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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

@thebjps.bsky.social

5.5K followers 990 following 280 posts

Latest issue: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/bjps/current BJPS Review of Books: https://www.thebsps.org/reviewofbooks/ BJPS Short Reads: https://www.thebsps.org/short-reads/ Podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/bjps

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · Nov 11

Welcome new followers! Some of the content we post will be behind a paywall (boo! hiss!)—but that wall is, like, two inches high. Join the BSPS for $20 ($4 for students) to get complete access to everything as well as the warm glow of supporting the society working for your discipline!

Journal subscriptions for The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science from the University of Chicago Press website.

press.uchicago.edu

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 18h

Just accepted:

Entanglement Swapping for Entanglement Realists
– Jørn Kløvfjell Mjelva

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Delayed-choice entanglement swapping experiments have been argued to undermine realism about entanglement. One response has been to argue that the correlations displayed in delayed-choice entanglement swapping experiments have a different physical interpretation than the correlations in the non-delayed case. This strategy runs into problems when applied to cases of spacelike entanglement swapping, as it would appear to require one to either posit a privileged foliation of spacetime or otherwise accept that whether entanglement obtains is frame dependent. In this article, I present a realist-friendly account of entanglement swapping that circumvents this dilemma, in which entanglement is explicated via the notion of a common ground. The issue of frame dependence is resolved by adopting the past light-cone criterion for property attribution, and the correlations displayed in the spacelike entanglement swapping experiments are attributed to a joint common ground.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 2d

Are you a phd student? Are you in the vicinity of one and want to help them with their bad life choices? Then this is for you! #philsci

Philosophy of Science Association @philsci.bsky.social · 2d

✨Don't forget✨ PSA Office Hours are back! Join us this Thursday, October 9 at 12 PM EST with S. Andrew Schroeder. Sign up at the link below to save your spot!

www.philsci.org/psa_...

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Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Alisa Bokulich @alisabokulich.bsky.social · 7d

#Postdoc at U. of Vienna in philosophy of science, with focus on scientific modeling, interdisciplinarity &/or philosophy of engineering, w/ Prof. Tarja Knuuttila. English & German language proficiency required.
Deadline: Oct 9th
#philsci

jobs.univie.ac.at/job/Universi...

University Assistant postdoctoral, in the research area of Philosophy of Science

jobs.univie.ac.at

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 7d

Just accepted:

Algorithmic Randomness and Probabilistic Laws
– Jeffrey Barrett & Eddy Keming Chen

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. We apply recent ideas about complexity and randomness to the philosophy of laws and chances, developing two ways to use algorithmic randomness to characterize probabilistic laws of nature: a generative chance law that employs a non-standard notion of chance, and a probabilistic constraining law that imposes relative frequency and randomness constraints that every physically possible world must satisfy. This removes an obstacle to a unified governing account of non-Humean laws, whereby laws govern by constraining physical possibilities; it also offers independently motivated solutions to problems for the Humean best-system account. On either approach, probabilistic laws are tied more tightly to corresponding sets of possible worlds: some histories permitted by traditional probabilistic laws are now ruled out as physically impossible. Consequently, the framework avoids one variety of empirical underdetermination while bringing to light others that are typically overlooked.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 9d

Just accepted:

Kinematical Equivalence and Cosmic Conspiracies
– Caspar Jacobs & Eleanor March

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Discussions of theoretical equivalence typically only concern a theory's dynamically possible models. Recently, however, March has shown that a theory's kinematically possible models are also relevant to questions of theoretical equivalence. We apply March's notion of kinematic equivalence to the difference between reduced and sophisticated theories introduced by Dewar. Although Dewar claims that these are equivalent, Jacobs has argued that only sophisticated theories can explain what are otherwise `cosmic conspiracies'. We show that this is a consequence of the kinematical inequivalence of reduced and sophisticated theories. Furthermore, we use Caulton's `downwards Hume's dictum' to show that kinematically inequivalent theories are also ontologically inequivalent.

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Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Alisa Bokulich @alisabokulich.bsky.social · 13d

#PhilJobs Dept Philosophy @ Stanford University
AOS: Philosophy of Physics (understood broadly to include all physical sciences, complexity, etc.), Philosophy of Science
AOC: Open
Open rank: tenure-track Assistant Prof, tenured Associate Prof, or Full Prof
Deadline: November 1
#PhilSci #philsky

Stanford | Faculty Positions: Details - Open Rank Faculty Position in Philosophy of Physics

facultypositions.stanford.edu

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 16d

Just accepted:

Reviving Reduction
– Dominik Ehrenfels

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Possessing symmetries often indicates that a theory’s models exhibit surplus structure, in turn suggesting the theory needs reformulation either by reduction or sophistication. Lately, sophistication has become more popular, on the grounds that reductions are difficult to find and often not as attractive. But this arises from a restrictive way of thinking about reduction. It is often held that theory reduction must be formulated in terms of symmetry-invariant quantities and must be empirically equivalent to the original. Using Barbour and Bertotti’s successful reformulation of Newtonian gravitation theory (NGT), I argue that reductions need not meet these criteria. While it is possible to sophisticate NGT with respect to scale symmetry, this has been a challenge for the reduction strategy, giving the impression that sophistication is superior. The approach to reduction I argue for here, however, is versatile enough to handle this case, arguably in a way superior to its rival.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 19d

Just accepted:

Climate Sensitivity through the Lens of Measurement Practice
– Matthias Ackermann

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. In its Sixth Assessment Report, the IPCC moved from a climate model-based to a climate model-supported assessment of equilibrium climate sensitivity. Unlike previous reports, climate model information is no longer used directly for estimates of equilibrium climate sensitivity. I offer a measurement view on the equilibrium climate sensitivity assessment that allows us to evaluate this shift in practice in terms of its practical and epistemic consequences. In particular, I argue for two conclusions involved in this move. First, the change in using climate models as direct sources of evidence to a supporting role involves a kind of repurposing of climate models as epistemic tools. This change should be evaluated relative to the researchers' aims, which include more accurately assessing equilibrium climate sensitivity. Second, I suggest that this shift in practice shares a kinship to calibration activities aimed at increasing the reliability of a measurement procedure.

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 20d

Just accepted:

What Gibbsian Statistical Mechanics Says: In Defence of Bare Probabilism
– David Wallace

Abstract in alt text or read the full paper here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. I expound and defend the `bare probabilism' reading of Gibbsian (that is, mainstream) statistical mechanics, responding to Frigg and Werndl's recent plea: `can somebody please say what Gibbsian statistical mechanics says?'.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 21d

Statistical Autonomous Explanations and the Patterns of Nature: A Modified Account
– Travis Holmes & André Ariew

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. This article provides a fuller account of purely statistical pattern-level explanations—that is, those that explain macro-level events by invoking limit theorems. The statistical autonomous explanation account is modified via integration with the maximum entropy approach for generating limit distributions. This achieves two important results: (1) the range of statistical autonomous explanations is vastly extended and shown to range over many different kinds of limit distributions; (2) the modified account permits answers to questions about why these limit distribution patterns are so common in nature; why these patterns are robust; and also why these patterns are insensitive to most lower-level details pertaining to the characters or events that comprise the statistical ensemble. The modified account can be understood as a corrective for many extant accounts of statistical pattern-level explanations that fail to answer these crucial questions.

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Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Justin Weinberg @dailynous.com · 22d

The Philosophy of Science Association makes experts on various topics available for conversation with graduate students anywhere with its "Office Hour" program. Other associations should consider doing this.

The PSA’s “Office Hour” Returns - Daily Nous

The Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) is continuing its excellent expert "office hour" series this semester---a program other academic associations should consider adopting. "The PSA Office Hour aims to facilitate interactions between our graduate student membership and prominent philosophers of science, and in a more controlled, accessible, and carbon-conscious setting than is provided by our

dailynous.com

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Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Eugene Y. S. Chua @eugenechua.bsky.social · 23d

Very happy to announce that the CFP is now open for APSA26: The Inaugural Biennial Conference of the Asian Philosophy of Science Association! It will be held at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. The keynote will be Craig Callender. Submission deadline: 31 Dec 2025. URL: tinyurl.com/APSA26

Asian Philosophy of Science Association (APSA) Conference 2026

tinyurl.com

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 23d

Sifting the Signal from the Noise
– Daniel Herrmann & Jacob VanDrunen

Abstract in alt text or read the full paper here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Signalling games are useful for understanding how language emerges. In the standard models, the dynamics in some sense already know what the signals are, even if they do not yet have meaning. In this article, we relax this assumption and develop a simple model we call an ‘attention game’, in which agents have to learn which feature of their environment is the signal. We demonstrate that simple reinforcement learning agents can still learn to coordinate in contexts where the agents do not already know what the signal is, and the other features in the agents’ environment are uncorrelated with the signal. Furthermore, we show that in cases where other features are correlated with the signal, there is a surprising trade-off between learning what the signal is and success in action. We show that the mutual information between a signal and a feature plays a key role in governing the accuracy and attention of the agent.

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Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 29d

New letter to the Editors

Caspar Jacobs, Against Presentist Velocities: Response to Gijsbers

www.thebsps.org/letters/gijs...

#philsci #philsky

On Gijsbers, Presentist Velocities | Letters to the Editor

Correspondence from Caspar Jacobs

www.thebsps.org

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 26d

All 12pt, 1.5 line spaced I’m afraid!

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 26d

Word count was only ever a proxy for page count (cost) and given what we publish—lots of formalism and mathematics, and a fair number of figures and tables—a very bad one

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Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Sabina Leonelli @sabinaleonelli.bsky.social · 26d

JOB AD: If you research philosophy, history or social studies of biology, with interest in agroecology, crop science or environmental intelligence, consider applying for 3-year postdoctoral fellowship in Munich! Deadline for applications: 31/10, details www.sts.sot.tum.de/en/sts/arbei... #philsci

Jobs

www.sts.sot.tum.de

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 26d

We introduced a 24-page limit to help reduce our backlog, but people got creative with formatting to obey the letter but not the spirit of the request…

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 26d

It applies to all text (besides references, title and abstract)!

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 26d

Knowledge of the Quantum Domain: An Overlap Strategy
– James Fraser & Peter Vickers

Abstract in alt text or read the full paper here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. The existence of multiple interpretations of quantum mechanics appears to pose a serious challenge for knowledge claims about the quantum domain. Hoefer argues that a scientific realist epistemology must be abandoned in this context, while Callender argues that the realist’s only option is to break the underdetermination between rival interpretations by appealing to extra-empirical virtues. We develop a different response to the quantum underdetermination problem based on identifying statements about the unobservable that all the major ontic interpretations of quantum mechanics agree on. It is commonly believed that Everettian, Bohmian, and GRW (Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber) quantum mechanics share nothing but empirical content. We argue that while they say very different things about the fundamental nature of quantum systems, they can be understood as agreeing on a plethora of more abstract theoretical claims. In our view, focusing on this descriptive overlap represents the most promising strategy for defending knowledge claims in the quantum domain. We close by considering how this overlap strategy relates to working posits formulations of scientific realism.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 27d

Host Specificity in Biological Control
– Thomas Blanchard

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. In recent years, the notion of biological specificity has attracted significant philosophical attention. This article focuses on host specificity, a kind of biological specificity that has not yet been discussed by philosophers, and which concerns the extent to which a species is selective in the range of other species it exploits for feeding and/or reproduction. Host specificity is an important notion in ecology, where it plays a variety of theoretical roles. Here, I focus on the role of host specificity in biological control, a field of applied ecology that deals with the suppression of pests through the use of living organisms. Examining host specificity and its role in biological control yields several valuable contributions to our understanding of biological specificity. In particular, I argue that host specificity cannot be fully understood in terms of Woodward’s well-known account of causal specificity. To adequately account for host specificity, we need a notion of causal specificity that takes into consideration the extent to which a variable’s effects are similar to one another—a dimension not captured in Woodward’s account. In addition, the literature on host specificity in biological control highlights certain aspects in which causally specific relationships can be practically valuable—aspects that have not yet been addressed in philosophical discussions of specificity. The literature also reveals that, in certain contexts, specificity can hinder rather than foster effective control, thus leading to a nuanced assessment of the practical value of specific causes.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 28d

Depression as a Disorder of Consciousness
– Cecily Whiteley

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. First-person reports of major depressive disorder reveal that when an individual becomes depressed a profound change or ‘shift’ to one’s conscious experience occurs. The depressed person reports that something fundamental to their experience has been disturbed or shifted, a change associated with the common but elusive claim that when depressed one finds oneself in a ‘different world’ detached from reality and other people. Existing attempts to utilize these phenomenological observations in a psychiatric context are challenged by the fact that this experiential ‘shift’ characteristic of depression appears mysterious and resists analysis in scientific terms. This article offers a way out of this predicament. The hypothesis proposed is that when an individual becomes depressed, the individual departs from a state of ordinary wakeful consciousness and enters a distinctive global state of consciousness akin to dreaming and the psychedelic state. After unpacking and motivating this hypothesis in the context of research in consciousness science, I outline two of its important implications for the neurobiology of depression and psychedelic psychiatry. The upshot is a promising and conceptually well-motivated hypothesis about depression that is apt for empirical uptake and development.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · 29d

New letter to the Editors

Caspar Jacobs, Against Presentist Velocities: Response to Gijsbers

www.thebsps.org/letters/gijs...

#philsci #philsky

On Gijsbers, Presentist Velocities | Letters to the Editor

Correspondence from Caspar Jacobs

www.thebsps.org

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · Sep 8

From the new issue

The Literalist Fallacy and the Free Energy Principle: Model Building, Scientific Realism & Instrumentalism
– Michael David Kirchhoff, Julian Kiverstein & Ian Robertson

Read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Disagreement about how best to think of the relation between theories and the realities they represent has a long-standing and venerable history. We take up this debate in relation to active inference models based on the free energy principle (FEP)—a contemporary framework in computational neuroscience, theoretical biology, and the philosophy of cognitive science. Active inference under the FEP is a very ambitious form of model-based science, being applied to explain everything from neurobiological structure and function to the biology of self-organization. In this context, some find apparent discrepancies between the map (active inference models based on the FEP) and the territory (target systems) to be a compelling reason to defend instrumentalism about such models. We take this to be misguided. We identify an important fallacy made by those defending instrumentalism about active inference models. We call it the literalist fallacy: this is the fallacy of accepting or affirming instrumentalism based on the claim that the properties of active inference models based on the FEP do not literally map onto real-world target systems. We conclude that a version of scientific realism about active inference models under the FEP is a live and tenable option.

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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · Sep 5

Time Reversal Invariance and Ontology
– Ward Struyve

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky

ABSTRACT. Albert and Callender have challenged the received view that theories like classical electrodynamics and non-relativistic quantum mechanics are time-reversal invariant. They claim that time reversal should correspond to the mere reversal of the temporal order of the instantaneous states without any accompanying change of the instantaneous state itself, as in the standard view. Given this, they claim that these theories are not time-reversal invariant. The view of Albert and Callender has been much criticized, with many philosophers arguing that time reversal may correspond to more than the reversal of the temporal order. This article will not so much engage with that aspect of the debate, but rather deflate the disagreement by exploiting the ontological underdetermination. Namely, it will be argued that with a suitable choice of ontology, these theories are in fact time-reversal invariant in the sense of Albert and Callender, in agreement with the standard view.

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