Dr Fabrício Campos
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camposvet.bsky.social
Dr Fabrício Campos
@camposvet.bsky.social
With a degree in Veterinary Medicine from UFPel, a Master's in Microbiology at PPGMAA/UFRGS, and a Ph.D. in Veterinary Science at UFRGS, I am a professor at PPGBIOTEC/UFT and serve as Coordinator at PPGMAA/UFRGS. For more information: www.labinftec.com.br
#H5N1 #OneHealth #Zoonoses #InfluenzaA

Andrieux et al. 2025: 10.1101/2025.11.28.689408
Nayduch et al. 2025: 10.1038/s41598-025-29856-9
Rivetti Jr. et al. 2025: 10.1016/j.virol.2025.110751
Turnbull et al. 2025: 10.1126/science.adq4691
8/8
December 1, 2025 at 1:57 PM
These findings stress the urgency of integrated insect surveillance and constant molecular monitoring. They also show that bird-adapted H5N1 does not undergo thermal inhibition, decisive warning. What more must H5N1 do for us to act? 7/8
December 1, 2025 at 1:57 PM
A key finding: H5N1 can evade fever, a primitive mammalian defense. Turnbull et al. showed that viruses carrying the avian PB1 subunit replicate efficiently at elevated temperatures, both in vitro and in febrile mice. 6/8
December 1, 2025 at 1:57 PM
In Brazil, Rivetti Jr. et al. identified multiple independent H5N1 introductions and intra-epizootic reassortment with local lineages. Some samples were linked to variants from Argentina and North America, indicating distinct routes of entry. 5/8
December 1, 2025 at 1:57 PM
In the U.S., Nayduch et al. detected H5N1 RNA in houseflies from California dairy farms. Viral genomes were nearly identical to those found in infected milk, suggesting flies may act as mechanical vectors. 4/8
December 1, 2025 at 1:57 PM
Although the tick’s vectorial role remains unclear, this is the first successful isolation of H5N1 from larvae, suggesting these arthropods may act as reservoirs in seabird colonies. 3/8
December 1, 2025 at 1:57 PM
In France, Andrieux et al. isolated H5N1 from tick larvae parasitizing sick gulls with systemic lesions and strong neural and epithelial tropism. Sequences from ticks showed up to 99.9% identity with viruses from the birds. 2/8
December 1, 2025 at 1:57 PM
Across studies, H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b keeps accumulating avian adaptations, infecting more mammals, persisting environmentally, and expanding into sub-Antarctic regions. This calls for updated detection, monitoring, and response strategies grounded in a true One Health approach. 7/9
November 27, 2025 at 9:43 AM
In the sub-Antarctic region, Mollet et al. show multiple incursions of genotype B3.2 in birds and marine mammals. PB2 mutants replicated efficiently in human cells while HA/NA kept avian tropism. These strains remain antiviral-sensitive with good cross-reactivity to pre-pandemic vaccines. 6/9
November 27, 2025 at 9:43 AM
Martí-Garcia et al. analyzed 115 dead birds in the UK with lesions including pancreatic necrosis, myocarditis, respiratory damage, and encephalitis. The key finding was high endothelial tropism, enabling systemic spread and neuroinvasion, similar to what occurs in marine mammals and cats. 5/9
November 27, 2025 at 9:43 AM
Nelli shows that pigs, sheep, goats, and alpacas have abundant α2,6 sialic acid receptors in the mammary gland, the same pattern that enabled infection and spread in cattle. This suggests vulnerability in other livestock and risks linked to consuming raw milk from these species. 4/9
November 27, 2025 at 9:43 AM
On 14 dairy farms in California, Campbell et al. detected H5N1 in air, water, cow respiratory aerosols, and mammary gland quarters, revealing a clinically subtle, persistent, and environmentally widespread infection. This supports multiple transmission routes in the dairy sector. 3/9
November 27, 2025 at 9:43 AM
Adegbaju et al. identified 40 structural determinants distinguishing the nine NA subtypes. In host comparisons, NA from chicken viruses showed positive selection—advantageous mutations adapting the virus to poultry systems, consistent with higher detection in commercial flocks. 2/9
November 27, 2025 at 9:43 AM
The story is still unfolding. We do not know where this panzootic ends, but ignoring its repeated warnings is not merely a technical failure. It is an ecological, economic, and public health risk with potentially severe consequences. 9/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
Not because the industry initiated it, but because reality has imposed limits that industrial-scale biosafety cannot sustain. After months following this panzootic, the question is unavoidable: are we learning from past mistakes, or repeating them at a larger scale? 8/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
With so little virus needed to start an outbreak, any operational failure can be costly. Meanwhile, previously taboo topics, such as vaccinating laying hens, turkeys, and long-cycle flocks, are finally entering global discussion. 7/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
As noted by Miriã Criado (Auburn University), the virus is highly adapted: the infectious dose is extremely low, and many mammals express both α2,3 and α2,6 sialic acid receptors, making the bird–mammal barrier far more fragile than assumed. 6/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
Scale has become the enemy of biosafety. In the U.S., transmission among cattle went unnoticed until the virus literally overflowed through raw milk. Few imagined H5N1 could adapt to ruminants, now Japan repeats the same mistakes. The issue is systemic, not geographic. 5/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
Since the emergence of the Gs/GD lineage in 1996, the same script has repeated across countries: operational failures, delayed detection, underestimated risks, massive flocks, lack of surveillance, resistance to vaccination, and overreliance on inadequate protocols. 4/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM
Even so, the case reinforces a recurring pattern: the virus exploits any breach, from barns housing one million birds to backyard flocks with inherently limited biosafety. 3/10
November 23, 2025 at 7:40 PM