yougov.co.uk/politics/art...

PS

As Brian Bell (Chair of the MAC) is quoted as saying, the proposed new rules on settlement (apart from being xenophobic, mean-spirited, and contrary to what the vast majority of the public think is fair) are likely to do significant economic damage.

7. It is, however, completely contrary to the narrative from many politicians/media/thinktanks that recent work migration is a) mostly low-skill & b) has a large fiscal cost.

The post-Brexit migration system was far from perfect! But it was clearly an economic benefit, not a cost. ENDS

6. So the overall story is that high skilled/high paid workers are strongly fiscally positive, while medium/lower paid workers are (very broadly) fiscally neutral in the long run (although positive in the short run). This is no great surprise to those of us who've looked at the data..

5. In the short term (where the numbers are more certain for obvious reasons) the picture is (even) more positive -even dependents are fiscally positive

4. Even care workers (a subset of those on the Health and Care Visa) are only a relatively small direct fiscal cost, and as the report says roughly comparable to Brits:

"Care Workers are therefore fiscally negative over their lifetimes and broadly similar to the UK median for the age group"

3. This isn't surprising! The SWV was supposed to be targeted at private sector workers who would make a significant economic/fiscal contribution. The Health and Care Visa was to address skill/labour shortages in the NHS and care sectors, not to (directly) boost government finances.

2. But this is highly heterogeneous - mostly driven by skilled workers *not* on health/care visas. The latter are also positive, but much smaller numbers, and offset by dependants.

1. This is the lifetime (discounted back) net contribution of those who arrived on skilled work visas (including health/care visas) *and* their dependants in 2022/23.

One way of looking at it is that this cohort (one year's worth of migrants) will "pay" for about 1.5% of the UK's £3 trillion debt

Although Condorcet winners are by definition the majority-preferred option, they frequently do not secure the largest share of votes. Nevertheless, they enter government with remarkable consistency, doing so in roughly 90% of cases across electoral system types.

Using data from the CSES we show that Condorcet-winner parties are often centrally located within the party system, but they are not necessarily large parties. Most often, they are social democrats, while nationalist parties are most often Condorcet losers.