Simon Columbus
@simoncolumbus.bsky.social
920 followers 410 following 450 posts
Lecturer, University of St Andrews | I work on cooperation, norms, institutions, & personality | http://simoncolumbus.com
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simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Some personal news: In April, I will be joining the University of St Andrews as a lecturer @standrewspsyneuro.bsky.social (~assistant professor for non-UK folks).

I work on cooperation, institutional legitimacy, and personality. If you're in the area and share some interests, I'd love to chat.
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
This week's Cooperation Colloquium:

Setayesh Radkani @setayeshradkani.bsky.social:

What people learn from punishment: A cognitive model

Date: Friday, Oct 10
Time: 15:00 UTC+2 Vienna / 9 am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: Authorities, from parents of toddlers to leaders of formal institutions, use punishment to communicate disapproval and enforce social norms. However, punishment is often interpreted in contrasting ways: at times it teaches and enforces norms, but at other times it fails or even backfires, undermining the authority’s legitimacy. We show that these seemingly contradictory effects of punishment can only be understood by considering the cognitive processes in the minds of human observers of punishment. In a series of experiments, we showed the systematic variability in how adults and children interpret punishment. We developed a formal cognitive model, derived from a standard model of how people make sense of each others’ actions (Inverse Planning), that captures and explains these inferences quantitatively and parsimoniously. This work reveals the rational logic behind how people learn from punishment, and a key constraint on the function of punishment in establishing shared social norms.
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Join us in three hours for this week's Cooperation Colloquium!
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Cooperation Colloquium this week:

Talbot M. Andrews @talbotmandrews.bsky.social (Cornell):

Overcoming the social dilemma of climate change

Friday, Sep 26, 15:00 UTC+2 Vienna / 9 am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: Mitigating the increasing threat of climate change poses a uniquely challenging cooperative problem. Multiple strategic features of climate change impede coordinating around successful action. For example, there is uncertainty about the timing and dynamics of climate change impacts. Different actors vary in their historic contribution to the problem and vulnerability now. There are many solutions available to mitigate climate change, but they differ in their effectiveness and probability of success. And, compounding all of this, there are asymmetries in information between elite decision-makers and the publics that they govern. In this talk, I argue economic games are well-suited to understand both how these strategic features delay successful climate action and provide insights into how to overcome these problems through public policy. Focusing on the case of governing emerging mitigation technologies, I will present the empirical evidence that people are willing to pay costs to avert climate disaster. While mistrust between the public and policymakers erodes cooperation, I will also present solutions that emerge from these experiments. I conclude by discussing how insights from the lab can inform real-world messaging and policymaking to encourage successful climate change mitigation.
Reposted by Simon Columbus
robertboehm.bsky.social
My PhD student @qinyuxiao.bsky.social has written a wonderful tribute to Gary Bornstein’s influential paper on team games (doi.org/10.1207/S153...) — a paper that remains as relevant today as it was over 20 years ago. You can read Qinyu’s short piece here: doi.org/10.1038/s441...
The multi-level social dilemmas of intergroup interactions - Nature Reviews Psychology
Nature Reviews Psychology - The multi-level social dilemmas of intergroup interactions
doi.org
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
The US government continues to abduct and disappear people in my former hometown.
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Cooperation Colloquium this week:

Talbot M. Andrews @talbotmandrews.bsky.social (Cornell):

Overcoming the social dilemma of climate change

Friday, Sep 26, 15:00 UTC+2 Vienna / 9 am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: Mitigating the increasing threat of climate change poses a uniquely challenging cooperative problem. Multiple strategic features of climate change impede coordinating around successful action. For example, there is uncertainty about the timing and dynamics of climate change impacts. Different actors vary in their historic contribution to the problem and vulnerability now. There are many solutions available to mitigate climate change, but they differ in their effectiveness and probability of success. And, compounding all of this, there are asymmetries in information between elite decision-makers and the publics that they govern. In this talk, I argue economic games are well-suited to understand both how these strategic features delay successful climate action and provide insights into how to overcome these problems through public policy. Focusing on the case of governing emerging mitigation technologies, I will present the empirical evidence that people are willing to pay costs to avert climate disaster. While mistrust between the public and policymakers erodes cooperation, I will also present solutions that emerge from these experiments. I conclude by discussing how insights from the lab can inform real-world messaging and policymaking to encourage successful climate change mitigation.
Reposted by Simon Columbus
jorgeapenas.bsky.social
📢 Apply to our (2-year) research fellowships at @iast.fr

Join a multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and indisciplinary group of scholars in Toulouse, walkable/cyclable pink city of chocolatines in the South of France.

Deadline: November 15, 2025.

www.iast.fr/research-fel...
Research Fellowships
Each year, IAST invites applications for post-doctoral Research Fellowships, which offer candidates an opportunity to devote themselves full-time to their research at the start of their careers. Fello...
www.iast.fr
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Must've gotten lucky with the weather then! Today there were clouds coming over from Italy as I was heading to the train station. A beautiful part of the world.
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Spent a few lovely days at the Matterhorn Symposium in Brig 🇨🇭, where I presented joint work with @mkasper.bsky.social and others on biased institutions. Next stop: Kassel for #DPPD25 and a talk on our new scale for HEXACO personality states.
A view from a Swiss alp near the Aletsch Glacier towards the Matterhorn.
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Come to Scotland, everybody!
renemottus.bsky.social
Submissions are now open for 22nd European Conference on Personality (Edinburgh, 2026); deadline 7/12/25.
Keynote speakers and pre-conference workshops have also been confirmed.
www.ecp22edinburgh.org/submission
European Conference on Personality, Edinburgh, 2026
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
What's the current state of the evidence on skill in investment banking?
Reposted by Simon Columbus
debruine.bsky.social
This fall I will have a blind student in my coding class for the first time. Do any other instructors or visually impaired coders have advice beyond making sure my book has useful alt-text for the images? #rstats #accessibility

Class book: psyteachr.github.io/reprores-v5/
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
How to make something sound uncool in one simple step:

1) Übersetzen Sie es ins Deutsche.
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Gabel, Kette, umgekehrte Gabel
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
I volunteer for a replication!
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
First Cooperation Colloquium of the semester!

Doruk İriş @dorukiris.bsky.social:
Normative expectations of reciprocal negotiators

Friday Sep 12, 14:00 UTC+2 (Vienna) / 8 am NYC

Sign up: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...
Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical framework to examine how normative expectations--what one considers others should do based on their fairness perceptions--in shaping the behavior of players with reciprocal preferences in a public goods game. Standard reciprocity models typically assume uniform, exogenously determined, and moderate expectations. By contrast, I allow players to (i) vary in how demanding they are of others, (ii) disagree about what counts as fair, and (iii) form self-centered normative expectations endogenously. In noncooperative play, strong reciprocal concerns transform the payoff structure from a material payoff dilemma into a coordination game in utilities, with one exception. In coalition formation, three central results emerge: (i) the empty coalition is always stable, (ii) the grand coalition becomes stable once reciprocal concerns are sufficiently strong, and (iii) partial coalitions can be stable under specific conditions. Exogenous expectations create distinct effects on cooperation: lower expectations facilitate the stability of the grand coalition, whereas higher expectations increase the size of partial coalitions, potentially leading to a majority coalition. This latter finding is more consistent with empirical observation.
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
A paper straight out of a feminist sci-fi novel
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
That's what a D.Sc. is, right?
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Dissertation Annihilation
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Für sowas musste auf Reddit
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
I was just at a great workshop in public economics. Chatting with the organiser afterwards, we agreed that much of what we'd seen would've been rejected as "not economics" even a decade ago. Not much use being ahead of your time if your reviewers aren't.
simoncolumbus.bsky.social
Stop it, Julia! That's a whole PhD proposal! Some time traveller from 2008 is already plagiarising this thread.