3/ "Reunification." For an article talking about ignoring Chinese intent, it sure knows how to regurgitate Chinese propoganda - Taiwan was never part of the PRC, any person with sensitivity in the field would know to avoid using thi

2/ c) From what we know, both the USG and Taiwan are pretty aware of what China's most likely playbooks are - that's why the entire focus for the US effort to strengthen Taiwan has shifted to resilience and the ability for military and civilian authorities to work together.

2/ b) Some operational TTX/simulation, or even mission level ones assume Chinese strikes because that was part of the many contingencies - and those are the ones on the harder end, so the intent was to test those. This has nothing to do with how "likely" this scenario may be.

2/ The big takeaway seemed to be that China will use coercive tactics to induce a Taiwan surrender without striking US bases first - this is a strawman argument:

a) Exploring Chinese intent really benefit little from a non-descript wargame setting without knowing the contextual constraints.

I miss Starfleet Academy Command School

3/ “The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting” Kundera reminded us how power can suppress memory to erase identity and control narratives - and today we are faced yet another authoritarian power wearing the red stars doing the same.

2/ The SVG fighting against Imperial Japanese forces was painted in ROCAF livery, an inconvenient fact that Xi is trying to erase by repainting the SVG I-15 exhibit within the Beijing Aviation museum from ROC markings to communist stars.

nd the funny part is on paper you SHOULD have enough pilots withe currency to rotate; but calcified organization and rules prevented that. WX/MX guys are waking up at 4am and going to bed past midnight - imagine having trouble convincing ppl to take the job.

They’re on “autopilot” - pun intended; Jack of all trades and master of none.

The fundamental problems is still a startling lack of operational and strategic planning capacity - and most importantly - no higher level strategic guidance on what the air force’s role is supposed to be for decades.

Situation is much much worse for support personnel whether you’re maintenance or weather; low morale long hours is a given - and since China start crossing the mid-line, an instructor told me his USAF colleague jokingly called him “7-11” - since they’re on standby alert 24/7 and 365 days a year.

They were also the most visible branch and with a pretty good tally when pinned against PLAAF. But under the hood they suffer similar issues - even for pilots on golden path politics and patronage still dominates your career, and you simultaneously have to fly and do an ungodly amount of paper work.

It’s a bit complicated - traditionally this was CKS’ Trump card and his relationship building tool especially with the US, a lot of the politics were run through Madame Chiang. That’s why it’s also the last branch to have any visible presence of Taiwanese vs mainlanders(外省, those who came post-49)

But that’s why it’s important to empower them through transparency and support from civilian government and the public - I’m thinking of the “iron majors” in the USAF post- Vietnam; top-down management clearly didn’t work and transparency was impossible under dictator era - time for something new?

For sure - the issue of squeezing the irreplaceable mid-career officers too hard, who are doing the bulk of the work has always been a concern - that’s why they’re either getting cancer or retire in droves, or work 12 hour shifts for staff jobs and haven’t seen their family in a week.