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Martin Gardner

@mglovesfun.bsky.social

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Betting shop worker. Former French-English interpreter. Love a crazy lawsuit. Medieval French enthusiast. Former tournament Scrabble player. MLB fan. Movie reviews.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · Jan 26

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Reposted by Martin Gardner

Steve in Chicago @spsnomad.bsky.social · 12h

Absolute genius, especially because the usual tactic is to push the crowd back to let vehicles out and then the reverse of that immediately yields footage of ICE backing down to the advance of inflatable frogs/woodland creatures/teletubbies.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 4h

The first sequel was actually good. I don't know why they made a third one. Not everything has to be a franchise.

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 4h

Cops are great

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 4h

LMAO

BFMTV @bfmtv.com · 5h

🔴 C'est reparti pour un tour ? ➡️ https://l.bfmtv.com/rbP2

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

Those were words.

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

This was my exact reaction as well.
bsky.app/profile/wolf...

Wolflawyer @wolflawyer.bsky.social · 16h

Oh no. Anyway…

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

Cops are great.

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

a man wearing sunglasses and a suit is standing in front of a brick wall and says `` cause reading is what ? ''

ALT: a man wearing sunglasses and a suit is standing in front of a brick wall and says `` cause reading is what ? ''

media.tenor.com

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

Real quick, here it is.

This Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, Doc. 3, and
ORDERS as follows:
1. Defendants,1 their officers, agents, assigns entered, and all persons acting in concert with
them, are temporarily enjoined from ordering the federalization and deployment of the
National Guard of the United States within Illinois.
2. This Temporary Restraining Order is at 5:55 P.M. central time on this 9th day of October
2025 and expires on October 23, 2025 at 11:59 P.M.
1President Trump, one of the name Defendants, is not enjoined by this Order.
Case: 1:25-cv-12174 Document #: 67 Filed: 10/09/25 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:990
3. Within two (2) calendar days of entry of this Temporary Restraining Order, Plaintiffs
shall post a nominal bond of $100. The bond shall be filed in the Clerk’s Office and be
deposited into the registry of the Court.
4. Defendants’ Request to Stay or Administratively Stay the Temporary Restraining Order,
Doc. 62 at 58, is DENIED.
5. A telephone hearing will be held on October 22, 2025, at 9:00 A.M. to address whether
this Temporary Restraining Order should be extended for an additional fourteen (14)
calendar days.

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for a TRO. Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(1) and MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 940 F.3d
922 (7th Cir. 2019), the Court has entered the terms of the TRO in a separate document. Doc. 67.
Date: October 10, 2025

[signature]
United States District Judge

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

It's likely to force to state to use resources (such as police, ambulance, fire services) which are finite, and it's an injury to the state itself.

scenarios” rather than to de-escalate conflicts, Doc. 13-7 ¶ 29, the Court believes that allowing
them to deploy at the Broadview Processing Center or anywhere else in Illinois will only add
fuel to the fire that Defendants themselves started.19 And Plaintiffs, quite literally, are responsible
for putting out those fires, as well as treating any injuries that may result. See Doc. 13-5 at 4
(noting that the Broadview Fire Department is responsible for providing paramedics and hospital
transportation for the ICE Processing Center). This diversion of limited state and local resources
is an irreparable harm for which Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

Yep. Deploying the NG is likely to CAUSE unrest, not prevent it.

Second, the Court finds that deployment of National Guard members is likely to lead to
civil unrest, requiring deployment of state and local resources to maintain order. There has been
overwhelming evidence presented that the provocative nature of ICE’s enforcement activity has
caused a significant increase in protest activity, requiring the Broadview Police, ISP, and other
state and local law enforcement agencies to respond. See, e.g., Doc. 13-5; Doc. 13-15; Doc. 13
14. Given that National Guard members “are trained to effectively destroy enemies in combat

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

Shocker; the government violating the Constitution is an irreparable injury (we've already seen standing above).

First, as is discussed above, the Court concludes that Defendants’ actions likely violate
the Tenth Amendment, and “[t]he existence of a continuing constitutional violation constitutes
proof of an irreparable harm.” Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 303 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978). The

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

If you win for reason A, I can decline to come to a conclusion on issue B.

Also, we're talking about a short-term order here. Court can still rule on this later.

Plaintiffs also contend that they are entitled to a TRO enjoining Defendants from
deploying the federalized National Guard based on the Posse Comitatus Act. Defendants raise a
number of arguments for why Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of this claim,
including that (1) the Act provides no basis to enjoin deployment of the National Guard, only the
Guards’ activities; (2) Plaintiffs lack a cause of action to enforce the Act in either equity or
through a private right of action; (3) the Act expressly permits federalized troops to engage in
law enforcement; and (4) the Guard has not been authorized to execute the laws in violation of
the Act. Given that the Court has already determined likelihood of success on the merits on other
grounds, it declines to reach the merits of the Posse Comitatus Act claim at this time.

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

Oh yeah. The very next paragraph.

Defendants’ definition was properly rejected by the Ninth Circuit. On the issue of Section
12406(3)’s meaning, the Ninth Circuit in Newsom declined to adopt the lower court’s definition
of the section that “so long as some amount of execution of the laws remain[ed] possible, the
statute cannot be invoked.” Newsom, 141 F.4th at 1051. But it also rejected the position asserted
by Defendants that “minimal interference with the execution of laws [would] justify invoking §
12406(3),” as such a reading “would swallow subsections one and two, because any invasion or
rebellion renders the President unable to exercise some federal laws.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Rather, the Ninth Circuit held that since evidence suggested execution of federal law had been
“significantly impeded,” invocation of 12406(3) was proper. Id. at 1052. That is a far cry from
Defendants’ proposed definition.

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

i.
Alternative Interpretations
Defendants offer their own interpretation of Section 12406(3), based on their reading of
Newsom v. Trump, 141 F.4th 1032 (9th Cir. 2025), which is that it authorizes the President to call
the National Guard whenever he is “unable to ensure to his satisfaction the faithful execution of
the federal laws by the federal officers who regularly enforce them, without undue harm or risk
to officers.” Doc. 62 at 35. This interpretation is shockingly broad: Defense counsel confirmed
during oral argument that it would allow the federalization of the National Guard if there was
any repeated or ongoing violation of federal law in a community. Given that Defendants have
also contended that every state official who implements a sanctuary city policy is violating
federal law, Defendants’ position also seems to be that the National Guard may be deployed
solely on the basis of state officials exercising their Constitutionally protected right to implement
these policies.

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

Here, there has been no showing that the civil power has failed. The agitators who have
violated the law by attacking federal authorities have been arrested. The courts are open, and the
marshals are ready to see that any sentences of imprisonment are carried out. Resort to the
military to execute the laws is not called for.

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

This section is quite technical and I'm not particularly interested in it. Starts on p. 34 for anyone interested.

2. Section 12406(3)
Turning to Section 12406(3), the parties dispute both its meaning and whether its
conditions have been met. With no Seventh Circuit or Supreme Court decision on Section
12406(3)’s meaning, the Court embarks—as it must—on its own, text-based interpretation of the
statute. The phrase “unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States”
contains several key terms.

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

Not thrilled with the wording here.

Of course, you have a First Amendment right to oppose the government; that's not what the opinion is talking about. It's talking about rebellion against the United States.

This is sensible, because the Court cannot find reasonable support for a conclusion that
there exists in Illinois a danger of rebellion satisfying the demands of Section 12406(2). The
unrest Defendants complain of has consisted entirely of opposition (indeed, sometimes violent)
to a particular federal agency and the laws it is charged with enforcing. That is not opposition to
the authority of the federal government as a whole. Defendants have offered no explanation
supporting the notion that widespread opposition to immigration enforcement constitutes the
makings of a broader opposition to the authority of the federal government.

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

Question (2nd highlighted passage) readily answers itself.

This sets a very high threshold for deployment of the National Guard: As an example,
during the late 1800s, after the close of the Civil War, the Supreme Court and several statutes
referred to the Civil War as constituting a “rebellion.” United States v. Anderson, 76 U.S. 56, 71
(1869) (“As Congress, in its legislation for the army, has determined that the rebellion closed on
the 20th day of August, 1866.”); id. at 70 (“On the 20th day of August, 1866, the President of the
United States, after reciting certain proclamations and acts of Congress concerning the rebellion,
... did proclaim ... that the whole insurrection was at an end, and that peace, order, and tranquility
existed throughout the whole of the United States of America. This is the first official declaration
that we have, on the part of the Executive, that the rebellion was wholly suppressed[.]”); Act of
March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 432 (approving in all respects President’s proclamations as to those
“charged with participation in the late rebellion against the United States”).
Are we, then, in danger of something akin to another Civil War? The President would be
entitled to great deference on the question of whether that state of affairs exists. But it does not
appear as though President Trump has made that conclusion. The June 7, 2025 memorandum
issued by President Trump states that “[t]o the extent that protests or acts of violence directly

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

Haha Loper Bright.

Before turning to the meaning of Section 12406’s subsections, a note on deference:
Defendants are not entitled to “deference” on the issue of what constitutes a rebellion for the
purposes of the Act, nor what it means to be “unable with the regular forces to execute the laws.”
Those are matters of statutory interpretation, a function committed to the courts. See Loper
Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024) (“Whatever respect an Executive Branch
interpretation was due, a judge ‘certainly would not be bound to adopt the construction given by
the head of a department.’ Otherwise, judicial judgment would not be independent at all.”)
(internal citation omitted); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92, 131–32 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (“[T]he Constitution does not empower Congress to issue a judicially binding
interpretation of the Constitution or its laws. Lacking the power itself, it cannot delegate that
power to an agency.”). The Court will not, therefore, simply accept Defendants’ assertion that the
deployment satisfies the strictures of Section 12406. See Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner,
Reading Law 53 (2012) (“Every application of a text to particular circumstances entails
interpretation.”).

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Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

Sigh, they keep trying this "Presidential discretion is not reviewable" argument, and it keeps failing.

Defendants raise two points in support of their argument that the President’s decision to
invoke Section 12406 is not reviewable. First, Defendants cite in passing the rule that when a
valid statute “commits [a] decision to the discretion of the President,” the President’s exercise of
discretion is not subject to judicial review. Doc. 62 at 28 (quoting Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S.
462, 474 (1994)). The Court takes no issue with this general premise but finds it does not apply
here. Section 12406 “permits the President to federalize the National Guard ‘[w]henever’ one of
the three enumerated conditions are met, not whenever he determines that one of them is met.”
See Newsom v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (quoting 10 U.S.C. §
12406) (emphasis in original). Thus, the decision whether to federalize the National Guard,

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

This is such a bullshit argument, I'm honestly surprised they made it.

Illinois, as the judge says, never claimed it was being deprived of the use of the Texas NG.

The Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs cannot challenge
deployment of the Texas National Guard because the Illinois Governor has no legally protected
interest in controlling the militia of another state. This misses the point: Plaintiffs’ claimed injury
is not loss of an ability to control or command, but the loss of its own sovereign rights.8 Nor is
the Court compelled by Defendants’ assertion that intrusion into Plaintiffs’ sovereign police
powers is too generalized to support standing. It is true that grievances may be too generalized to
support Article III injury if what the plaintiff seeks is “relief that no more directly and tangibly
benefits him than it does the public at large.” Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573-74. That is not
the case here, though, as Illinois’s evidence describes injuries directed to its specific sovereign
interests, not the interests of states generally.9 For these reasons, the Court concludes that
Plaintiffs have standing.

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

They challenged standing???

I. Justiciability
Defendants first challenge Plaintiffs’ standing to seek a TRO based on their claim that
Defendants’ deployment of federalized National Guard into Illinois violates 10 U.S.C. § 12406.
Federal courts have jurisdiction only over “cases” and “controversies,” U.S. Const. art. III § 2, cl.

Martin Gardner @mglovesfun.bsky.social · 15h

This section, beginning (as you can see) on p. 14, is excellent, and I'd highly recommend reading all of it.

A. The Constitution
During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, one topic of hot debate among the
Founders was how to properly scope the federal government’s military powers. Indeed, among
the grievances directed against King George III by signatories to the Declaration of
Independence was his keeping “in Times of Peace, Standing Armies, without the Consent of our
Legislatures.” Decl. of Independence para. 13 (U.S. 1776). Thus, while the Founders recognized hat well-trained soldiers were necessary “for providing for the common defense” of our young
nation, they were concerned “that a national standing Army posed an intolerable threat to
individual liberty and to the sovereignty of the separate states.” Perpich v. Dept. of Defense, 496