Nicole Grajewski
@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
11K followers 470 following 680 posts
Fellow with Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program and Associate with Harvard’s Managing the Atom | PhD from Oxford | working on nuclear issues involving Russia and Iran | author of Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine (OUP/Hurst)
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Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
tnsr.org
Our latest roundtable examines the rapidly evolving global nuclear order. From North Korea to NATO, China to Latin America, this collection of essays explores the domestic and international forces reshaping nuclear security.

Full roundtable: tnsr.org/roundtable/n...
Navigating the New Nuclear Map - Texas National Security Review
The global nuclear order is undergoing rapid and complex transformations, driven by the expansion of arsenals, evolving doctrines, and the interplay of domestic and international politics. This roundt...
tnsr.org
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
tnsr.org
From Iran’s nuclear ambitions to great power competition over energy, this essay by @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social and Jane Darby Menton examines the complex nuclear dynamics shaping the Middle East and North Africa.

📖 Read here: tnsr.org/roundtable/n...
"MENA at the Threshold? Proliferation Risks and Great Power Competition" by Nicole Grajewski and Jane Darby Menton

This article situates the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the global nuclear order, emphasizing how the region has both challenged and spurred adaptations in international nuclear governance for decades. It then examines two pressing contemporary issues: the uncertain trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program after Israeli and US military strikes in June 2025, and the anticipated expansion of nuclear energy across MENA, which could also result in more countries with capabilities that would be conducive to pursuing the bomb. Both developments underscore the difficulties of managing nuclear latency in a conflict-prone region, where tensions among local actors inflect nuclear decision-making. While there are opportunities to mitigate these challenges, and principles that policymakers should follow in addressing them, nuclear aspirations are likely to remain a prominent feature of MENA’s security landscape so long as underlying tensions between regional actors remain unresolved.
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
warontherocks.bsky.social
How far can Moscow and Tehran really take their uneasy cooperation? @osto.bsky.social and @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social discuss.

Listen here: warontherocks.com/ep...
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
Iranian entities under UNSC sanctions
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
Oh totally agree. It is also unprecedented for the UNSC because they could just veto a resolution that they opposed.
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
No respect for the use of their very own innovation in the JCPOA
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
Russian UNSC statement: There has been no snapback, and there will be no snapback. Any moves to resuscitate anti-Iranian Security Council resolutions that were in effect prior to 2015 are null and void.
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
The main sanctions that will be reimposed on Iran will be:
UNSCR 1696 (2006)
UNSCR 1737 (2006)
UNSCR 1747 (2007)
UNSCR 1803 (2008)
UNSCR 1929 (2010)
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
Vote on UNSCR 2231 extension:
4 in favor
9 against
2 abstentions

Snapback is happening. All pre-JCPOA UN sanctions on Iran will be reinstated at 00:00 GMT tomorrow.
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
puca.bsky.social
A very quick and crudely drawn map in QGIS, just to illustrate the clearest contrails and their locations.
Also, a current map showing current vessel locations around Novaya Zemlya.
Of note, Teriberka left Pankovo in the last few hours.
Reposted by Nicole Grajewski
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
To conclude, Iran’s ongoing efforts to rebuild after the 12 day war shouldn’t be detached from the looming restoration of snapback sanctions or its endemic economic issues. The adaptations so far still have not addressed the deeper structural issues the plagued Iran’s defenses.
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
Given their opposition to snapback, it is unlikely that Russia or China would fully abide by such a reinstated embargo. However, the real question is whether either would be willing to provide Iran with arms. That’s an issue for another thread.
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
These resolutions did not explicitly prohibit air defense systems. But they cover nearly all major offensive conventional systems, meaning that a snapback would freeze Iran’s ability to acquire tanks, aircraft, ships, artillery, and missile systems abroad.
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
UNSCR 1929 (2010) strengthened this by prohibiting the direct or indirect supply of those same categories to Iran, and extended the prohibition to spare parts, related materiel, technical training, financial resources, maintenance, and associated services.
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
UNSCR 1747 (2007) called on states to exercise restraint in transfers to Iran of any systems covered by the UN Register of Conventional Arms: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles.
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
Arms acquisitions from abroad will be directly impacted if snapback sanctions are reimposed. A return to the pre-JCPOA UN sanctions would bar Iran from legally importing many major weapons systems.
nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
So far there is nothing on passive defense and no details on which specific systems might be funded. Interestingly, very little discussion on self-sufficiency which may indicate a realization that foreign procurement of arms would be more optimal.