Tsz Chun Kwok
@tckwok.bsky.social
13 followers 18 following 7 posts
PhD candidate at Uppsala University
Posts Media Videos Starter Packs
Reposted by Tsz Chun Kwok
nber.org
NBER @nber.org · 29d
Providing a theoretical foundation for why firms with many small shareholders pollute less and why more equal ownership usually, but not always, reduces pollution, from Tsz Chun Kwok, @danielspiro.bsky.social, and Arthur A. van Benthem https://www.nber.org/papers/w34203
tckwok.bsky.social
🛠️Technical implication: Representative-agent models that assume firms ignore pollution are inconsistent. When everyone owns equal stakes across firms, firms behave almost like social planners, fully internalizing the costs of pollution.
tckwok.bsky.social
In most cases the distribution-of-power effect and giver's preference effect dominate, but if the receiver's effect is strong, equality can backfire🔥.
tckwok.bsky.social
Broadening ownership can reduce pollution, but the effects are nuanced. It depends on how 3 forces interact:
1️⃣Distribution-of-power effect
2️⃣Receiver’s preference effect
3️⃣Giver’s preference effect
tckwok.bsky.social
At the firm level, decisions depend on the “weighted median” shareholder: if this owner holds a small stake, the firm abates more; if large, it abates less.⚖️
tckwok.bsky.social
Everyone in society suffers from a firm's pollution, but large owners bear more of the cost of abatement through lost profits. Smaller owners lose less profit and are therefore more willing to support abatement.💰
tckwok.bsky.social
🚨NEW working paper! In our new research, @danielspiro.bsky.social, Arthur van Benthem and I study how ownership influences pollution outcomes.🧵
nber.org/papers/w34203
We provide a theoretical micro foundation for how much pollution (negative externalities) a firm will internalize based on the ownership distribution of its shareholders. Small shareholders, compared to large ones, want the firm to spend more on avoiding pollution since they suffer less profit loss for the same environmental benefit. In particular, if a shareholder holds a share of 1/N, where N is the population in society, that shareholder’s preferences align with a social planner’s. Three theoretical predictions arise. First, small shareholders will systematically vote for a greener corporate profile. Second, firms with a smaller weighted median shareholder will pollute less. Third, countries with concentrated corporate wealth holdings and/or more
individualized firm ownership pollute more. This implies that standard models of externalities in environmental economics and macroeconomics containing representative agents are either internally inconsistent or not fully specified.
Reposted by Tsz Chun Kwok
johncawley.bsky.social
If you'll be on the #EconJobMarket this coming year, you may want to join this webinar by @aereorg.bsky.social, titled, "Navigating Uncertain Waters: Advice for the Current Job Market," with Min Gong & @adrienneohler.bsky.social. 29 Sept 2025 @ 11am ET.
Reposted by Tsz Chun Kwok
oskarnskans.bsky.social
Submit your "core" labor economics papers (wages, employment..) to this great workshop I co-organize for the third time - join with, e.g., Cardoso, Machin, Mogstad and Spitz-Oener for some serious Labor Economics in Helsinki in August!
Reposted by Tsz Chun Kwok
adam-gill.bsky.social
🚨New Working Paper!🚨

Excited to share a new IZA DP (No. 17468) with @oskarnskans.bsky.social looking at the relationship between trust and work from home (WFH). #EconSky

“Trusted from Home: Managerial Beliefs and Workers’ Spatial Autonomy”

docs.iza.org/dp17468.pdf

A short 🧵…