Stephen Herzog
@herzogsm.bsky.social
Professor of the Practice, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies | Associate, Harvard Project on Managing the Atom | nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, disarmament, technology
Reposted by Stephen Herzog
Special thanks to our excellent co-chairs @herzogsm.bsky.social, @professorrdg.bsky.social, and Hassan Elbahtimy!
Check out the whole special issue here:
www.tandfonline.com/toc/rnpr20/3...
Check out the whole special issue here:
www.tandfonline.com/toc/rnpr20/3...
The Nonproliferation Review
Beyond Nuclear Deterrence - Special Issue 1. Volume 31, Issue 4-6 of The Nonproliferation Review
www.tandfonline.com
December 3, 2025 at 1:52 PM
Special thanks to our excellent co-chairs @herzogsm.bsky.social, @professorrdg.bsky.social, and Hassan Elbahtimy!
Check out the whole special issue here:
www.tandfonline.com/toc/rnpr20/3...
Check out the whole special issue here:
www.tandfonline.com/toc/rnpr20/3...
5/5
If you’re interested in how AI might affect nuclear (non)proliferation, latency, and verification, we’d love if you would give it a read!
If you’re interested in how AI might affect nuclear (non)proliferation, latency, and verification, we’d love if you would give it a read!
December 1, 2025 at 3:00 PM
5/5
If you’re interested in how AI might affect nuclear (non)proliferation, latency, and verification, we’d love if you would give it a read!
If you’re interested in how AI might affect nuclear (non)proliferation, latency, and verification, we’d love if you would give it a read!
4/5
Key takeaway 3:
We simulate 6 hypothetical scenarios: from AI with limited proliferation relevance to AI acting as a full nuclear weapon design team. Each shows that early investment in advanced detection methods is essential to stay ahead of the proliferation curve.
Key takeaway 3:
We simulate 6 hypothetical scenarios: from AI with limited proliferation relevance to AI acting as a full nuclear weapon design team. Each shows that early investment in advanced detection methods is essential to stay ahead of the proliferation curve.
December 1, 2025 at 3:00 PM
4/5
Key takeaway 3:
We simulate 6 hypothetical scenarios: from AI with limited proliferation relevance to AI acting as a full nuclear weapon design team. Each shows that early investment in advanced detection methods is essential to stay ahead of the proliferation curve.
Key takeaway 3:
We simulate 6 hypothetical scenarios: from AI with limited proliferation relevance to AI acting as a full nuclear weapon design team. Each shows that early investment in advanced detection methods is essential to stay ahead of the proliferation curve.
3/5
Key takeaway 2:
Breakout is a race. Monitoring and verification remain ahead of proliferation-enabling emerging tech––for now. But accelerating commercial developments could shift that balance.
Key takeaway 2:
Breakout is a race. Monitoring and verification remain ahead of proliferation-enabling emerging tech––for now. But accelerating commercial developments could shift that balance.
December 1, 2025 at 3:00 PM
3/5
Key takeaway 2:
Breakout is a race. Monitoring and verification remain ahead of proliferation-enabling emerging tech––for now. But accelerating commercial developments could shift that balance.
Key takeaway 2:
Breakout is a race. Monitoring and verification remain ahead of proliferation-enabling emerging tech––for now. But accelerating commercial developments could shift that balance.
2/5
Key takeaway 1:
You don't just get the bomb by "messing with ChatGPT." States still need relevant materials and production facilities. But AI could compress how latent proliferators think about the time it would take to build a nuclear weapon.
Key takeaway 1:
You don't just get the bomb by "messing with ChatGPT." States still need relevant materials and production facilities. But AI could compress how latent proliferators think about the time it would take to build a nuclear weapon.
December 1, 2025 at 3:00 PM
2/5
Key takeaway 1:
You don't just get the bomb by "messing with ChatGPT." States still need relevant materials and production facilities. But AI could compress how latent proliferators think about the time it would take to build a nuclear weapon.
Key takeaway 1:
You don't just get the bomb by "messing with ChatGPT." States still need relevant materials and production facilities. But AI could compress how latent proliferators think about the time it would take to build a nuclear weapon.
2/2
My chapter is on "Why States Join Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Treaties." I summarize different camps in the literature and discuss future directions for research.
Link to that chapter here: link.springer.com/chapter/10.1...
My chapter is on "Why States Join Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Treaties." I summarize different camps in the literature and discuss future directions for research.
Link to that chapter here: link.springer.com/chapter/10.1...
Why States Join Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Treaties
Why do states join multilateral nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament treaties that limit their military capabilities? If the world is to eventually move beyond nuclear deterrence, t...
link.springer.com
November 21, 2025 at 7:09 PM
2/2
My chapter is on "Why States Join Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Treaties." I summarize different camps in the literature and discuss future directions for research.
Link to that chapter here: link.springer.com/chapter/10.1...
My chapter is on "Why States Join Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Treaties." I summarize different camps in the literature and discuss future directions for research.
Link to that chapter here: link.springer.com/chapter/10.1...
Reposted by Stephen Herzog
@mvranka.bsky.social for @ejisbisa.bsky.social.
Their latest paper uses survey experiments on US & UK policy decision-makers to show that public backing for or opposition to nuclear use shapes perceptions of third party deterrent threats and affects elites’ support for nuclear use.
ssp.news/ls111125
Their latest paper uses survey experiments on US & UK policy decision-makers to show that public backing for or opposition to nuclear use shapes perceptions of third party deterrent threats and affects elites’ support for nuclear use.
ssp.news/ls111125
Atomic responsiveness: How public opinion shapes elite beliefs and preferences on nuclear weapon use | European Journal of International Security | Cambridge Core
Atomic responsiveness: How public opinion shapes elite beliefs and preferences on nuclear weapon use
ssp.news
November 20, 2025 at 6:47 PM
@mvranka.bsky.social for @ejisbisa.bsky.social.
Their latest paper uses survey experiments on US & UK policy decision-makers to show that public backing for or opposition to nuclear use shapes perceptions of third party deterrent threats and affects elites’ support for nuclear use.
ssp.news/ls111125
Their latest paper uses survey experiments on US & UK policy decision-makers to show that public backing for or opposition to nuclear use shapes perceptions of third party deterrent threats and affects elites’ support for nuclear use.
ssp.news/ls111125
4/4
If you do experimental or observational research on the public and nuclear weapons, this is a key reference for explaining why public opinion matters for foreign policy and nuclear choices.
Check it out! www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
If you do experimental or observational research on the public and nuclear weapons, this is a key reference for explaining why public opinion matters for foreign policy and nuclear choices.
Check it out! www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
Atomic responsiveness: How public opinion shapes elite beliefs and preferences on nuclear weapon use | European Journal of International Security | Cambridge Core
Atomic responsiveness: How public opinion shapes elite beliefs and preferences on nuclear weapon use
www.cambridge.org
November 12, 2025 at 2:45 PM
4/4
If you do experimental or observational research on the public and nuclear weapons, this is a key reference for explaining why public opinion matters for foreign policy and nuclear choices.
Check it out! www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
If you do experimental or observational research on the public and nuclear weapons, this is a key reference for explaining why public opinion matters for foreign policy and nuclear choices.
Check it out! www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
3/4
So @smetanamichal.bsky.social, @laurensukin.bsky.social, @mvranka.bsky.social, and I fielded an elite policymaker survey in the UK and the US with embedded public opinion treatments.
So @smetanamichal.bsky.social, @laurensukin.bsky.social, @mvranka.bsky.social, and I fielded an elite policymaker survey in the UK and the US with embedded public opinion treatments.
November 12, 2025 at 2:45 PM
3/4
So @smetanamichal.bsky.social, @laurensukin.bsky.social, @mvranka.bsky.social, and I fielded an elite policymaker survey in the UK and the US with embedded public opinion treatments.
So @smetanamichal.bsky.social, @laurensukin.bsky.social, @mvranka.bsky.social, and I fielded an elite policymaker survey in the UK and the US with embedded public opinion treatments.
2/4
Scholars and analysts working on public opinion and the nuclear taboo are inevitably asked: “Why does this matter for policy?” We took that skepticism seriously.
Scholars and analysts working on public opinion and the nuclear taboo are inevitably asked: “Why does this matter for policy?” We took that skepticism seriously.
November 12, 2025 at 2:45 PM
2/4
Scholars and analysts working on public opinion and the nuclear taboo are inevitably asked: “Why does this matter for policy?” We took that skepticism seriously.
Scholars and analysts working on public opinion and the nuclear taboo are inevitably asked: “Why does this matter for policy?” We took that skepticism seriously.