Max Warner
@maxwarner.bsky.social
580 followers 57 following 110 posts
Economist at the IFS working on health and social care, public spending and public sector productivity https://ifs.org.uk/people/max-warner
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Reposted by Max Warner
benzaranko.bsky.social
On the question of one vs two OBR forecasts per year...

The IMF said first best option would be to operate with more ‘headroom’. They did not call for one forecast. They suggested that the rules could be assessed only once per year, but explicitly said that two forecasts per year is best practice!
Reposted by Max Warner
theifs.bsky.social
NEW PODCAST: The end of the peace dividend? UK defence in a changing world

🎧 @helenmiller.bsky.social, @maxwarner.bsky.social & @rusi.bsky.social's Matthew Savill chat all things defence spending: what it covers, how it's changed and what reaching 3.5% of GDP would mean: ifs.org.uk/articles/end...
maxwarner.bsky.social
One of my favourite charts from our new report on defence spending:

For decades, the 'peace dividend' of falling defence spending as a share of GDP has allowed more spending on things like health without such a big rise in the size of the state. That is no longer the case
theifs.bsky.social
The UK last spent 3.5% of GDP on defence in 1987–88, when health spending was 4.0% of GDP. By 2035, health spending could reach 9.2% of GDP.

Funding concurrent increases in health and defence spending on this scale would pose a considerable fiscal challenge.

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Chart shows scenarios for defence and health spending as a share of GDP. Title states: "Meeting NATO defence spending commitment would reverse the ‘peace dividend’ of falling defence spending as a share of GDP over time."
Reposted by Max Warner
beeboileau.bsky.social
In new @theifs.bsky.social work, we examine the fiscal challenge of the UK's commitment to higher defence spending. If met, for the first time in a long time health and defence spending would likely rise simultaneously (as a % of GDP). This would change the shape and/or size of the state.
Reposted by Max Warner
benzaranko.bsky.social
Some great charts in this report. This one is my favourite. The UK has signed up the new NATO commitment to spend 3.5% of GDP on defence. The scale of the increase is fiscally challenging, and we've given ourselves a decade. Poland, on the other hand, has done it in just two years.
maxwarner.bsky.social
We have a new @theifs.bsky.social report out today on UK defence spending. Defence spending commitments, if met, will have a large impact on the shape and/or size of the state. We cover lots of important aspects of defence spending, including international comparisons and impacts on growth
theifs.bsky.social
NEW: Honouring the NATO commitment to increase defence spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035 would reshape the British state.

@maxwarner.bsky.social & @beeboileau.bsky.social's new IFS Green Budget chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org, examines the past and future of UK defence spending:

[THREAD:]
Chart shows defence spending out-turn and plans. Title states: "Meeting the NATO defence spending commitment would be equivalent to spending an extra £36 billion, or £500 per person, a year in current terms."
maxwarner.bsky.social
We have a new @theifs.bsky.social report out today looking at the government's ambitious plans for public sector productivity. If productivity growth disappoints, the govt will have to choose between worse public service performance than planned or topping up budgets
theifs.bsky.social
NEW: The government is banking on big rises in public sector productivity to deliver its plans for public services.

@maxwarner.bsky.social and Olly Harvey-Rich’s new IFS Green Budget chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org, examines the outlook for public sector productivity:

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Chart shows historical and planned productivity improvements, between 1997 and 2029. Title states: "The government’s spending plans rely on public sector productivity increasing at more than four times its historic average."
Reposted by Max Warner
benzaranko.bsky.social
A key factor at the next election will be the state of Britain's public services. That will depend on whether the government can make those services more productive, to deliver more without huge cash injections.

Join our @theifs.bsky.social event on Friday to hear more: ifs.org.uk/events/how-a...
How ambitious are the government's plans for public sector productivity? | Institute for Fiscal Studies
This event will present new analysis on the current government's plans for improving public sector productivity, with a response from Jeremy Hunt MP.
ifs.org.uk
Reposted by Max Warner
maxwarner.bsky.social
There are reports that the government is considering changing student loans or pensions for resident doctors. We've written a new @theifs.bsky.social comment on the potential merits of such changes. Here's a summary:
maxwarner.bsky.social
@benzaranko.bsky.social and I have a new paper out in the Oxford Review of Economic Policy on the future of health and social care provision in the UK. It sets out the challenges and opportunities for increasing inputs and productivity in the NHS and adult social care in the coming decades
Reposted by Max Warner
theifs.bsky.social
NEW: A response to government commitment to spend 5% of GDP on national security

@beeboileau.bsky.social‬ and @maxwarner.bsky.social‬ set out what this could mean for government spending and future fiscal events: ifs.org.uk/articles/res...
ifs.org.uk
Reposted by Max Warner
ckfarquharson.bsky.social
Spending on the new childcare entitlements next year could be £1bn higher than initially forecast in March 2023 - a 25% increase.

So what's going on? I break down the numbers that @pjtheeconomist.bsky.social and @maxwarner.bsky.social set out in @theifs.bsky.social post-Spending Review briefing.
maxwarner.bsky.social
Great work from my colleagues out today on Crown Court productivity. A relatively good news story for broader public sector productivity, with complexity adjusted Crown Court productivity appearing to have returned to pre-pandemic levels
theifs.bsky.social
Recent months have shown a marked productivity improvement in the Crown Court.

After adjusting for changes in case complexity, we estimate that Crown Court productivity recovered to pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2024.
Chart shows Crown Court case disposals per sitting day (indexed values, 2019–20 average = 100), with adjustment for case complexity. Title states: "On a complexity-adjusted basis, Crown Court productivity appears to have returned to around its pre-pandemic level at the end of 2024."
Reposted by Max Warner
theifs.bsky.social
We're now just under a week away from the Spending Review, the first multi-year spending review since 2021.

Sign up for our post-Review analysis the morning after at 10:30am: ifs.org.uk/events/spend...
ifs.org.uk
maxwarner.bsky.social
This is a key point from our pre Spending Review report. Increasing NHS capital spending implies cuts to capital spending on other areas, e.g. transport, schools or net zero, given defence plans. Seems unlikely the NHS will see a large increase in capital spending at the SR.
theifs.bsky.social
Although capital spending is set to be maintained at a high level, the Spring Statement in March (implicitly) promised all of the planned real-terms increase over the next four years to defence.

Increasing capital funding elsewhere therefore will mean a cut somewhere else.
Chart shows average annual real growth in capital budgets. Title states: "Government investment is set to be sustained at historically high levels, but the increases in the coming years have already been promised to defence."
maxwarner.bsky.social
In summary, given the size of health spending and the slow growth in planned overall spending, the government faces a really challenging and important trade-off at the Spending Review between increasing health spending and increasing spending on everything else. 12/12
maxwarner.bsky.social
3.4% per year is of course not the upper limit of what DHSC might want, or what might be needed to achieve the govt’s NHS objectives – but faster growth (or any further defence increases) mean there is even less for other areas within the current plans for total spending. 11/12
maxwarner.bsky.social
Such growth rates would probably be sufficient to improve NHS performance – particularly with improvements in productivity. But they would imply substantial squeezes on other public services, where the govt also wants to improve performance. 10/12
maxwarner.bsky.social
After defence commitments and the Barnett formula, giving DHSC 2.5% per year in real-terms would leave no real-terms increases for other areas. 3.4% per year for DHSC (closer to the long-run average) would imply 1% cuts per year in real-terms for everything else. 9/12
Chart showing the trade-off between DHSC spending growth and spending growth for all other areas
maxwarner.bsky.social
But giving health anything above this has massive implications for spending on everything else. That’s because DHSC makes up around 40% of total day-to-day spending by public services. 8/12
maxwarner.bsky.social
Giving health a 1.2% annual real-terms increase (the same as the overall envelope) would be very challenging for the NHS. It would be a third of the long-run average health spending growth, and only slightly higher than seen under the coalition government in 09-10 to 14-15. 7/12
maxwarner.bsky.social
The key question is whether the government sticks to this new pattern, or returns to the traditional pattern. This time the envelope for total spending is growing relatively slowly – at an average of 1.2% per year in real-terms for day-to-day spending. 6/12