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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 13h

Congratulations to a new MacArthur fellow, Sébastien Philippe, @sebphilippe.bsky.social www.macfound.org/fellows/clas...

Sébastien Philippe

Exposing past harms and potential risks from building, testing, and storing launch-ready nuclear weapons.

www.macfound.org

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Reposted by Pavel Podvig

The European Leadership Network (ELN) @theeln.bsky.social · 19h

In New York for the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament & International Security? Make sure to check out ELN Senior Policy Fellow Julia Berghofer's and ELN Senior Network member @akmentt.bsky.social's side event ⤵️
docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1F...

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 7d

I don't think Russia will agree, but that would be a reasonable response to the Russian initiative. As opposed to the "peer competitors" and "we cannot verify anything" lines. And who knows, maybe this can start some kind of a process that will eventually lead to real limits. 6/6

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 7d

I made an argument along these lines in my Arms Control Today piece www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-05/.... The limits are much less important than data exchange and verification (including on-site inspections). The US seems prepared to bear the political cost of the upload anyway. 5/

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 7d

The US, of course, will insist (already does) that Russia's constraints are not verifiable. Fair enough (even though this is often more of an excuse than a good-faith argument). What the US should do then is to make a counteroffer - restore the New START verification system. 4/

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 7d

Partly this is because Russia doesn't have many ways to respond. Yes, it has some upload capability, but it would be a largely symbolic measure. There are advantages of presenting itself as a "responsible" nuclear power. 3/

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 7d

"Steps that would undermine the existing balance" also may mean many different things. It's not impossible that Russia says that a moderate upload does not undermine anything. Or that the Golden Dome doesn't work anyway (which, of course, it won't). 2/

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 7d

As fully expected, the US nuclear community is strongly against adhering to New START limits after Feb 2026. "Two peer competitors" etc. But the Russian proposal is vague enough to leave some room for US upload: "a similar spirit" does not have to mean full reciprocity. 1/

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 8d

Here is the Politico story politi.co/46tL1qI (It would be interesting to see that July 31 DOE memo, though). 5/5

Democrats alarmed as Trump eyes weapons material to fuel nuclear reactors

The scramble to build new reactors to supply power to AI data centers may include plutonium from the nation’s nuclear deterrent.

politi.co

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 8d

Regarding the potential transfer of plutonium to the industry, I don't think there will be any takers. All these companies work on uranium (mostly HALEU) fuel designs. So, most likely the plutonium will remain where it is (the pit plutonium is mostly in Pantex). 4/

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 8d

To produce pits the US has about 30 tonnes of unobligated Pu (79.7-49.4 fissilematerials.org/countries/un...). Only about half of this is in active weapons, so the US could double its weapons stock. It's the manufacturing capacity, not the availability of Pu that is the problem. 3/

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 8d

The material was to be disposed via the "dilute and dispose" route, but Trump stopped it by the 23 May 2025 "Reinvigorating" executive order. In any event, this program has nothing to do with the pit manufacturing schedule. 2/

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 8d

A somewhat confused piece in Politico re US plutonium by
@zcolman.bsky.social. These 25 tonnes of plutonium in pits is the material identified as surplus 30 years ago, no way it "plays a central role in the US nuclear weapons stockpile" (pits are not "highly radioactive" by the way) 1/

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 9d

Here is Al Mauroni's (very interesting) Substack post substack.com/home/post/p-... and here is the USAF document doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/d... (In the document's metadata, the author is listed as "Buff, Grandpa." Google tells me it's a B-52 reference.) 2/2

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 9d

This is from the "Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-72, Nuclear Operations," released in August 2025:
"To achieve theater-level objectives, CCDRs [Combatant Commanders] may request the use of CONUS-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)..."
h/t Al Mauroni, links ⬇️ 1/

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Reposted by Pavel Podvig

Liviu Horovitz @liviuhorovitz.bsky.social · 12d

A new @unidir.org report by Tamara Patton & @russianforces.org proposes the concept of ‘demonstrable verification’ to show compliance in the absence of agreed verification measures for nuclear arms control and space security 7/10

Verification Without a Treaty → UNIDIR

In the established practice of nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements, verification provisions are negotiated as part of a treaty to provide States with a mechanism to assess compliance and t...

unidir.org

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