not to
consolidate control over the nation's standing army and naval forces into a single branch of
federal government. Power to command was vested in the President, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1,
but power to actually "declare War… Navy" entrusted to Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-13; see also The Federalist No. 24,
at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Ernest Cooke, ed., 1961) (noting "the whole power of
raising armies was lodged in the legislature, not in the executive") (emphasis in original).
Moreover, two of the Constitution's first ten Amendments articulate safeguards against the
military: the Second Amendment-with its assurance that well-regulated militias would be
prepared and armed to fight for the security of the states-and the Third Amendment, with its
prohibition on quartering of soldiers in times of peace.
Finally, the Constitution and its early amendments also reflect another long-standing
American principle: that the states possess a "residuary and inviolable dual sovereignty." The
Federalist No. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob Ernest Cooke, ed., 1961); see also Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) ("It is incontestible that the Constitution established a
system of 'dual sovereignty"'); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936) (the
Framers "meant to carve from the general mass of legislative powers, then possessed by the
states, only such portions as it was thought wise to confer upon the federal government"). This
conception is reflected throughout the Constitution's text, but particularly in the Tenth
Amendment, which states that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. Const. amend. X. These reserved and residuary powers include, among other
things, "the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States." United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S 598, 618 (2000); see also Patterson v. State of Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 503 (1878) (the "power to establish the ordinary regulations of police has been left with the individual States, and cannot be assumed by the national government");
Carte…
tripledubbel.bsky.social
good try Phils.

see you for pitchers & catchers!

congrats Dodgers
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tripledubbel.bsky.social
thank you for reporting all of this!
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tripledubbel.bsky.social
Liberty Vote is owned by a former Republican election official.

(kind of a big point that should be in the headline fwiw)
tripledubbel.bsky.social
let’s go phils!!!
tripledubbel.bsky.social
this game needs more pipe organ!
tripledubbel.bsky.social
Topper’s pitching calls are lacking