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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 6d

😍 On peut faire voter le conseil à la majorité qualifiée sur les questions fiscales !!!
Il suffit d'arguer que le dumping fiscal induit des "distorsions de concurrence sur le marché intérieur". Ce qui est complètement justifié selon Eva Joly.
Art. 116 du TFUE. eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-conten...

EUR-Lex - 12008E116 - FR

eur-lex.europa.eu

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

➡️ Check out my alternative proposal, which addresses all these limitations: github.com/bixiou/globa...

And recall that, despite the limitations, I strongly vote YES to Wolfram et al. proposal.

Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

3. Inefficiency in the differentiated price scenario: Why not a uniform price with emission rights welfare-equivalent to the differentiated prices?
4. Insufficient information: I hope the authors will soon publish code, data, & results by country: would be useful for policymakers to make a decision.

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

These would remain voluntary and implicitly limited to the bare minimum so that a LIC country would not feel worse off by joining the coalition. Why not rebating the revenue from carbon pricing on an equal per capita basis, or a similar arrangement?

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

2. Limited transfers: While LIC/LMICs like India (rightly) demand large transfers from HICs to finance decarbonization, SDGs, and address climate injustice, the proposal doesn't include any quantified transfer.

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

Why not covering all fossil fuel emissions? Or complementing the policy with other sectoral regulations, such as a ban on the production/import of combustion-engine cars by 2035 and a tax on kerosene?

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

- Can we do better? Yes. Here are some limitations of this proposal:
1. Limited ambition: It reduces global carbon emissions by a mere 2%. The price is too low (it should be rising over time rather than fixed), and the sectoral coverage restrictive.

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

- Would the population support this? Yes, there is majority support in all countries for much more ambitious policies (covering all sectors, with a higher price and North-South transfers). Cf. bsky.app/profile/adri...

Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · Jun 6

🚨New Paper🚨

Would people support global redistributive policies?
Surveys in 20 countries (🇪🇺, 🇺🇸, 🇨🇳, 🇮🇳, 🇯🇵, 🇧🇷, 🇿🇦...) show strong majority support for:
✅global climate policies
✅a global wealth tax
✅a global democratic assembly
✅more foreign aid

www.nature.com/articles/s41...
1/N

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

My two cents:
- Should any country join this climate coalition?
YES! If the question is a binary Yes/No, I'd vote Yes without hesitation: it reduces carbon emissions, raise govt revenue, with limited impact on output.

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

The authors foresee a 10% emission reduction in the covered sectors (don't model at which date), significant revenue collection (e.g. 3% of GDP in China), limited impacts on prices (from steel +5% to cement +20%, much less on final products) and on sectoral output (-1%).

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

There are two scenarios: a uniform $50/t price, and the "IMF" graduated price: $25 for LICs & LMICs, $50 for UMICs, $75 for HICs.

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

There would be a CBAM at the border of the coalition but no CBAM within (the EU would renounce to its CBAM). The coalition modeled (CN, EU, IA, UK, BR, ID, AFR) covers ~70% of global emissions from these sectors. (Note that China alone is ~55% of global emissions in these sectors.)

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

Wolfram et al. propose that a climate coalition establish a price on carbon emissions from steel, aluminum, cement, and fertilizers (20% of all CO2 emissions). There would be no mutualization of revenue (only discretionary transfers).

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 21d

🔴 Much expected report commissioned by hashtag#COP30 presidency (ping Ana Toni) to Catherine Wolfram and her team, who brought some leading environmental economists on board. This report will serve as the basis of negotiations on international carbon pricing. A critical summary:

Catherine Wolfram @cwolfram.bsky.social · 21d

I'm delighted to announce the release of the Flagship Report of the Global Climate Policy Project at Harvard and MIT Working Group on Climate Coalitions on "Building a Climate Coalition: Aligning Carbon Pricing, Trade, and Development."

ceepr.link/3VmgC7g

A 🧵 on what we do/find:

ceepr.link

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 28d

"Mercredi, 15h, on arrête tout et on réfléchit."
C'est le synopsis de "l'an 01", film génial de 1972 produit avec Charlie Hebdo: une utopie qui montre comment renverser le système dans la joie.

Une source d'inspiration pour le mouvement "on bloque tout" ?

Torrent: piratebay.party/torrent/9545...

L'An 01 (Coluche - Depardieu) de Jacques Doillon - 1972.avi (download torrent) - TPB

Download L'An 01 (Coluche - Depardieu) de Jacques Doillon - 1972.avi torrent or any other torrent from the Video Movies. Direct download via magnet link.

piratebay.party

Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · 29d

Researcher Pro Tip: When you publish in a Nature *** journal, put a garbage email address, not your professional one.

Since I published in Nature Human Behavior, I am HARASSED by predatory journals and conferences, on average two invitations per day to give a keynote or edit a special issue.

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · Sep 8

Take-up from this literature?
Price differentiation may be justified but it's VERY hard to estimate existing distorsions, so no one dares advising a specific sectoral differentiation (all say "we need more research").
Those pushing for country differentiation justify it with (IMO flawed) reason #4.

Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · Sep 8

Interestingly, in support for the proposals by Parry et al. (IMF, 2021) and @cwolfram.bsky.social, Chateau et al. (2024) find that differentiated carbon prices without Carbon Border Adjustment ($25/50/75 in LIC/MIC/HICs) don't reduce HICs' competitiveness compared to BCA + carbon price only in HICs.

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · Sep 8

Anyway, various papers study the "efficiency-sovereignty" trade-off in climate policies (that if you don't allow transfers, either welfare decrease in LICs, or you differentiated prices and lose efficiency): Bauer et al. (2020), Bekkers & Cariola (2022), Young-Brun et al. (2025)...

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · Sep 8

4. No international transfers
Many authors argue that large international transfers are not possible. I don't know why they say that: surveys say otherwise, and differentiated prices are a hidden, inefficient form of transfers.

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · Sep 8

... for example existing taxes on transport fuels can be understood not as distorsions but as (second-best) instruments to address local externalities or pay for roads.

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · Sep 8

Optimizing carbon price by sectors in the EU, Boeters shows that the optimal differentiation can be huge (so much that EU could reduce its emissions by 27% without reducing welfare)... but warns against a naive interpretation of these results.
Indeed, existing "distorsions" may be justified...

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · Sep 8

...than other sectors, it lowers (domestic hence global) demand for oil, in turn lowering its price and improving its terms-of-trade. Similarly, China has an interest to set a higher carbon price on manufactured goods to increase the value of its exports.

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · Sep 8

...then a higher carbon price on the aviation sector improves welfare.
To understand terms-of-trade effect, take the example of China, which (due to its size) has market power in the oil or manufactured goods markets. As an oil importer, China benefits from a lower oil price. By taxing oil more...

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Adrien Fabre @adrien-fabre.bsky.social · Sep 8

2. Terms-of-trade effects & 3. Other taxes (e.g. on fuels)
Babiker et al. (04) explain theoretically and Boeters (2014) models numerically that existing distorsions can be reduced by differentiating carbon prices across sectors or countries. For example if aviation is (& has to remain) under-taxed..

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