This quote regularly pops up as Popper's, but that's spurious. Its from a 1995 NYT obituary written by Ryszard Kapuscinski.
www.nytimes.com/1995/01/01/m...
Popper's point in the paradox of tolerance concerns the limits to allowing political actors who are hostile to certain principles of a broadly liberal form of governance, to act without contraint. Free speech comes into it only secondarily to this point, and subject to it.
Popper's point in the paradox of tolerance concerns the limits to allowing political actors who are hostile to certain principles of a broadly liberal form of governance, to act without contraint. Free speech comes into it only secondarily to this point, and subject to it.
This quote regularly pops up as Popper's, but that's spurious. Its from a 1995 NYT obituary written by Ryszard Kapuscinski.
www.nytimes.com/1995/01/01/m...
The paradox Popper refers to - at several points in his writing, not just the OSE footnote - isn't a general, "apriori" one, but rather one he claims is inherent *in an assumption, (absolute) value(ing) or argument*, according to which tolerance must be granted absolutely.
The paradox Popper refers to - at several points in his writing, not just the OSE footnote - isn't a general, "apriori" one, but rather one he claims is inherent *in an assumption, (absolute) value(ing) or argument*, according to which tolerance must be granted absolutely.
The paradox of intolerance has to do with threats to concrete liberal rule - politically, who's in power and what the actual power relations are - not the limits of acceptable social practice (except to say that the latter requires the former in place to be relevant).
The paradox of intolerance has to do with threats to concrete liberal rule - politically, who's in power and what the actual power relations are - not the limits of acceptable social practice (except to say that the latter requires the former in place to be relevant).
Both this (2) and the previous (1) posts don't quite get P right.
(1') the "one counterexample" had to do with the *logical* status of theories - the data here isn't a theory - not necessarily in practice.
(2') P always acknowledged probabilistic statements within science.
Both this (2) and the previous (1) posts don't quite get P right.
(1') the "one counterexample" had to do with the *logical* status of theories - the data here isn't a theory - not necessarily in practice.
(2') P always acknowledged probabilistic statements within science.
Marxism: Popper sympathised with Marx's concerns; the critiques mostly aimed at "scientific" Marxism.
Marxism: Popper sympathised with Marx's concerns; the critiques mostly aimed at "scientific" Marxism.
But then given that induction in some form or other is still widely endorsed, that alone would mean we still need Popper.
But then given that induction in some form or other is still widely endorsed, that alone would mean we still need Popper.
What does being continental have to do with "screw (anyone)"? And is there something specific to Popper that made him the target of that exclamation?
What does being continental have to do with "screw (anyone)"? And is there something specific to Popper that made him the target of that exclamation?
Popper's falsification criterion wasn't meant to explain as much as it was a proposal in light of philosophical problems, given accepted aims.
He later (pre-Kuhn) acknowledged the role in science of theories that don't meet it, and stressed their criticizability as key.
Popper's falsification criterion wasn't meant to explain as much as it was a proposal in light of philosophical problems, given accepted aims.
He later (pre-Kuhn) acknowledged the role in science of theories that don't meet it, and stressed their criticizability as key.
bsky.app/profile/tcla...
This quote regularly pops up as Popper's, but that's spurious. Its from a 1995 NYT obituary written by Ryszard Kapuscinski.
www.nytimes.com/1995/01/01/m...
bsky.app/profile/tcla...
He indeed enrolled in more Schlick courses than any other lecturer but Buhler. However, he was quickly disillusioned, and the sharp criticism of Schlick's theory of knowledge in Popper's dissertation carried into his first book. He was first and foremost Buhler's student.
He indeed enrolled in more Schlick courses than any other lecturer but Buhler. However, he was quickly disillusioned, and the sharp criticism of Schlick's theory of knowledge in Popper's dissertation carried into his first book. He was first and foremost Buhler's student.
P was not particularly a proponent of there being "different kinds of truth and reality". Can you give a direction of what you had in mind here?
P was not particularly a proponent of there being "different kinds of truth and reality". Can you give a direction of what you had in mind here?