The HMT refines the demand substitution focus in the caselaw (e.g., duPont (Cellophane)) by suggesting a conceptual metric to determine how much demand substitution is too much to define a market. Looking just to Brown Shoe doesn't tell you how to think about that.
I see the HMT as differing from Brown Shoe for a different reason: The HMT looks only to evidence about a single economic force, demand (buyer) substitution, while some Brown Shoe factors are about other economic forces. As you say, both approaches integrate qualitative & qualitative evidence.
Reposted by: Jonathan B. Baker
New Working Paper! Lucky to work with Shane Greenstein @shanegreenstein.bsky.social and Pai-Ling Yin on "New Economic Forces Behind the Value Distribution of Innovation." Abstract and link follow.
lnkd.in/ew6UHk3v
lnkd.in/ew6UHk3v
Reposted by: Jonathan B. Baker, Trevon D. Logan, Karen Benjamin Guzzo
Looming problems from BLS statistics politicization. Social security benefits and many long term labor market contracts are indexed to the CPI. BLS makes the CPI. Recipients care about indexed cost of living increases, a lot.
/1
/1
Agreed—market def in this case seems too fact-bound to be a good candidate for cert.
Nested markets are fine if the facts support both. I could imagine, for example, markets for colas, all soft drinks, and all beverages. If all satisfy the hypothetical monopolist test, conduct that harms competition in any one of them (or more than one) would presumably violate the antitrust laws.
I recently reviewed Louis Kaplow’s book "Rethinking Merger Analysis." The review evaluates the book’s discussion of market definition, coordinated effects, entry, efficiencies, and the welfare standard. Available in The Antitrust Source or at ssrn.com/abstract=533...
Looking at Merger Review from Outside an Ivory Tower
This article reviews Louis Kaplow, Rethinking Merger Analysis (MIT Press 2024). The review evaluates the book's discussion of five major topics:&
ssrn.com
Reposted by: Jonathan B. Baker
Are you wondering how to make monopoly digital platforms more competitive? I have a new book with answers. Intro article here in ProMarket: www.promarket.org/2025/06/26/a...
A Pro-Competitive Handbook for Policymakers to Unlock Digital Competition - ProMarket
Fiona Scott Morton introduces her new book on how regulators and policymakers can promote competition and fairness in digital markets.
www.promarket.org
Lunch with some DC area antitrust professors. With @profgavil.bsky.social @lancierifilippo.bsky.social Dale Collins and @stevesalop.bsky.social
Reposted by: Jonathan B. Baker
While the second Trump administration's initial moves in #antitrust enforcement suggested continuity, more recent actions outside the realm of antitrust enforcement have the potential to change #competitionpolicy dramatically, explains @jbbecon.bsky.social.
cepr.org/publications...
#EconSky
cepr.org/publications...
#EconSky
Reposted by: Jonathan B. Baker, Ugo Panizza
📢 New CEPR #eBook out NOW! 📚
"The Economic Consequences of the Second Trump Administration: A Preliminary Assessment"
Editors: Gary Gensler, @simonhrjohnson.bsky.social, @upanizza.bsky.social, @wederdim.bsky.social
Free download: cepr.org/publications...
#EconSky
"The Economic Consequences of the Second Trump Administration: A Preliminary Assessment"
Editors: Gary Gensler, @simonhrjohnson.bsky.social, @upanizza.bsky.social, @wederdim.bsky.social
Free download: cepr.org/publications...
#EconSky
by Diane Coyle — Reposted by: Jonathan B. Baker, Jonathan Parker, Luis Garicano
I have a new book! Digital Platform Regulation. Fun analysis of what society should do to get some competition out of of our favorite gatekeeper platform. Relevant to the DMA and US antitrust remedies. And free! Download here:
som.yale.edu/centers/thur...
som.yale.edu/centers/thur...
Digital Platform Regulation
som.yale.edu
Slater’s perspective favors strong antitrust. But it’s natural to wonder whether liberty protection—the intellectual basis for what she calls a new right realignment in antitrust—would, like Lochner era thinking, now justify non-antitrust policies to circumscribe social & economic regulation. 5/5
Slater also recalls the 19th c in her populist framing of antitrust as supporting “forgotten men and women”—for her consumers, workers, and small businesses and innovators in Little Tech, manufacturing, and family farms—against private monopolies, particularly “online platforms” 4/5
That view animated the Supreme Court’s 1899 Addyston Pipe decision, a leading antitrust precedent still read today written by Justice Rufus Peckham. Peckham famously supported expansive substantive due process protection for contract and property rights. 3/5
Slater emphasizes that individual liberty is threatened by “corporate tyranny” just as it is threatened by government tyranny. Similarly, the Lochner era Supreme Court objected to all artificial interference with the market, public or private, as inconsistent with the “liberty of contract.” 2/5
When AAG Slater roots her “America First Antitrust” (www.justice.gov/opa/speech/a...) in “conservative values,” she recalls judicial thinking from over a century ago. 1/5
Assistant Attorney General Gail Slater Delivers First Antitrust Address at University of Notre Dame Law School
Good afternoon. Thank you so much for having me. It is an honor to be here at Notre Dame to give my first formal address as Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division. I’ve had many offers
www.justice.gov
Reposted by: Jonathan B. Baker
NEW: After the second Trump administration initially appeared to maintain significant continuity in antitrust enforcement, the president more recently thrust the agencies into turmoil. Those later actions create troubling risks to the economy and the rule of law, writes @jbbecon.bsky.social.
Threats to Competition Policy in the Second Trump Administration: Is Antitrust Enforcement Following Alice Down the Rabbit Hole? - ProMarket
After the second Trump administration initially appeared to maintain significant continuity in antitrust enforcement, the president more recently thrust the agencies into turmoil. Those later actions ...
www.promarket.org
Threats to Competition Policy in the Second Trump Administration: Is Antitrust Enforcement Following Alice Down the Rabbit Hole?
My new blog post: www.promarket.org/2025/04/11/t...
My new blog post: www.promarket.org/2025/04/11/t...
Threats to Competition Policy in the Second Trump Administration: Is Antitrust Enforcement Following Alice Down the Rabbit Hole? - ProMarket
After the second Trump administration initially appeared to maintain significant continuity in antitrust enforcement, the president more recently thrust the agencies into turmoil. Those later actions ...
www.promarket.org
I gave a list of examples such as unilateral effects of mergers and raising rivals' costs analysis, and said "Those developments often moved the law and enforcement in a direction counter to the distributional interest of big business." From ssrn.com/abstract=449... 4/4
Not a Simple Story of Big Business Capture: An Essay on the Political Economy of Antitrust
This essay questions a political economy theory that views U.S. antitrust institutions as having been captured by big business around the late 1970s. It explain
ssrn.com
On the role of economics, I wrote in 2023 that "the big business capture theory cannot readily rationalize the not insubstantial influence ... of developments in economics since the 1970s that called into question non-interventionist perspectives" 3/4
..."Trump has organized his political movement around cultural and identity issues, not economic issues.”
Both quotes from ssrn.com/abstract=414... I also noted differences between the economic interests of Trumpian populists and big business. That's not saying big business favors democracy. 2/4
Both quotes from ssrn.com/abstract=414... I also noted differences between the economic interests of Trumpian populists and big business. That's not saying big business favors democracy. 2/4
Finding Common Ground Among Antitrust Reformers
This forthcoming article explains why antimonopolists (neoBrandeisians) and post-Chicagoans (centrist reformers) should work together to advance both groups’ go
ssrn.com
On democracy, here's what I wrote in 2022 (before Trump began to work with Musk): "[T]he imminent threat to democracy comes from authoritarians, not from the political power of large firm interests—at least so long as big business avoids making common cause with Trumpian populists." 1/4
Finding Common Ground Among Antitrust Reformers
This forthcoming article explains why antimonopolists (neoBrandeisians) and post-Chicagoans (centrist reformers) should work together to advance both groups’ go
ssrn.com
Whether courts should extend Rambus to merger and agreement cases turns primarily on error cost considerations that may look different to courts today than they appeared when Rambus was decided. Paper: ssrn.com/abstract=511.... 9/9
Conduct that Increases Market Power Without Lessening Competition: A Challenge for Antitrust Law
Conduct that violates the antitrust laws usually lessens competition and increases market power. But some conduct increases market power without lessening compe
ssrn.com
Policy issues: the practical ability of courts to deter harmful conduct, error cost considerations, and non-economic values. Legal issue: whether Rambus v. FTC, a unilateral conduct case requiring increased market power to flow from lessened competition, extends to merger and agreement cases. 8/9
Lessened competition can generate increased market power, but it is not the only mechanism that can lead to that outcome. Whether the antitrust laws should reach conduct where increased market power does not flow from lessened competition turns on legal and policy considerations. 7/9
Definitions: a firm experiences lessened competition in serving buyers when buyer substitution opportunities become less attractive (relaxing a competitive constraint). A firm exercises increased market power when its terms of trade become less advantageous to its buyers. 6/9
All are examples of the increased exercise of market power that does not flow from lessened competition. Not finding an antitrust violation may appear counterintuitive because market power has increased. Yet finding a violation may appear counterintuitive because competition has not lessened. 5/9
3) Post-acquisition application of contractual provision. Two merging cablecos have contracts with programming firms that require the merged firm to pay common suppliers the greater of the two pre-merger input prices. The merged firm passes through its higher costs by raising cable prices. 4/9