From yesterday's Oregon Supreme Court decision in State v. Cortes, written by Justice Bronson James: Defendant, who is houseless, is on probation and subject to the general conditions of probation provided for by Oregon law. Those conditions include the requirement that a probationer shall "[n]ot possess weapons, firearms or dangerous animals." Defendant's probation officer issued a probation violation report alleging that defendant had violated the general weapons condition when he reported to the probation office with a knife in his backpack. At the probation violation hearing, defendant claimed that, although it was a knife, it was a steak knife, and it was therefore not a weapon but a tool, an essential eating implement that defendant carried in his backpack by necessity because, being houseless, he carried all his worldly possessions upon his person. {The knife was nine inches long, and the blade was four-and-a-half inches in length and had a rounded tip.} The trial court rejected defendant's argument that the knife—even if it was a steak knife—was not a weapon for purposes of the probation statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. We allowed review to consider whether defendant violated the weapons condition in ORS 137.540(1)(j). The debate in this case might appear ontological in nature: What makes a weapon a weapon? What characteristics give an object weaponness? But, we need not resolve those deeper philosophical questions. Our task is more grounded; we are only called upon to decide what the Oregon legislature intended to be considered a weapon for purposes of ORS 137.540. Here, based on the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 137.540(1)(j), and considering maxims of constitutional avoidance, we hold that the legislature intended for the term "weapons," as used in that statute, to apply to instruments designed primarily for offensive or defensive combat or instruments that would reasonably be recognized as having substantially the same character, and not to tools or objects designed primarily for utility, even when those tools can be used as weapons under some circumstances. Based on that definition, we conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that defendant had violated the weapons condition without first engaging in a factual inquiry about the knife at issue and making a factual determination as to whether it was a knife that was designed primarily for offensive or defensive combat, or one that would reasonably be recognized as having substantially the same character, as opposed to a knife designed primarily for utility…. The development of the probation statutes since 1931 provides several important contextual clues for interpreting the weapons provision in ORS 137.540(1). First, the purpose of the probation system is to promote a probationer's freedom and need for rehabilitation so long as those interests are consistent with public safety. Second, it is Oregon's policy to ensure that the probation system operates in a swift, certain, and consistent manner. To achieve that policy, the legislature has developed a system of general and specific conditions of probation with the goal of limiting the discretion of probation officers to interpret judgments while, at the same time, providing probationers with clear notice of what conduct is prohibited and required while under supervision. With that context in mind, it is unlikely that the legislature intended for "weapons" to mean literally anything capable of being used to inflict injury. Such a definition would capture a nearly endless number of objects and would give probation officers unreasonably broad authority to determine what objects constitute weapons. That result would deprive probationers of fair notice about what conduct would constitute a violation. Moreover, it would lead to arbitrary enforcement, with each probation officer determining individually whether a particular object is a weapon in a particular circumstance, as exemplified by the testimony of the probation officer in this case who, when asked to define a weapon, said it was "[a]nything that can cause me harm." … [And i]f the term "weapons" is defined by situational use, then virtually anything in the home can be a weapon when used in a particular manner. Defining a weapon in terms of how an object is used works well when evaluating past behavior, such as criminal statutes that apply to actions already undertaken. But probation conditions exist to regulate future behavior. A situational "use" definition applied to constructive possession makes it nearly impossible for probationers to predict what future behavior would, or would not, be prohibited. Further, it invites arbitrary enforcement that would vary between probation officers. For these reasons, we reject the state's definition of "weapons," in favor of a definition of "weapons" tied to the features of an object's design…. The sole question in this case is the legislative intent in using the term "weapons" in the general conditions of probation. Nothing in our decision today forecloses an individual court from constructing a special condition of probation for knives or other forms of potentially dangerous tools—such as, for example, a special condition prohibiting actual possession of any type of knife, regardless of design, outside the home, unless possessed for work purposes—as long as the record supports that such a condition is "reasonably related to the crime of conviction or the needs of the probationer for the protection of the public or reformation of the probationer, or both." … Justice Stephen Bushong, joined by Justice Christopher Garrett, dissented: Under ORS 137.540(1)(j), a probationer shall not "possess weapons, firearms or dangerous animals." The statute does not define "weapons," and, as the majority opinion points out, a knife can be used as a tool—a utensil that is used to eat or cut food—and as a weapon. I would distinguish between the two, not by focusing on whether the implement was designed for combat or reasonably recognized as having the same character, as the majority opinion concludes, but by examining the circumstances surrounding a probationer's possession…. Defendant possessed the knife in his backpack, with the handle sticking out, making it readily accessible to him by reaching back—without removing his backpack—and grabbing it. That suggests that he possessed the knife to use it as a weapon. The handle of the knife was wrapped in tape, making it easier for defendant to grab it quickly and hold it tightly, in a threatening way, if he thought he needed a weapon. Defendant's manner of possessing the knife suggests that he possessed it as a weapon because he intended to use it, if necessary, as a weapon. That also is how defendant's probation officer saw it. After seeing the knife handle sticking out of defendant's backpack, the probation officer thought that defendant was in possession of a "weapon" in violation of the general condition of probation in ORS 137.540(1)(j). Based on the probation officer's testimony, the trial court determined as a factual matter that defendant had possessed a weapon in violation of that general condition of probation. Because there are sufficient facts in the record to support that determination, I would affirm. That does not mean that any possession of this knife would necessarily be a violation of the general condition of probation in ORS 137.540(1)(j). For example, if defendant had possessed this knife in the bottom of his backpack, wrapped in a napkin with a fork and spoon alongside a cup and a plate, I would conclude as a factual matter that he possessed it as an eating utensil, not as a weapon. Similarly, a probationer who possessed a hammer in a toolbox alongside a wrench and a screwdriver on the way to his job at a construction site possessed the hammer as a tool, not as a weapon. A probationer who possessed a baseball bat in a duffel bag alongside a mitt, a baseball, cleats, and a baseball uniform on the way to a baseball field possessed the bat to play baseball, not to use it as a weapon. Under those circumstances, probation officers and courts should conclude that the probationer had not possessed a weapon in violation of the general condition of probation in ORS 137.540(1)(j). But hammers and baseball bats, though not specifically designed for combat, can be used as weapons. The same is true of a knife that is not specifically designed for combat. The circumstances in which a probationer possessed such an implement can reveal that a probationer possessed it as a weapon. For example, a probationer holding a baseball bat or a hammer in his hand in a threatening manner as he walked towards a street brawl would be possessing the implement as a weapon. In my view, such a possession would violate the general condition of probation in ORS 137.540(1)(j), even if the probationer stopped short of using the implement to bludgeon someone…. Public defender Francis C. Gieringer represents Cortes. The post Knife with 4½" Blade and Rounded Tip Wasn't "Weapon" Forbidden by Probation Condition, Oregon Court Holds appeared first on Reason.com.

From last week's Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision in Smith v. State, written by Justice Scott Walker: Appellant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the trial court's mask mandate…. In Romero v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), … one of the State's key witnesses refused to testify without wearing a "disguise" consisting of "dark sunglasses, a baseball cap pulled down over his forehead, and a long-sleeved jacket with its collar turned up and fastened so as to obscure [his] mouth, jaw, and the lower half of his nose." This Court noted that "the presence requirement is motivated by the idea that a witness cannot 'hide behind the shadow' but will be compelled to 'look [the defendant] in the eye' while giving accusatory testimony." [The court in Romero also reasoned that, "Although the physical presence element might appear, on a superficial level, to have been satisfied by Vasquez's taking the witness stand, it is clear that Vasquez believed the disguise would confer a degree of anonymity that would insulate him from the defendant. The physical presence element entails an accountability of the witness to the defendant…. In the present case, accountability was compromised because the witness was permitted to hide behind his disguise." -EV] Although in Maryland v. Craig (1990), the Supreme Court [rejected a Confrontation Clause because it] determined that the testimony of a child through a one-way closed-circuit monitor was reliable even though the physical presence element was lacking, the facts in Craig are not analogous to Romero. "[U]nlike Craig, [Romero] also involve[d] a failure to respect a second element of confrontation: observation of the witness's demeanor." When more than two elements of confrontation are being compromised, this Court determined that the Confrontation Clause requirements can only be circumvented if the public policy interest being served is "truly compelling." We did not find the witness's fears compelling, noting differences between adults' fears and children's fears and the fact that the defendant already knew the witness's name and address…. The Confrontation Clause requires case-specific evidence showing an encroachment of the defendant's right to confrontation was necessary to further a public-policy interest for the encroachment to be allowed under the United States Constitution. Because a surgical mask affects the physical-presence element of the Confrontation Clause and the jury's ability to assess demeanor, the trial court was required to make case-specific showings of fact that the mask mandate was necessary to further a public-policy interest…. [T]he use of surgical masks in the case at bar … is a significant impediment to viewing facial expressions due to the coverage of both the nose and mouth …. A reversal of the conviction is warranted because (1) the trial court did not show case-specific evidence that the masks were necessary, and (2) the mask mandate was applied regardless of individual necessity…. [Moreover], the trial took place in January of 2023, after face masks were no longer required by the Supreme Court of Texas and after the Governor had issued an executive order prohibiting mask requirements…. Judge David Schenck, joined by Judges Kevin Yeary and Jesse McClure, dissented: This case poses the question of whether the trial court's policy requiring every person in the courtroom, including witnesses providing live testimony in the presence of jurors, to wear a mask violated Appellant's rights under the U.S. Constitution's Confrontation Clause. To be sure, the COVID-19 pandemic presented many courts with the same question concerning trials during the time in which state and national declarations of disaster were in effect; the answer to that question was uniform: masking requirements do not violate a defendant's confrontation rights. Now, this Court is presented with that question for a trial occurring post-pandemic. While the decision to require masks of all the trial's participants and observers was imprudent and (we are told) evidently political, I do not believe the interference with the juror's ability to observe witness demeanor somehow ripened into a Confrontation Clause violation…. The U.S Supreme Court has identified four elements that collectively ensure the right to confrontation: 1) physical presence; 2) oath; 3) cross-examination; and 4) observation of demeanor by the trier of fact. Craig. The "combined effect" of these distinct elements collectively "serve[ ] the purposes of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm …." Being different, they are not necessarily equal. It is physical presence of the witness, as opposed to any of the other elements alone or in combination, that anchors the Craig analysis and, in turn, any evaluation of a claim of deprivation. "[A] defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." "Although demeanor evidence is … of … high significance, it is nevertheless well settled that it is not an essential ingredient of the confrontation privilege …." While the demeanor of a witness is also significant, infringements on that aspect of confrontation alone typically will not impede the core interest in forcing witness accountability for his or her testimony or amount to a categorical denial of the face-to-face encounter so critical to confrontation. To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has never held—or considered—whether disruption of the demeanor element would, on its own, constitute a violation of the confrontation right…. Accordingly, only the physical presence element triggers the Craig analysis…. Should the answer to the threshold issue of whether there is a denial of the face-to-face component of confrontation in the first place be no, the Craig analysis is simply not implicated…. [In this case], the witnesses were physically present in the courtroom during testimony, testified under oath, and were subject to cross-examination by counsel and observation by the jury throughout…. [T]he witnesses in this case were actually present in the courtroom before Appellant and within his scope of vision. Additionally, the jurors could assess witness credibility and demeanor by observing "body language" and "delivery." … "[T]he reliability of witness testimony" in this case "was otherwise assured; jurors were able to observe how witnesses moved, spoke, hesitated, and even cried," the witnesses were not disguised, their eyes were visible, and had no degree of anonymity due to the ability to remove the masks for identification. Sophie Bossart represents Smith. The post 2023 Criminal Trial Where Witnesses Wore Surgical Masks Violated Confrontation Clause appeared first on Reason.com.

A rare instance in which courts were willing to impose sanctions upon sanctionable conduct.

After this decision, rescinding this Biden Administration rule may be more difficult.

"A Nashville city councilman threatened to withdraw business from a law firm,  which served as the city's outside counsel, due to the position one of its attorneys took as the chair of the county election commission on a tax referendum."

11/26/1829: Justice Bushrod Washington dies. He was President George Washington's nephew. Justice Bushrod Washington The post Today in Supreme Court History: November 26, 1829 appeared first on Reason.com.

What’s on your mind?

The Plaintiffs argued the 2021 map was an unconstitutional gerrymander. How could reimposing the 2021 map actually redress their purported injuries?

If someone was prosecuted (and later pardoned) for being an unregistered foreign agent for Iran, is it defamatory to say he was prosecuted for "spying"?

I'd like to again solicit submissions to our peer-reviewed Journal of Free Speech Law, and mention one of our great advantages: We can publish quickly (by the standards of academic journals), if that's what you'd like. Our most recent articles, for instance, were published 3 to 5 months from when we received them, and that includes the time stemming from the authors revising their articles in various ways (which we certainly allow, if the author is willing to take the time). We have published articles as quickly as 2½ months after we received them, when the author has wanted to move fast. To my knowledge, many top student-edited journals are shut down for the Winter, and won't review manuscripts until February. That means the manuscripts probably wouldn't be published until the end of 2026, or even later. But if you submit to us now, and want to publish quickly, you can have the article out by February or March. There are other advantages as well: We offer anonymized feedback from the reviewers whether the article is accepted or rejected; many authors have told us this was very helpful. And when we accept article, it's edited by one of our Executive Editors (Jane Bambauer, Ash Bhagwat, or me), and many authors have likewise told us that the edits, by experienced free speech scholars, are quite useful. Some more details: The journal is now nearly five years old, and has published over 100 articles, including by Jack Balkin (Yale), Mark Lemley (Stanford), Jane Ginsburg (Columbia), Philip Hamburger (Columbia), Christopher Yoo (Penn), and many others—both prominent figures in the field and emerging young scholars, including ones who didn't have a tenure-track academic appointment. (This list doesn't include our reprinting others' symposia, which have also included many other top scholars, such as Robert Post, Mark Tushnet, Geoffrey Stone, Lee Bollinger, Jeremy Waldron, Danielle Citron, Genevieve Lakier, and more.) The articles have been cited so far in 13 court cases, over 400 articles, and over 100 briefs. And note that all the articles have only had four years or less to attract these citations. Please pass this along to friends or colleagues who you think might be interested. Note that the submissions don't compete for a limited number of slots in an issue or volume; we'll publish articles that satisfy our quality standards whenever we get them. All submissions must be exclusive to us, but, again, you'll have an answer within 14 days (though perhaps up to 21 days if it's over Thanksgiving, Christmas, or New Year's), so you'll be able to submit elsewhere if we say no. Please submit an anonymized draft, together with at https://freespeechlaw.scholasticahq.com/. A few guidelines: * Instead of a cover letter, please submit at most one page (and preferably just a paragraph or two) explaining how your article is novel. If there is a particular way of showing that (e.g., it's the first article to discuss how case X and doctrine Y interact), please let us know. * Please submit articles single-spaced, in a proportionally spaced font. * Please make sure that the Introduction quickly and clearly explains the main claims you are making. * Please avoid extended background sections reciting familiar Supreme Court precedents or other well-known matters. We prefer articles that get right down to the novel material (if necessary, quickly explaining the necessary legal principles as they go). * Each article should be as short as possible, and as long as necessary. * Like everyone else, we like simple, clear, engaging writing. * We are open to student-written work, and we evaluate it under the same standards applicable to work written by others. We publish: * Articles that say something we don't already know. * Articles with all sorts of approaches: doctrinal, theoretical, historical, empirical, or otherwise. * Articles dealing with speech, press, assembly, petition, or expression more broadly. * Generally not articles purely focused on the Free Exercise Clause or Establishment Clause, except if they also substantially discuss religious speech. * Articles about the First Amendment, state constitutional free speech provisions, federal and state statutes, common-law rules, and regulations protecting or restricting speech, or private organizations' speech regulations. * Articles about U.S. law, foreign law, comparative law, or international law. * Both big, ambitious work and narrower material. * Articles that are useful to the academy, to the bench, or to the bar (or if possible, to all three). * Articles arguing for broader speech protection, narrower speech protection, or anything else. The post Journal of Free Speech Law: Publish Your Article in a Few Months appeared first on Reason.com.

This new article is here. The Introduction: Artificial general intelligence is "probably the greatest threat to the continued existence of humanity." Or so claims OpenAI's Chief Executive Officer Sam Altman. In a seeming paradox, OpenAI defines its mission as ensuring "that artificial general intelligence—AI systems that are generally smarter than humans—benefits all of humanity." Whether artificial general intelligence becomes a universal boon or an existential threat—or both—there is general agreement concerning its revolutionary potential. Indeed, Microsoft founder Bill Gates has called it "as fundamental an advance as the personal computer or the internet," and Google CEO Sundar Pichai has predicted that it will "bring about a more profound shift in human life than electricity or Promethean fire." Thus far, AI systems are not generally smarter than humans. Not yet. Large Language Models (LLMs), however, are advancing at a startling pace. LLMs use artificial intelligence to synthesize massive amounts of textual data and then predict text and generate responses to users in "natural" human language. On a scale measuring the progress of LLMs toward general intelligence, OpenAI's flagship model, GPT-3 scored zero percent in 2020. Just five years later, OpenAI's o3-preview scored between 75% and 88%. Meanwhile, OpenAI competitors such as Anthropic, Google, and DeepSeek are likewise racing to deliver on the promise of "systems that can think and act rationally in ways that mirror human behavior and intelligence." Even as LLM models make progress toward general intelligence, there are already AI systems that have exceeded human performance on narrow, clearly scoped tasks. For example, chess engines have been performing at superhuman levels for years, and AI models can now help detect breast cancer far earlier than human experts—and the models continue to improve. Meanwhile, OpenAI's o1 reasoning model has an LSAT score higher than the median student admitted to the law schools at Harvard, Yale, and Stanford. As AI systems begin to mirror human thought, it pays to remember the words of Seneca: "[N]ot all mirrors stick to the truth." LLMs now regularly create outputs that appear to be the product of independent thought, but LLMs are essentially prediction engines that "answer" prompts (or inputs) by calculating which words are most likely to come next and then assembling them into an output. LLMs, as such, do not predict truth but instead predict probabilities. In doing so, they sometimes replicate false information common in their training data. They also inevitably produce "plausible yet false outputs," commonly referred to as hallucinations. An LLM may produce fake legal documents, non-existent academic citations, or false biographical data. Although LLM producers and users can employ various tactics to reduce hallucinations, these errors cannot be eliminated. And they are quite prevalent. In fact, data gathered from multiple chatbots suggests that hallucinations occur in 3% to 10% of outputs, leading one legal scholar to dub LLMs "Large Libel Models." Radio host Mark Walters found out about hallucinations the hard way. Walters is the first person in the United States to sue an LLM producer for defamation. Walters alleged that OpenAI's Large Language Model iteration operating at the time, GPT-3.5, falsely accused him of fraud and embezzlement. The accusation, which was unequivocally false and potentially reputation-damaging, arose in response to a prompt from a journalist named Frederick Riehl. Fortunately, Riehl had more than an inkling that the accusation was false, and he contacted Walters shortly after receiving it. No one else received the hallucination. Walters nonetheless sued OpenAI for its defamatory output. The rise of defamation-by-hallucination cases presents significant challenges for defamation law. In most states and in most cases, defamation liability hinges on the defendant's scienter, or mental state. As a matter of tort law, plaintiffs generally must establish that the defendant was at least negligent in publishing a defamatory, false, factual statement about them. As a matter of constitutional law, plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures must prove actual malice on the part of the defendant: In other words, such plaintiffs must prove that the defendant knew at the time of publishing that the defamatory statement was false or recklessly disregarded its falsity. To state the obvious, it is not possible to judge whether an LLM "knew" of or was reckless as to the falsity of an output prior to publishing it in response to a prompt. Nor is it possible to determine whether the LLM exercised reasonable care. Only human actors have scienter as to falsity, or even as to the act of publishing. Generative AI is not the first technology to which defamation law has had to adapt. Laws addressing infliction of reputational harm predate the printing press, and each new technology of communication has forced the common law to reexamine how to protect reputation without unduly deterring valuable speech. In the United States, courts have long adapted tort doctrines to achieve what they perceive to be sound communications policy. This was true even before the Supreme Court intervened to balance state interests in protecting reputation against free speech concerns. Adapting defamation law to generative AI is simply the latest challenge in defamation law's long and ongoing evolution. Nonetheless, the stakes are high. If defamation law imposes liability on AI companies for every defamatory hallucination, the potential of LLMs as a tool for discovery, data analysis, information gathering, and creativity enhancement may be squandered. In fact, it is easy to imagine a new form of barratry emerging, in which lawyers and others search name after name to generate endless numbers of new clients. The costs of defending against claims and the threat of massive, unpredictable monetary awards may cause developers of Large Language Models to implement excessive filtering and content moderation, shift costs to end users, and reduce accessibility. In addressing defamation by hallucination, therefore, legal decision-makers must balance the desire to impose accountability for reputational harm with the need to foster the development of an important and perhaps revolutionary medium of information gathering and generation. This article proposes a two-pronged approach to address harms caused by the newest AI reasoning models. First, this article introduces a framework for applying centuries-old tort doctrines to these models. Rooted in tort law rather than the First Amendment, this framework takes as a given that AI "speech" is valuable to recipients. and that public access to powerful, new information-gathering tools is essential to sound communications policy. Second, recognizing that tort law alone cannot adequately address the reputational harms the newest models pose, this article argues for statutory reforms focused on reducing such harms and making them easier to prove when they do occur. Part I examines the application of existing defamation doctrines—both common law and constitutional—to "foundation-model" generative AI speech, highlighting the points at which existing doctrines may be deployed to accommodate communications policy concerns. This Part examines these doctrines through the prism of the trial court's order in Walters v. OpenAI, which addressed (1) whether a hallucination generated by an LLM in response to a prompt is a factual assertion when the prompter has serious reason to doubt the veracity of the output; (2) how to apply defamation's scienter requirements when the speech in question is generated by an LLM; and (3) whether a plaintiff can recover presumed damages when the evidence indicates no damage actually occurred. This Part also explores a fourth doctrine unexplored in the Walters order: namely, whether an LLM is a publisher or a distributor of the content it produces. Part II highlights the challenges and opportunities posed by the newest LLM reasoning models, particularly "chain of thought" models. Reasoning models can "understand" concepts, contexts, and ambiguity in ways that their predecessors could not, which makes them more capable than their predecessors of solving "complex reasoning and problem-solving tasks." Chain-of-thought models, in particular, promise to deliver greater accuracy (i.e., more correct results) as their final outputs. Even as these models produce more reliable final outputs, however, new avenues for defamatory outputs arise in their intermediate "chains of thought." Moreover, even those reasoning models that "show their sources" continue to produce hallucinated outputs. Relying on the latest computer-science research on hallucinations, and particularly on a hallucination "taxonomy" developed by Yale researchers, this Part demonstrates that hallucinations are inevitable and, in some instances, surprisingly valuable. This fact has significant implications for those seeking to "regulate" hallucinations by way of defamation law. Based on insights from Part II, Part III identifies the chief policy considerations that should underpin the adaptation of defamation law to this new technology. This Part begins to sketch how defamation law can balance the protection of individual reputation with the need to accommodate those hallucinations that are inextricably linked to LLMs' generative capacities. Specially, this Part contends that legal rules in this area must attempt to incentivize compensation for provable reputational harm, correction of the digital record, model transparency, innovations for safety and accuracy, the exercise of reasonable care at all stages of AI development, and the exercise of reasonable care by AI users. Part IV proposes a legal framework for addressing defamatory hallucinations. This framework rests on the proposition that the law should treat defamatory hallucinations—both in an LLM's final output and in its chains of thought—as "inevitable errors," in much the same way that the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan recognized that some journalistic errors must be tolerated in order to produce "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" public discourse. Part IV first explores some of the practical and technological limitations of prior scholarly proposals addressing defamation by hallucination in "foundation model" LLMs. Next, it draws lessons from defamation law's adaptation to past technologies, such as the telegraph, to argue that LLMs bear more similarities to information distributors than to publishers, and AI developers' liability for defamation should be governed accordingly. However, any tort law "privilege" accorded to AI developers must be balanced by the imposition of statutory duties designed to protect victims of defamation by hallucination. Specifically, LLM producers should have a duty to warn (and educate) their users that it is unreasonable to rely on AI outputs without verification. Furthermore, LLM producers should have a duty to preserve search records for a limited period of time in order to enable defamation plaintiffs to prove the existence and scope of their harm. Finally, this Part contends that users who repeat defamatory hallucinations without taking reasonable steps to verify them should often face liability, because such users will often be the cheapest cost avoiders in the realm of reputational harm. We conclude with caveats about the limits of defamation law as a regulatory tool for dealing with hallucination-based harms. The post Journal of Free Speech Law: "Inevitable Errors: Defamation by Hallucination in AI Reasoning Models," by Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrew Daves appeared first on Reason.com.

From yesterday's decision by Florida trial court judge Hunter Carroll in Trump Media & Tech. Group Corp. v. Guardian News & Media Ltd.: This action arises from the publication of several articles reporting on a federal criminal investigation related to TMTG's receipt of two payments totaling $8 million. On March 15 and March 17, 2023, the Guardian published two articles stating federal prosecutors in New York were conducting a money laundering investigation related to the payments, which were wired through the Caribbean from Paxum Bank and ES Family Trust, entities with ties to an ally of Russian president Vladimir Putin and a history of providing banking services to the sex worker industry. The articles report [TMTG co-founder Will] Wilkerson's statements that the origins of the loans caused alarm at TMTG and TMTG's then CFO weighed returning the money, but the money was ultimately not returned…. The Guardian articles were reported on by others. On March 15 and March 22, Penske published two articles in Variety that reported federal prosecutors investigated TMTG for potential money laundering violations related to the payments. On March 18, [Defendant Chris] Anderson published an article in the Sarasota Herald-Tribune that stated federal prosecutors were reportedly investigating the payments to TMTG. The Variety articles and the Herald-Tribune article explicitly reference and provide direct links to the Guardian articles as the source for the statements at issue. TMTG alleges the articles published by the Defendants are false and defamatory because TMTG "is not, and never was, under investigation for money laundering," and neither TMTG nor its executives have "been the focus of any investigation." … Count 1 purports to state a claim for defamation and defamation per se based on seven allegedly false statements published in the Guardian articles: * "Federal investigators examined [TMTG] for possible money laundering"; * "New York prosecutors expanded [a] criminal inquiry of [TMTG] last year and examined acceptance of $8m with suspected Russian ties"; * "Federal prosecutors in New York involved in the criminal investigation into [TMTG] last year started examining whether it violated money laundering statutes in connection with the acceptance of $8m with suspected Russian ties"; * "[TMTG] initially came under criminal investigation over its preparations for a potential merger with a blank check company called Digital World (DWAC)"; * That there was a "criminal investigation" of TMTG and that the nature of the investigation "expanded"; * That "prosecutors in the US attorney's office for the southern district of New York" were "examin[ing]" the "Russian connection"; and * That "months after [TMTG] came under criminal investigation for the merger by the US attorney's office for the southern district of New York, federal prosecutors started to examine whether the company violated money-laundering statutes over the payments." Count 2 purports to state a claim for defamation by implication based on two statements published in the Guardian articles: * "The extent of the exposure for Trump Media and its officers for money laundering remains unclear. The statutes broadly require prosecutors to show that defendants knew the money was the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and the transaction was designed to conceal its source. But money laundering prosecutions … can be based on materials that show that the money in question was unlikely to have legitimate origins"; and * "A spokesman for the justice department, the US attorney's office for the southern district of New York and outside counsel for Trump Media declined to comment about the investigation." The court held that the defendants' substantial truth defense couldn't be accepted in this case on a motion to dismiss: The Guardian and Wilkerson first argue the challenged statements are substantially true. The substantial truth doctrine provides that even if the challenged statement contains minor inaccuracies, it is not actionable if the "gist" or "sting" of the statement is true when read in the full context of its publication. The ultimate question is whether the alleged inaccuracies change the statement's effect on the mind of the reader. Where a statement is ambiguous and reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, the question must be submitted to the trier of fact. The Guardian and Wilkerson argue the gist of the articles is that the loans to TMTG from Russian sources caused concern among TMTG executives and prompted an investigation by federal prosecutors. They argue that any inaccuracies in the challenged statements do not materially change their sting within the context of the articles. TMTG responds that the false and defamatory gist of the articles is that prosecutors were investigating TMTG specifically or focusing on TMTG for wrongdoing. The Court finds the challenged statements are susceptible of both interpretations and cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. But the court concluded that the plaintiffs' hadn't plausibly alleged enough evidence supporting the constitutionally required finding of "actual malice," which is to say that any possible falsehood was knowing or reckless: The actual malice element of both claims rests on the following allegations: * The Guardian harbors bias against TMTG and frequently publishes articles critical of Donald Trump. * The Guardian relied on Wilkerson as its sole source for the statements despite knowing Wilkerson had "bad blood with TMTG" because he was fired from TMTG for making unauthorized disclosures. * The Guardian failed to investigate and obtain independent evidence for the statements in violation of journalistic standards. * Devin Nunes, then CEO of TMTG, notified the Guardian the statements were false. * Wilkerson "knew that TMTG did not commit any wrongdoing" because he was aware of TMTG's finances from his former role. * Wilkerson "was in a position to know" the statements were false based on his discussions with federal investigators. TMTG's allegations of Guardian and Wilkerson's bias or ill will, without more, does not show actual malice. TMTG's allegations that Wilkerson was the sole source for the challenged statements is belied by the face of the article. The article attributes its description of the investigation to the plural "sources familiar with the matter." The only statements attributed to Wilkerson are: (1) that DWAC CEO Patrick Orlando declined to provide details about the lenders or the origins of the loan; and (2) that concerns about the origins of the loans prompted TMTG's then CFO to consider returning the money. TMTG does not allege these statements are defamatory. TMTG concedes Wilkerson had knowledge of relevant TMTG financial information and was in discussions with the federal investigators referenced in the articles. Whether Wilkerson knew TMTG had actually committed any wrongdoing is not germane to the existence or nature of the investigation. Actual malice also requires more than a departure from journalistic standards or a mere failure to investigate. Moreover, the article reflects it was based on multiple sources familiar with the investigation, review of internal TMTG communications, investigation of the entities who made the loans, and fruitless requests for further information from the Department of Justice, the investigators' office, and outside counsel for TMTG. The article also reported the denial of then CEO Nunes that TMTG knew of any issues related to the loans. This denial is not germane to the existence or nature of the investigation, and even if it was, such commonplace denials do not establish actual malice. Finally, TMTG's allegations that further investigation would have proved the statements false or that Wilkerson was "in a position to know" the statements were false are conclusory and unsupported by factual allegations…. The court also ruled in favor of two other defendants, who relied on The Guardian's reporting: As to Penske Media, which owns Variety, the court applied the wire service privilege, which, despite its name, "protects a defendant who republishes the reporting of a reputable news agency" (wire service or not); Penske is protected by the privilege, the court ruled, because it was entitled to rely on The Guardian's work. And the court concluded that statements in an article by Sarasota Herald-Tribune writer Chris Anderson were opinion: The Anderson article was published in the opinion section of the Herald-Tribune with a disclaimer that it expressed the views of its author, and the headline identified the article as an opinion piece. When viewed on the Herald-Tribune website, the article also includes the following phrase: "Is Trump's Sarasota company tied to Russia? Investigators want to know." The article begins by stating federal prosecutors "have reportedly been investigating two loans" made to TMTG, a statement that is explicitly attributed to the March 15 Guardian article. The Anderson article states "[t]he Guardian reported this week" that the prosecutors "were examining loans" made to TMTG. The article opines that "even if the latest allegations are unfounded, the optics of being investigated for money laundering will not enhance his 2024 presidential run." The Anderson article, when read in its entirety, is protected opinion and not actionable. It is consistently identified as opinion article. It explicitly sets forth the "reported" facts on which the opinions are based, and it acknowledges that the "allegations" reported by the Guardian may be "unfounded." Anderson states that prosecutors were "reportedly" investigating "the loans" made to TMTG, a statement TMTG does not dispute. The sole reference to TMTG being "under investigation" is Anderson's opinion on how the "optics" of the facts reported by the Guardian may affect then-candidate Trump's presidential campaign, with cautionary language that the allegations may be unfounded. When placed in context, these statements do not endorse the Guardian's reporting but merely offer opinion and commentary on the possible effects of that reporting, with the caveat that it may be unfounded…. The post Trump Media Group's Libel Lawsuit Over Guardian's Allegations of Federal Criminal Investigation Dismissed appeared first on Reason.com.

11/25/1757: Henry Brockholst Livingston's birthday. He dissented in the property law classic, Pierson v. Post (NY 1805). Justice Henry Brockholst Livingston The post Today in Supreme Court History: November 25, 1757 appeared first on Reason.com.

What’s on your mind?

I will be giving multiple talks in these two countries, in December.

An excerpt from today's long opinion by Chief Judge Allen Winsor (N.D. Fla.) in Damsky v. Summerlin, which I think is likely correct: Damsky has been a controversial figure at the law school since he enrolled. He seems to enjoy pushing boundaries and provoking others. He achieved that and more with two seminar papers and one social media exchange that ultimately became the basis for his expulsion. In the fall semester of his second year, Damsky wrote two seminar papers that generally argue the United States was founded as a race-based nation and should be preserved as such. He concluded each paper with what some perceived as extralegal calls to violence. In American Restoration, Damsky offered this view: [W]e should feel no shame about feeling attached to those with whom we share a common racial origin. The founding generations of Americans were also no strangers to fighting, killing, and dying on behalf of their rights and sovereignty. The hour is late, but we are not yet so outnumbered and so neutered that we cannot seize back what is rightfully ours. This land, America, our due inheritance, is worth the struggle. In National Constitutionalism, Damsky went perhaps further: The Supreme Court and inferior federal courts have the power to arrest the dispossession of White America…. If the People are not granted relief from the government—which includes the judiciary—then, if they are to survive as masters in the land of their ancestors, they must exercise "their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow" the government. And that will be a process which no deskbound jurist can gleefully look forward to; for it will be a controversy decided not by the careful balance of Justitia's scales, but by the gruesome slashing of her sword. Neither of Damsky's seminar professors found his language particularly alarming, and both gave him high marks. Still, the papers garnered attention. Many students found them upsetting, and some insisted the law school take action. The law school refused any discipline, though, concluding the writings did not constitute true threats, were not significantly disruptive, and enjoyed First Amendment protections…. [T]he semester continued without incident—at least until Damsky's March 21 X post: My position on Jews is simple: whatever Harvard professor Noel Ignatiev meant by his call to "abolish the White race by any means necessary" is what I think must be done with Jews. Jews must be abolished by any means necessary. This post was immediately available to Damsky's few X followers (Damsky said he has "almost no following"), as well as anyone else who happened across his public account. Law student S.J. saw the post and found it upsetting but not, by itself, alarming. A week later, S.J. reported the post to the Interim Dean. A few days after that, on April 1, one of the University's Jewish law professors engaged with Damsky on X. Replying to his post, she asked, "Are you saying you would murder me and my family? Is that your position?" Damsky offered this in reply: Did Ignatiev want Whites murdered? If so, were his words as objectionable as mine? If Ignatiev sought genocide, then surely a genocide of all Whites would be an even greater outrage than a genocide of all Jews, given the far greater number of Whites. The next day, the professor continued to engage: I notice you didn't say no, but instead resorted to whataboutism. Yes, his words are despicable, but you implicitly admit yours are, too. (The professor's post included a link to a Brittanica Encyclopedia article about "whataboutism.") At the time, the professor considered the exchange provocative but not alarming or threatening. Other professors and many students, however, found Damsky's posts quite alarming and threatening. Some students were visibly upset, and many came to the Assistant Dean's office crying and describing their fears. Students feared physical harm, and expressed concern that Damsky might come to school armed. {The record suggests students' concerns of physical harm flowed from Damsky's rhetoric alone and not from any separate indication that he might be armed or violent.} The professor who had engaged with Damsky on X, and who initially did not feel threatened, later grew afraid of what Damsky might do after she heard from students more familiar with him. She and her husband slept with a baseball bat by the bed. Springing into action, the law school increased campus security, began locking doors previously kept unlocked, and provided a police presence at a Jewish Law Students Association event. Then, on April 2—twelve days after Damsky's first post and one day after his follow-up exchange with the professor—the University suspended Damsky. Damsky was eventually expelled: In his letter, [University of Florida Dean of Students] Summerlin described Damsky's X posts as threatening and disruptive. And Summerlin described the seminar papers—the ones the Interim Dean earlier concluded were protected speech—as containing "violent rhetoric" that injected fear into the law school community. Summerlin also admonished Damsky for declining to "walk back" what he wrote…. But the court concluded that the expulsion likely violated the First Amendment. First, it concluded that Damsky's posts weren't "true threats" of violence (a category of speech that the Supreme Court has held is excluded from First Amendment protection): Read in context, Damsky's statements "do not convey a real possibility that violence will follow." Even if ostensibly referring to violence, a hyperbolic and coarse expression of political opinion does not necessarily constitute a true threat. Thus, a draft opponent's public announcement that "[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.," was protected speech. Watts v. United States (1969). His statement did not, in context, constitute a true threat. See also id. (noting that "[t]he language of the political arena … is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact"). Here, even taking the statement as the University does—"My position on Jews is simple: … Jews must be abolished by any means necessary"—Damsky offers no indication that he will act on his "position" or do anything at all. {The ellipses are the University's. As Damsky notes, and as discussed more fully below, what the ellipses skip over is important context.} He is stating a view—even if a hateful and offensive one. His statement is thus quite unlike those in the true-threat cases the University cites. The threat in United States v. Ramos (M.D. Ga. 2024) was an individual message sent "to the home address of a Rabbi who had been speaking publicly against antisemitism following a neo-Nazi demonstration at her synagogue." The private letter—a "typical means for delivery of threats"—said, among other things, "Use code 'GASTHEJEWS' for 10% off!." The threat in United States v. Baker was unequivocal in target, location, and time: "[A]rmed racists mobs" at the state capitol on Inauguration Day would be met with "every caliber available," and those who were "afraid to die fighting the enemy" were advised to "stay in bed and live." Damsky's posts lacked those characteristic features of personal, targeted imminence. Moreover, Damsky's post was not simply that "Jews must be abolished by any means necessary." His full statement was this: My position on Jews is simple: whatever Harvard professor Noel Ignatiev meant by his call to "abolish the White race by any means necessary" is what I think must be done with Jews. Jews must be abolished by any means necessary. Read in context, the post was equating Damsky's view that "Jews must be abolished" to the view of a Harvard professor. This context further undermines any suggestion that the post was a "serious expression" that Damsky would harm others. The University says the reference to Ignatiev means little because most people are unfamiliar with Ignatiev and because Damsky did not explain that "Ignatiev was not calling for violence." Regardless, Damsky's post expressly conditioned "abolish" and "any means necessary" on "whatever Harvard professor Noel Ignatiev meant." That makes the University's reference to Black's Law Dictionary (quoting definition of "Abolish") inapposite. {Tellingly, the witnesses who considered Damsky's reference to Ignatiev (whether or not they agreed with Damsky's interpretation of the author) did not find the March 21 post clearly threatening. Cf. Watts (considering the audience's reaction as relevant context).} Similarly, Damsky's other post—his April 1 response to the professor—was no serious expression of a real intent to harm. The post referenced Noel Ignatiev again and asked rhetorically what he wanted when he wrote about abolishing the white race. Notably, the professor to whom he directed his post did not interpret it as a threat to harm her or her family. In fact, she responded with a witty reference to "whataboutism" and a link to an encyclopedia article. The University makes much of the fact that when asked if he was saying he would murder the professor and her family, Damsky did not say no. True, but neither did he say yes. He answered the question with a question. The overall context of Damsky's exchange with the professor reveals a perhaps course and crude debate on tolerable academic thought, but it does not express a serious intent to commit violence. That his posts "came on the heels of his two seminar papers" does not undermine that conclusion either. Even if the papers provide pertinent context to the X posts, further context is the law school's recognition months earlier that those papers were protected under the First Amendment. And those papers—pure speech—are different than the kind of violent context that sometimes renders an expression a true threat. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists (9th Cir. 2002) (wanted-style posters "acquired currency as a death threat" after three murders); United States v. Hart (8th Cir. 2000) (use of Ryder truck to protest abortion clinic could be viewed as "true threat" because it was the same style truck used in the then-recent and widely reported Oklahoma City bombing). To be sure, those reading Damsky's words may be justifiably fearful. Some may assume that anyone uttering such commentary is more likely to act violently than someone who does not. But that is not the test. The test is whether Damsky's posts constituted a "serious expression" that he meant "to commit an act of unlawful violence." Many would not love the idea of attending school with someone who burns crosses, cf. Virginia v. Black (2003), marches in Nazi parades, cf. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie (1977), or engages in countless other forms of offensive expression. But "the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Snyder v. Phelps (2010) (quoting Texas v. Johnson (1989)). The court also rejected the argument that Dansky could be disciplined on the grounds that his speech was "materially disruptive." It noted that it was unclear whether the "more deferential First Amendment standard" from Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist. (1969) that allows restricting student speech to prevent disruption was applicable to university student speech (as opposed to the K-12 speech in Tinker). But, even if that standard was applicable, the court concluded that Dansky's speech wasn't reasonably perceived as threatening, and thus wasn't sufficiently "disruptive" on that score. It then reasoned: Without a showing that Damsky's speech constituted a school-directed threat, the University is left without much of a Tinker argument. In fact, it has not articulated any other basis under Tinker to discipline Damsky for his speech. The entirety of its disruption argument is tied to the purported threat. The University does not argue, for example, that the offensive nature of Damsky's speech or students' strong disagreement with it—even when manifested as an outpouring of students' concern, including crying or anxiety—constitutes the type of "disruption" that would justify restricting the speech. {The Second Circuit's reasoning in Leroy v. Livingston Manor Central School District (4th Cir. 2025) is persuasive here. There, a high school student's social media post generated community outcry and demonstrations. The court noted, however, Tinker's relevant question is "disorder or disturbance on the part of the" speaker. And tying a speaker's free speech rights "to the reaction that speech garners from upset or angry listeners" cannot be squared with Tinker or First Amendment principles. I agree. See also, e.g., Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. (Alito, J., concurring) (noting speech on sensitive subjects like politics and social relations may "disrupt instruction and good order on school premises," but "it is a 'bedrock principle' that speech may not be suppressed simply because it expresses ideas that are 'offensive or disagreeable'").} Nor does [the University] argue any interest in restricting Damsky's speech to "inculcate the habits and manners of civility." Cf. Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting district court and upholding high school principal's policy prohibiting display of Confederate flag on school property). Instead, its Tinker argument turns exclusively on its insistence that Damsky's X posts were school-directed threats. At bottom, schools "have a heavy burden to justify intervention" as "to political … speech that occurs outside school or a school program or activity." The University has not met that heavy burden here. The post Court Orders Reinstatement of Law Student Expelled for Writing "[W]hatever Harvard Professor Noel Ignatiev Meant by … '[A]bolish the White Race by Any Means Necessary' … Must Be Done with Jews" appeared first on Reason.com.

"The [eventually released personnel] records contain no negative performance reviews, but they do contain three anonymous complaints. Those complaints accused Grossenbach of 'creat[ing] a hostile environment for transgender and LGBTQ students' in connection with his SaveCFSD activities [allegedly referring solely to Grossenbach's outside-class political activity -EV], among other things."

From Vaughn v. Harrison County, decided Friday by Judge Taylor McNeel (S.D. Miss.): Yesterday, Rev. John Vaughn filed this lawsuit seeking to have fifty people attend a worship service in a barn on his private property. Vaughn is proceeding pro se. He has scheduled the worship service for some time tomorrow, but he acknowledges that Harrison County has told him he cannot have the fifty people in the barn because Harrison County believes that a gathering at the property "would constitute a very serious life safety situation." Vaughn has filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order asking this Court to order Harrison County to allow the fifty people into the barn. But he does not want Harrison County to have notice of this motion or to have the opportunity to respond. Instead, he wants this Court to enter an ex parte Order without giving Harrison County the chance to explain their position. But this is a litigation strategy created by Vaughn's own making. Instead, Harrison County needs to be served with process, given time to respond, and then an evidentiary hearing can be set. Vaughn's motion is denied for a number of reasons. First, the primary purpose of a temporary restraining order is to maintain the status quo. But Vaughn is seeking to change it—not maintain it. Harrison County told him about seven months ago to not have fifty people in this barn. Vaughn could have challenged that action then. Second, Vaughn does not establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Vaughn does not really present evidence or on-point case law to support his assertions. Third, Vaughn does not show a substantial threat of irreparable injury. Vaughn recognizes that the congregation's primary church building is available for the worship service. Fourth, the harm that will result if the temporary restraining order is granted potentially outweighs Vaughn's injury. If the Court were to grant the temporary restraining order, these people could be injured while congregating at Vaughn's barn. And fifth, granting the temporary restraining order could disserve the public interest because it may expose fifty people to potentially dangerous and unsafe conditions. It is true that some of his allegations—even if conclusory—are concerning. But even still, Harrison County has stated that it believes allowing fifty people inside of this barn will present a "very serious life safety situation." Vaughn has really only presented conclusory statements in response. And he provides no concrete evidence in support. No sworn affidavit. No photographs. A court turns activist if it were to force a county to allow a gathering that the county believes is dangerous—without allowing the county the opportunity to first respond and explain. Accordingly, the Court denies the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and takes the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction under advisement. For more details, read the whole opinion; here's an excerpt discussing the factual allegations: [O]n April 30, 2025, Harrison County issued a cease-and-desist order "regarding remodeling work on Plaintiff's barn." {Vaughn does not provide the Court with any information, through photo evidence or otherwise, of the state of his barn and the remodeling work which led to the cease-and-desist order.} The order was allegedly related to zoning and construction requirements. But the directive at issue, which Vaughn refers to as "Item #8," requires Vaughn to "[c]ease operating a church and accessory structures or apply for conditional use to do so." {Vaughn does not provide any information or context as to why the cease-and-desist order was issued, nor does he provide the entirety of the order. The only portion of the cease-and-desist order that Vaughn submitted to the Court was a seemingly partial list of required actions.} Vaughn assures the Court of his "complete cooperation" with "Item #8's prohibition." Vaughn says that, since April 30, 2025, he has refrained from hosting Bible studies or worship services, conducting monthly prayer meetings, and "exercis[ing] religious practice on his own land." And he claims that he did not "violate, or resist any legitimate zoning requirement related to construction or building safety," despite his argument that "Item #8 is not about construction[,] … fire safety[,] … [or] building permits." But this changed on November 15, 2025 when he "announced during a worship service at his church that he intended to hold a Thanksgiving prayer gathering and fellowship meal on Saturday, November 22, 2025, at the property." [Fifty people are expected to attend. Vaughn claims that "[s]omeone recorded [his] announcement and provided it to Harrison County officials." … Vaughn claims violations of RLUIPA, Mississippi Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and several First Amendment theories. But he provides only conclusory statements that he "has an extraordinarily strong likelihood of success" on his claims. Vaughn provides no real evidence or specific case law to support his claims. Rather, he provides only general case law and legal theories. But even if he provided more evidence to support his claims, a person does not have a constitutional or statutory right to host fifty people in a structure that "constitute[s] a very serious life safety situation," even if the reason for hosting is for a worship service. On the other hand, a local government cannot claim a structure "constitute[s] a very serious life safety situation"—when it does not—just to prevent people from worshiping. And obviously the First Amendment and RLUIPA trump any local ordinance, so Harrison County must be mindful that their actions do not violate federal law. But this is why Harrison County needs to respond. An evidentiary hearing is required to resolve this dispute. And the "static deficiency in the quantum of evidence" is far from the only problem with Vaughn's request. Samuel L. Bray, The Purpose of a Preliminary Injunction, 78 Vand. L. Rev. 809, 822 (2025). The Court is also faced with the issue of time, for "the district judge cannot be said to have the advantage of living with the case and getting to know its factual nuances." Id. (quotations omitted). So the Court is being asked to appraise the merits when the information needed to do that is unavailable. Id. at n.87 (citing John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 33, 41 (2007). And the "problem for the judge asked to grant a preliminary injunction7 is that he is being asked to rule in a hurry, on the basis of incomplete information. The risk of error is high." Id. (quoting Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.4, at 522 (3d ed. 1986)). Since this motion was filed, the Court has handled four sentencings and two guilty pleas. This is in addition to the time spent out of the courtroom itself that still requires special attention given to other cases in the management of the hundreds of cases on the civil and criminal dockets…. The post No Emergency Order Allowing Worship Service in Possibly Unsafe Barn appeared first on Reason.com.

From the Justice Department's press release Wednesday: Natalie Greene, 26, of Ocean City was charged with one count of conspiracy to convey false statements and hoaxes and one count of making false statements to federal law enforcement. On November 19, 2025, Greene made her initial appearance in federal court before U.S. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Pascal. Greene was released on a $200,000 unsecured bond and additional conditions, as set by the Court. According to statements made in court and documents filed in the case: Late at night on July 23, 2025, Greene's co-conspirator called 911 and reported that she and Greene had been attacked by three men when they were out walking on a trail at a nature preserve in Egg Harbor Township. According to the co-conspirator, during the attack, the men had called Greene by name and had specifically referenced her employment with Federal Official 1, an official whose identity is known to the Government. When law enforcement officers located Greene, she was lying in a wooded area just off the trail, with her hands and feet bound together with black zip ties. Greene's shirt was pulled over her head and was also tied with a black zip tie. Greene had numerous lacerations on her face, neck, upper chest, and shoulder. The words "TRUMP WHORE" were written on her stomach and the words "[Federal Official 1] IS RACIST" were written on her back. [Press accounts state that the words written were that Van Drew is racist. -EV] Greene was crying and yelling that one of her alleged attackers had a gun. Greene told police officers that one or more of the men who allegedly attacked her said he had a gun and threatened to shoot her. Greene also said that one or more of the attackers had held her down and restrained her movement, cutting her and writing on her body. A couple days later, after receiving medical treatment for her lacerations, Greene again described her alleged attack to law enforcement officers, including an agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The investigation revealed that Greene had not, in fact, been attacked by three men at gunpoint on July 23. Instead, Greene had paid a body modification/scarification artist to deliberately cut the lacerations on her face, neck, upper chest, and shoulder, based on a pattern that she had provided beforehand. Law enforcement officers recovered black zip ties in Greene's car on the night of the alleged attack, similar to the zip ties that had been used to bind Greene's arms and feet. Also, the investigation revealed that, two days prior to the alleged attack, the cellphone of Greene's co-conspirator had been used to search "zip ties near me." You can find more details in the Criminal Complaint, as well as in many news accounts (including this one from Fox News [Greg Norman]). An excerpt: Individual 1 [the body modification artist] provided the investigators with photos of Greene that he took after the scarification had been completed on the afternoon of July 23, 2025, in his studio in Pennsylvania. The photos from Individual 1 reflect that the cuts made to Greene's skin by Individual 1, at Greene's request, follow the exact same pattern as the lacerations that were observed on Greene when she was found lying on the ground in the Egg Harbor Township Nature Reserve, as well as the lacerations that were observed on Greene and photographed at Hospital-1 later the same evening. The photo comparison is as follows: The post Republican Congressman's Staffer Prosecuted for Alleging Faking Attack on Herself, Including "Trump Whore" Written on Her Stomach appeared first on Reason.com.

Could today's summary reversal be a sign of things to come?

The firm, has "more than 1,600 attorneys in over 80 offices nationwide."

"The Defendants intentionally or recklessly invited public critique and scrutiny over Plaintiff's title as an exorcist by repeatedly asserting that the Plaintiff is not an exorcist."

11/24/2001: Salim Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan. The Supreme Court would decide his case in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006). The Roberts Court (2006) The post Today in Supreme Court History: November 24, 2001 appeared first on Reason.com.

What’s on your mind?

11/23/1804: President Franklin Pierce's birthday. He would appoint Justice John Archibald Campbell to the Supreme Court. President Pierce appointed Justice Campbell to the Supreme Court The post Today in Supreme Court History: November 23, 1804 appeared first on Reason.com.