Gabriele Contessa
@gabecontessa.bsky.social
Philosopher @ Carleton University 🇨🇦
SocEpi/PhiSci/PolPhi/PhiEcon
Currently writing a book on public trust in science.
Paper-length overview: https://philpapers.org/rec/CONITA-5
Shorter overview: http://tinyurl.com/49mwupex.
He/him
SocEpi/PhiSci/PolPhi/PhiEcon
Currently writing a book on public trust in science.
Paper-length overview: https://philpapers.org/rec/CONITA-5
Shorter overview: http://tinyurl.com/49mwupex.
He/him
Pinned
Science Denial
Cambridge Core - Philosophy: General Interest - Science Denial
doi.org
My Element on science denial is free to download until December 1st! Get it for free while you can!
doi.org/10.1017/9781...
doi.org/10.1017/9781...
My Element on science denial is free to download until December 1st! Get it for free while you can!
doi.org/10.1017/9781...
doi.org/10.1017/9781...
Science Denial
Cambridge Core - Philosophy: General Interest - Science Denial
doi.org
November 17, 2025 at 2:09 PM
My Element on science denial is free to download until December 1st! Get it for free while you can!
doi.org/10.1017/9781...
doi.org/10.1017/9781...
Excited to share that this is forthcoming as part of the Cambridge Elements in Philosophy of Science series! (Preprint downloadable through the link) philpapers.org/rec/CONSDP-2
Gabriele Contessa, Science Denial: Post-Truth or Post-Trust? - PhilPapers
Over the last couple of decades, there has been increasing concern about the alleged rise of various forms of science denial. But what exactly is science denial? Is it really on ...
philpapers.org
June 25, 2025 at 6:53 PM
Excited to share that this is forthcoming as part of the Cambridge Elements in Philosophy of Science series! (Preprint downloadable through the link) philpapers.org/rec/CONSDP-2
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
I’m super excited to announce I'm part of an amazing team (<3 @williambrady.bsky.social @killianmcloughlin.bsky.social @mjcrockett.bsky.social) that just published a paper in @science.org on the role of outrage in spread of misinformation
Link here:
science.org/doi/10.1126/...
Summary in🧵🔽
1/
Link here:
science.org/doi/10.1126/...
Summary in🧵🔽
1/
November 29, 2024 at 10:06 AM
I’m super excited to announce I'm part of an amazing team (<3 @williambrady.bsky.social @killianmcloughlin.bsky.social @mjcrockett.bsky.social) that just published a paper in @science.org on the role of outrage in spread of misinformation
Link here:
science.org/doi/10.1126/...
Summary in🧵🔽
1/
Link here:
science.org/doi/10.1126/...
Summary in🧵🔽
1/
How long before higher-ed admins finally realize that, if they eliminate instructors completely, they can cut costs and turn their university/college into an all-inclusive resort for those who want the “college experience” without the burden of getting an education in the process?
November 29, 2024 at 1:21 PM
How long before higher-ed admins finally realize that, if they eliminate instructors completely, they can cut costs and turn their university/college into an all-inclusive resort for those who want the “college experience” without the burden of getting an education in the process?
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Nice idea, Gabriele. In this article, Michel Croce and I argue against the view that the norms of good friendship require epistemic partiality by appealing to the idea that friendship requires understanding.
Michel Croce & Matthew Jope, Understanding friendship - PhilPapers
This article takes issue with two prominent views in the current debate around epistemic partiality in friendship. Strong views of epistemic partiality hold that friendship may require biased beliefs ...
philpapers.org
November 28, 2024 at 3:06 PM
Nice idea, Gabriele. In this article, Michel Croce and I argue against the view that the norms of good friendship require epistemic partiality by appealing to the idea that friendship requires understanding.
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
This is the most recent one and thus my favorite.
The title is descriptive: it's about how to apply norms of testimony / assertion to the presentation of graphs (and other depictions). Plus what (some) philosophers of science get wrong about honesty.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
The title is descriptive: it's about how to apply norms of testimony / assertion to the presentation of graphs (and other depictions). Plus what (some) philosophers of science get wrong about honesty.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
How do you assert a graph? Towards an account of depictions in scientific testimony
I extend the literature on norms of assertion to the ubiquitous use of graphs in scientific papers and presentations, which I term “graphical testimony.” On my account, the testimonial presentation o...
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
November 27, 2024 at 7:54 PM
This is the most recent one and thus my favorite.
The title is descriptive: it's about how to apply norms of testimony / assertion to the presentation of graphs (and other depictions). Plus what (some) philosophers of science get wrong about honesty.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
The title is descriptive: it's about how to apply norms of testimony / assertion to the presentation of graphs (and other depictions). Plus what (some) philosophers of science get wrong about honesty.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Here, I try to ground epistemic normativity in the internal rules of epistemic social practices. The view also vindicates the idea that reasons concerning social inquiry - what I call inquisitive reasons - can be counted as epistemic reasons in good standing.
philpapers.org/rec/FLEEPA
philpapers.org/rec/FLEEPA
Will Fleisher, Epistemic practices: A unified account of epistemic and zetetic normativity - PhilPapers
This paper presents the epistemic practices account, a theory about the nature of epistemic normativity. The account aims to explain how the pursuit of epistemic values such as truth and knowledge ...
philpapers.org
November 27, 2024 at 8:01 PM
Here, I try to ground epistemic normativity in the internal rules of epistemic social practices. The view also vindicates the idea that reasons concerning social inquiry - what I call inquisitive reasons - can be counted as epistemic reasons in good standing.
philpapers.org/rec/FLEEPA
philpapers.org/rec/FLEEPA
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
What kind of beliefs should policymakers form when experts disagree? (probably not my favorite, but want to get it out there)
The Precautionary Principle and Expert Disagreement - Erkenntnis
The Precautionary Principle is typically construed as a conservative decision rule aimed at preventing harm. But Martin Peterson (JME 33: 5–10, 2007; The ethics of technology: A geometric analysis of ...
link.springer.com
November 27, 2024 at 8:04 PM
What kind of beliefs should policymakers form when experts disagree? (probably not my favorite, but want to get it out there)
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
This is a service paper, trying to put the conceptual (and very basic formal) tools together to think about what collective inquiry is link.springer.com/article/10.1...
Group Inquiry - Erkenntnis
Group agents can act, and they can have knowledge. How should we understand the species of collective action which aims at knowledge? In this paper, I present an account of group inquiry. This account...
link.springer.com
November 27, 2024 at 8:33 PM
This is a service paper, trying to put the conceptual (and very basic formal) tools together to think about what collective inquiry is link.springer.com/article/10.1...
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Knowledgeable voters are perhaps more dangerous to democracy than ignorant ones because they use their knowledge and intelligence to twist the facts and reason their way to whatever they want.
philpapers.org/rec/HANASV
philpapers.org/rec/HANASV
Michael Hannon, Are Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters? - PhilPapers
It is widely believed that democracies require knowledgeable citizens to function well. But the most politically knowledgeable individuals also tend to be the most partisan, and the strength of partis...
philpapers.org
November 27, 2024 at 10:28 PM
Knowledgeable voters are perhaps more dangerous to democracy than ignorant ones because they use their knowledge and intelligence to twist the facts and reason their way to whatever they want.
philpapers.org/rec/HANASV
philpapers.org/rec/HANASV
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
In this chapter on political deference, I argue that we can be required to defer to others on the ground of their epistemic authority. The account also explains why political deference to experts is not normally required, however.
academic.oup.com/book/46053/c...
academic.oup.com/book/46053/c...
Political Deference
Abstract. Political deference, as I understand it, is deference to others on what the right political decision is in a given situation. If they defer polit
academic.oup.com
November 27, 2024 at 9:16 PM
In this chapter on political deference, I argue that we can be required to defer to others on the ground of their epistemic authority. The account also explains why political deference to experts is not normally required, however.
academic.oup.com/book/46053/c...
academic.oup.com/book/46053/c...
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
When you discredit knowers because of their identity, that's epistemic injustice. But when you limit their knowledge claims to their identity - by reducing it to 'experience' or to a fixed domain of knowledge (like gender studies) - that's epistemic positioning. journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...
Epistemic injustice and epistemic positioning: towards an intersectional political economy - Jana Bacevic, 2023
This article introduces the concept of epistemic positioning to theorize the relationship between identity-based epistemic judgements and the reproduction of so...
journals.sagepub.com
November 27, 2024 at 7:27 PM
When you discredit knowers because of their identity, that's epistemic injustice. But when you limit their knowledge claims to their identity - by reducing it to 'experience' or to a fixed domain of knowledge (like gender studies) - that's epistemic positioning. journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
This is a paper where I argue that game theory is a critical tool for even the most "pure" of social epidemiologists.
link.springer.com/article/10.1...
link.springer.com/article/10.1...
The theory of games as a tool for the social epistemologist - Philosophical Studies
Traditionally, epistemologists have distinguished between epistemic and pragmatic goals. In so doing, they presume that much of game theory is irrelevant to epistemic enterprises. I will show that thi...
link.springer.com
November 27, 2024 at 7:43 PM
This is a paper where I argue that game theory is a critical tool for even the most "pure" of social epidemiologists.
link.springer.com/article/10.1...
link.springer.com/article/10.1...
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Upcoming handbook chapter offering an overview of the philosophical debate about epistemic injustice kicked up by Miranda Fricker's work, with an eye towards more sharply delineating the target phenomena from her particular theoretical and terminological choices:
Aidan McGlynn, Epistemic Injustice: Phenomena and Theories (Author's preprint) - PhilPapers
Epistemic injustice has become one of the most widely discussed topics in social epistemology, and has revived interest in issues in the intersections between epistemology and ethics and political phi...
philpapers.org
November 27, 2024 at 7:53 PM
Upcoming handbook chapter offering an overview of the philosophical debate about epistemic injustice kicked up by Miranda Fricker's work, with an eye towards more sharply delineating the target phenomena from her particular theoretical and terminological choices:
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What’s more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. I argue we shouldn’t make such ascriptions.
philpapers.org
November 27, 2024 at 4:28 PM
Group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What’s more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. I argue we shouldn’t make such ascriptions.
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
"Bald-Faced Bullshit and Authoritarian Political Speech: Making Sense of Johnson and Trump. (Co-authored with Tim Kenyon). Defends a new definition of bullshit, which allows for audience variation. Discusses the role of Power Bullshit in authoritarianism.
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
November 27, 2024 at 2:59 PM
"Bald-Faced Bullshit and Authoritarian Political Speech: Making Sense of Johnson and Trump. (Co-authored with Tim Kenyon). Defends a new definition of bullshit, which allows for audience variation. Discusses the role of Power Bullshit in authoritarianism.
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
philpapers.org/rec/WORSCB
The fact that a belief of yours is suspiciously convenient to you is a reason for you to become less confident that it's true. A kind of ideal epistemological theory can be used to resist this conclusion, but that only brings out the pathologies of such ideal theory.
The fact that a belief of yours is suspiciously convenient to you is a reason for you to become less confident that it's true. A kind of ideal epistemological theory can be used to resist this conclusion, but that only brings out the pathologies of such ideal theory.
Alex Worsnip, Suspiciously Convenient Beliefs and the Pathologies of (Epistemological) Ideal Theory - PhilPapers
Public life abounds with examples of people whose beliefs—especially political beliefs—seem suspiciously convenient: consider, for example, the billionaire who believes that all taxation is unjust, or...
philpapers.org
November 27, 2024 at 2:34 PM
philpapers.org/rec/WORSCB
The fact that a belief of yours is suspiciously convenient to you is a reason for you to become less confident that it's true. A kind of ideal epistemological theory can be used to resist this conclusion, but that only brings out the pathologies of such ideal theory.
The fact that a belief of yours is suspiciously convenient to you is a reason for you to become less confident that it's true. A kind of ideal epistemological theory can be used to resist this conclusion, but that only brings out the pathologies of such ideal theory.
Social Epistemologists: I was trying to populate a starter pack for us manually but got lazy and thought it would be much more fun to turn this into a game!
Post a link to your favourite paper you wrote on the topic below with a post-length abstract and I’ll add you to it!
#PhilSky #SocEpis
Post a link to your favourite paper you wrote on the topic below with a post-length abstract and I’ll add you to it!
#PhilSky #SocEpis
November 27, 2024 at 1:31 PM
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
One project: arguing that information and its negations and perversions (mis/disinformation) are too epistemologically thin to bear the weight the current trust in science literature places on them.
November 26, 2024 at 11:06 PM
One project: arguing that information and its negations and perversions (mis/disinformation) are too epistemologically thin to bear the weight the current trust in science literature places on them.
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Acknowledging the diversity of human experience should push us toward a recognition of vijñaptimātratā. But that doesn’t yield a form of idealism, or even a form of phenomenology; it opens up a pathway for the cultivation of a deeply embodied awareness of an ecological form of non-duality.
November 26, 2024 at 9:28 PM
Acknowledging the diversity of human experience should push us toward a recognition of vijñaptimātratā. But that doesn’t yield a form of idealism, or even a form of phenomenology; it opens up a pathway for the cultivation of a deeply embodied awareness of an ecological form of non-duality.
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Not a trained philosopher, but hoping I'm allowed to play :)
AI has the potential to "re-enchant" the world.. that might be a good thing, but it's probably a very bad thing.
AI has the potential to "re-enchant" the world.. that might be a good thing, but it's probably a very bad thing.
November 26, 2024 at 9:19 PM
Not a trained philosopher, but hoping I'm allowed to play :)
AI has the potential to "re-enchant" the world.. that might be a good thing, but it's probably a very bad thing.
AI has the potential to "re-enchant" the world.. that might be a good thing, but it's probably a very bad thing.
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
I'm developing a logic of worldviews.
What are world-views? How do they function as sign-systems? How do world-views, frameworks, Gestalts, ethical orientations, rules for arguments, etc. hang together? How can one compare world-views rationally? #philosophy #worldview #logic
What are world-views? How do they function as sign-systems? How do world-views, frameworks, Gestalts, ethical orientations, rules for arguments, etc. hang together? How can one compare world-views rationally? #philosophy #worldview #logic
Philosophers on Bluesky: Let's play a game! Explain your current research project in one skeet. I'll start in the replies below.
(Please feel free to reskeet(?) or reply to this skeet as you see fit and hopefully this will help more of us to connect here).
(Please feel free to reskeet(?) or reply to this skeet as you see fit and hopefully this will help more of us to connect here).
November 26, 2024 at 6:59 PM
I'm developing a logic of worldviews.
What are world-views? How do they function as sign-systems? How do world-views, frameworks, Gestalts, ethical orientations, rules for arguments, etc. hang together? How can one compare world-views rationally? #philosophy #worldview #logic
What are world-views? How do they function as sign-systems? How do world-views, frameworks, Gestalts, ethical orientations, rules for arguments, etc. hang together? How can one compare world-views rationally? #philosophy #worldview #logic
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
When is attention good and when bad? What makes it good or bad?
November 26, 2024 at 3:23 PM
When is attention good and when bad? What makes it good or bad?
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
People are not primarily attracted to conspiracy theories because of pathology, personality traits, or political commitments. Instead, people are drawn to CTs for aesthetic reasons: they have a taste for a particular type of story.
November 26, 2024 at 3:03 PM
People are not primarily attracted to conspiracy theories because of pathology, personality traits, or political commitments. Instead, people are drawn to CTs for aesthetic reasons: they have a taste for a particular type of story.
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Courage has been neglected among the virtues (yes, I have receipts). Fear is underestimated and understudied by philosophers (esp. moral). Empirical and philosophical literatures on both attitudes tend to not talk much with other. My new book project will be an attempt at remedying these issues.
November 26, 2024 at 3:09 PM
Courage has been neglected among the virtues (yes, I have receipts). Fear is underestimated and understudied by philosophers (esp. moral). Empirical and philosophical literatures on both attitudes tend to not talk much with other. My new book project will be an attempt at remedying these issues.