Bjarn Eck
@bjarneck.bsky.social
930 followers 370 following 27 posts
PhD-researcher in Political Science at ULB Brussels | political behaviour, elections, European politics | bjarneck.eu
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Reposted by Bjarn Eck
emilievh.bsky.social
📊 New Dataset Release: Belgian Electoral Panel Survey 2024 🇧🇪

We’re excited to announce the release of a new dataset from a 4-wave panel survey conducted during the 2024 Belgian elections!

📥 Download the dataset now:
www.sodha.be/dataset.xhtm...
www.sodha.be
bjarneck.bsky.social
For @ecprtheloop.bsky.social, I argue that it's time for Europe to finally develop a clear Ukraine strategy — one focused on enabling victory.
ecprtheloop.bsky.social
🧭 #EUEnlargementDilemmas No.25
🕊️ EU enlargement alone won’t bring peace or security to #Ukraine.
🪖 Without matching accession promises with increased #MilitarySupport, writes @bjarneck.bsky.social, Europe risks prolonging the war — and exposing itself to greater danger.
👉 buff.ly/n47afoO
🧭 Military support to Ukraine is more fundamental than enlargement
EU enlargement alone won’t bring peace or security to Ukraine. Without matching accession promises with sustained military aid, writes Bjarn Eck, Europe risks prolonging the war — and exposing itself…
buff.ly
bjarneck.bsky.social
I wrote in an earlier thread (see below) on the implications. Most importantly: there is room for elites to shape opinions if they justify aid clearly. But framing it as a trade-off with the domestic economy – as Scholz has done – risks undermining support. 4/4
bjarneck.bsky.social
These findings have several implications, of which I discuss two here. First, there is still room for European leaders to increase support to Ukraine, as well as to shape public opinion on this topic – the high selection of the midpoint on our scale seems partially rooted in non-attitudes. (8/12)
bjarneck.bsky.social
Support for decreasing aid is driven by national-level economic concerns as well as strong national identities. Personal financial concerns do not play a role, and citizens in countries that contribute relatively more are not more sceptical. 3/4
bjarneck.bsky.social
We find few signs of war fatigue. Many Europeans are satisfied with current aid, although this might partially reflect non-attitudes. Considerable shares even want to increase aid, and only a small minority (~10%) categorically rejects it. 2/4
bjarneck.bsky.social
New publication in the Journal of European Public Policy together with @eliemichel.bsky.social.

We study public opinion toward supporting Ukraine in 6 European countries and ask whether citizens want to increase, sustain, or decrease support. 1/4

Paper (OA): doi.org/10.1080/1350...
bjarneck.bsky.social
More broadly, the winner-loser gap literature might have focused too much on electoral losers. If anything, we find that they actually want *more* democracy to influence policy. It’s rather the electoral winners that we might need to worry about. 6/6
bjarneck.bsky.social
The main implication is that affective polarization might undermine the accountability mechanism between parties and government voters. Obviously, opposition to referendums is not inherently problematic, and more research is needed to unpack this mechanism. 5/6
bjarneck.bsky.social
We indeed find a strong winner-loser gap in referendum support, especially among affectively polarized citizens. Yet, this difference is completely attributed to electoral winners, who become much less supportive if they are affectively polarized. 4/6
bjarneck.bsky.social
Additionally, we theorize that these dynamics are strongest among affectively polarized citizens. Affective polarization should make electoral defeat more painful for losers, whereas it should reinforce the impulse of winners to protect their party in government from outside interference. 3/6
bjarneck.bsky.social
The winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy is well-known, but little research has studied its consequences. We argue that losers should be more supportive of electoral alternatives such as referendums, while winners desire their party to govern without constraint. 2/6
bjarneck.bsky.social
New paper out in @bjpols.bsky.social, co-authored with Emilien Paulis.

Using survey data from 13 European democracies, we show that electoral winners are less supportive of referendums, especially when they are affectively polarized. 1/6

Paper: doi.org/10.1017/S0007123425000365
Reposted by Bjarn Eck
glandsbergis.bsky.social
I agree with @kajakallas that the EU should become a beacon of freedom. So when do we start?
Here I offer six ways to actually light the beacon and step into the role history has chosen for us. Our response to the current uncertainty can be firm and long term. A thread.🧵1/17
bjarneck.bsky.social
While the former seems not a concern for European leaders, the latter should be. In fact, the current aid strategy to Ukraine (letting it fight the war, but not win the war) might undermine support for continued (and increasing) aid on the long run if setbacks on the battlefield surge. (12/12)
bjarneck.bsky.social
Second, we know from American literature that the public is capable of incurring battlefield casualties, provided two conditions: the public believes the war has a just cause and it still has enough potential to reach its goals. (11/12)
press.princeton.edu/books/paperb...
Paying the Human Costs of War
press.princeton.edu
bjarneck.bsky.social
And that is just a financial calculation. The political and security costs of a Russian win in Ukraine, for the EU and for European democracies, remains unforeseen. (10/12)
bjarneck.bsky.social
These findings have several implications, of which I discuss two here. First, there is still room for European leaders to increase support to Ukraine, as well as to shape public opinion on this topic – the high selection of the midpoint on our scale seems partially rooted in non-attitudes. (8/12)
bjarneck.bsky.social
Furthermore, people who identify along national lines are also clearly more sceptical of sending aid to Ukraine. It shows that attitudes to Ukraine are not solely an economic consideration, in line with findings in the European integration literature. (7/12)
bjarneck.bsky.social
With regards to economic concerns, we find that people with pessimistic views of the domestic economy are clearly less supportive of aiding Ukraine. At a personal level, we find no evidence for this: concerns about personal incomes do not drive attitudes toward supporting Ukraine. (6/12)
bjarneck.bsky.social
We propose two factors that should shape these attitudes: economic concerns (national and individual) and national (vs. European) identities. (5/12)
bjarneck.bsky.social
We find few signs of war fatigue: many are satisfied with current aid, and a slight majority even supports an increase. Around 10% categorically opposes any aid in each country. Importantly, opinions seem unrelated to existing aid: larger contributors (NL, PL) do not witness more scepticism. (4/12)
bjarneck.bsky.social
We asked respondents if they want to increase, decrease, or maintain their country's current support level (0-10 scale). We argue that this better reflects political debates on Ukraine, which have focused on adjusting aid levels (increasing/decreasing) rather than ceasing support entirely. (3/12)
bjarneck.bsky.social
Fielded more than two years after the start of the war (just after the 2024 EP elections), we believe that this should provide a clear picture of public opinion on supporting Ukraine, uncontaminated by initial rally effects. (2/12)
bjarneck.bsky.social
Just uploaded this new preprint co-authored with @eliemichel.bsky.social, and sharing here already because of the public relevance of the data.

We study public opinion toward supporting Ukraine in six European countries: BE, DE, HU, IT, NL, and PL. (1/12)
doi.org/10.31219/osf...