Borjan (Boki) Milinković
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neuromorphicboki.bsky.social
Borjan (Boki) Milinković
@neuromorphicboki.bsky.social
Mathematical Neuroscientist. Biologically Inclined

Postdoc Researcher @ Destexhe Lab, CNRS, Paris-Saclay

Exploring brains and minds, in humans and machines.

consciousness . synthetic systems . emergence . computation . information . autonomy . causality
nicee.. and what is an active agent by your definition?
December 23, 2025 at 5:16 PM
So autonomy -- in your view -- is only closure of some sort. Whilst agency includes some control of the environment, and maybe also -- if i've understood -- some control of oneself too?
December 23, 2025 at 4:35 PM
What does it mean to be a condition of agency? Would that generalise autonomy, where agency is the special case? If so, what are the additional assumptions or criteria for agency?
December 23, 2025 at 4:34 PM
The next step worth tackling empirically is to outline the differences between our approach and current systems. Build the formal, operational measure (currently in progress ;-) ), and build the hardware!

So your point is.. right, on, point, @hakwan.bsky.social. :-)
December 22, 2025 at 8:48 AM
The scale integration across hybrid processes is a strategy through accretion in evolved systems, this is our argument. So it must be utilised by other functions too. However, with consciousness, we get that as a special kind. It is outlined with a little more nuance in *Section 3.4* in our paper...
December 22, 2025 at 8:48 AM
@hakwan.bsky.social, I didn't see this second post. But, yes you're onto a great point. The diff is that it integrates in a fundamentally *different* manner. And this does dictate as to how digital systems perform language or memory operations, as we have already become privy to...
December 22, 2025 at 8:48 AM
..that is, it should be marked by integrating across a larger domain of coarse-grained processes. Also, I should say, that on a not-altogether-separate note, I don't think motor control is completely devoid of conscious processing. Consc and motor control are deeply intertwined. 🤗
December 22, 2025 at 8:38 AM
Wow, @hakwan.bsky.social, big compliment, thanks for the interest!

Great point! I would say that it does apply to motor control as a *general case* of the computations implemented of the kind we mention in the paper. But we hold that consc. is different in the way it integrates across scales..
December 22, 2025 at 8:38 AM
.. so yes, in way it doesn’t match the real behaviour, but precisely because they’re not simulations.

(p.s. thanks for the great questions! Really enjoying formulating an answer and thinking through it!)
December 20, 2025 at 1:38 PM
..for a) it is because they are not simulations, in our view, they are primarily physical computations that do not split their computational operations from the physically-instantiated quantities. Again, that means physical and computational time as well as operations are not separated. = No simul.
December 20, 2025 at 1:38 PM
I don’t think silicon is the wrong subtrate-backbone. I remain agnostic to that.

The other two questions might not align with the way I could give an answer though, but I will attempt to nonetheless...
December 20, 2025 at 1:38 PM
..serve as fundamental principles; and 3. Building the correct, possibly fluidic systems of a particular neuromorphic class.. all of this needs to fleshed out.
There is a long way to go. But we think that these are humble beginnings that are on the right track.
hope this helps clarify some things 😊🫀
December 20, 2025 at 1:33 PM
..instantiating it in synthetic systems. Each of the parts of what I call the triptych we developed, i.e., 1. the formal operationalisation of computational process across stochastic, hybrid multiscale scale-integrated processes, 2. additional features of biological process that..
December 20, 2025 at 1:33 PM
We undoubtably will not have a complete picture from the get-go. This is impossible. But we do attempt to move forward in some humble sense with it. For us, these are the building blocks for a proto-theory of a biologically -plausible account of consciousness. And a conceptual framework of..
December 20, 2025 at 1:33 PM
And, on this point, we indeed do expand on a biologically centred principle for consciousness. Of course, this takes considerable effort. Biological principles n consciousness are not often touched upon. we attempted to cover a ‘seriously’-vast portion of the field. As you mention..
December 20, 2025 at 1:33 PM
I’m incredibly grateful for your the keen interest and comments! 😊
December 20, 2025 at 1:24 PM
In the paper we do expand on how it relates to consciousness. See Section 3.4. Further elements are sprinkled throughout as well.

But there is so much space where one can digress; the argument needs to be built up. For the given proposition we thought it was enough.

Of course, will be extended..
December 20, 2025 at 1:23 PM
It might require deeper reading. But yes, if they are simulations this will not suffice. The algorithm is the substrate in our case, and this requires a rethinking of computation both hardware oriented and theory.

Hope that helps in the short space we have for these! 😊🙏
December 20, 2025 at 7:51 AM
Thank Bjorn! Indeed I would have loved to make this longer, but alas, publishing has limitations ;-)..

For this you will have to wait for the sequel. 😊
December 20, 2025 at 7:45 AM