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Pavel Podvig

@russianforces.org

7.7K followers 310 following 700 posts

Russian nuclear forces, nuclear arms control, disarmament, verification. Strictly personal views here. All coordinates are at http://russianforces.org/podvig

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Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 2d

As Dmitry @kovchegin.bsky.social noted, US non-compliance may not have been the primary factor. Maybe. Without PMDA, Russia can use its reactor-grade Pu in BN-800. But I guess the decision was that if the US is not complying, why should Russia? fissilematerials.org/blog/2019/08... 3/3

Russia uses civilian reactor-grade plutonium to produce MOX fuel for BN-800

The Mining and Chemical Combine in Zheleznogorsk began serial production of MOX fuel for the BN-800 fast-neutron reactor. The first batch of 18 MOX fuel assemblies was sent to BN-800 on 16 August 2019...

fissilematerials.org

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 2d

As I argued in this piece, the US did have some options, but decided that to disregard Russia's opinion and its own obligations. thebulletin.org/2016/04/can-... 2/

Can the US-Russia plutonium disposition agreement be saved?

With Washington shifting tacks and Putin slinging accusations, a bilateral agreement on disposing of weapon-grade plutonium appears to be in trouble.

thebulletin.org

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 2d

The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), which Russia is about to withdraw from, is an example of US violating its obligations. Link to a brief history is below. The US did ask eventually, but when Russia said no, went ahead with the change of plans anyway 1/

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 2d

A counteroffer like this would be perfectly appropriate. Just don't reject the offer outright. They are wrong, btw, that the offer is conditional on things like Golden Dome or Ukraine. The first year seems unilateral, conditions start later strategicsimplicity.substack.com/p/responding... 2/2

Responding to Putin's arms control proposal

Austin and I spoke with Mike Albertson and John Warden to understand Putin's offer, how the U.S. and Russian governments think about arms control policy, and the pros and cons of saying yes or no.

strategicsimplicity.substack.com

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 2d

Strategic Simplicity folks looked at Russia's post-New START proposal (link next). Quite surprisingly, they came up with reasonable recommendations. Like the one below. I just came from an ACA First Committee side event, where I advocated something similar 1/

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 3d

Congratulations to a new MacArthur fellow, Sébastien Philippe, @sebphilippe.bsky.social www.macfound.org/fellows/clas...

Sébastien Philippe

Exposing past harms and potential risks from building, testing, and storing launch-ready nuclear weapons.

www.macfound.org

Reposted by Pavel Podvig

The European Leadership Network (ELN) @theeln.bsky.social · 3d

In New York for the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament & International Security? Make sure to check out ELN Senior Policy Fellow Julia Berghofer's and ELN Senior Network member @akmentt.bsky.social's side event ⤵️
docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1F...

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 10d

I don't think Russia will agree, but that would be a reasonable response to the Russian initiative. As opposed to the "peer competitors" and "we cannot verify anything" lines. And who knows, maybe this can start some kind of a process that will eventually lead to real limits. 6/6

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 10d

I made an argument along these lines in my Arms Control Today piece www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-05/.... The limits are much less important than data exchange and verification (including on-site inspections). The US seems prepared to bear the political cost of the upload anyway. 5/

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 10d

The US, of course, will insist (already does) that Russia's constraints are not verifiable. Fair enough (even though this is often more of an excuse than a good-faith argument). What the US should do then is to make a counteroffer - restore the New START verification system. 4/

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 10d

Partly this is because Russia doesn't have many ways to respond. Yes, it has some upload capability, but it would be a largely symbolic measure. There are advantages of presenting itself as a "responsible" nuclear power. 3/

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 10d

"Steps that would undermine the existing balance" also may mean many different things. It's not impossible that Russia says that a moderate upload does not undermine anything. Or that the Golden Dome doesn't work anyway (which, of course, it won't). 2/

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 10d

As fully expected, the US nuclear community is strongly against adhering to New START limits after Feb 2026. "Two peer competitors" etc. But the Russian proposal is vague enough to leave some room for US upload: "a similar spirit" does not have to mean full reciprocity. 1/

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 11d

Here is the Politico story politi.co/46tL1qI (It would be interesting to see that July 31 DOE memo, though). 5/5

Democrats alarmed as Trump eyes weapons material to fuel nuclear reactors

The scramble to build new reactors to supply power to AI data centers may include plutonium from the nation’s nuclear deterrent.

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 11d

Regarding the potential transfer of plutonium to the industry, I don't think there will be any takers. All these companies work on uranium (mostly HALEU) fuel designs. So, most likely the plutonium will remain where it is (the pit plutonium is mostly in Pantex). 4/

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 11d

To produce pits the US has about 30 tonnes of unobligated Pu (79.7-49.4 fissilematerials.org/countries/un...). Only about half of this is in active weapons, so the US could double its weapons stock. It's the manufacturing capacity, not the availability of Pu that is the problem. 3/

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 11d

The material was to be disposed via the "dilute and dispose" route, but Trump stopped it by the 23 May 2025 "Reinvigorating" executive order. In any event, this program has nothing to do with the pit manufacturing schedule. 2/

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 11d

A somewhat confused piece in Politico re US plutonium by
@zcolman.bsky.social. These 25 tonnes of plutonium in pits is the material identified as surplus 30 years ago, no way it "plays a central role in the US nuclear weapons stockpile" (pits are not "highly radioactive" by the way) 1/

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 12d

Here is Al Mauroni's (very interesting) Substack post substack.com/home/post/p-... and here is the USAF document doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/d... (In the document's metadata, the author is listed as "Buff, Grandpa." Google tells me it's a B-52 reference.) 2/2

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 12d

This is from the "Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-72, Nuclear Operations," released in August 2025:
"To achieve theater-level objectives, CCDRs [Combatant Commanders] may request the use of CONUS-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)..."
h/t Al Mauroni, links ⬇️ 1/

Reposted by Pavel Podvig

Liviu Horovitz @liviuhorovitz.bsky.social · 15d

A new @unidir.org report by Tamara Patton & @russianforces.org proposes the concept of ‘demonstrable verification’ to show compliance in the absence of agreed verification measures for nuclear arms control and space security 7/10

Verification Without a Treaty → UNIDIR

In the established practice of nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements, verification provisions are negotiated as part of a treaty to provide States with a mechanism to assess compliance and t...

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 16d

Nobody has a crystal ball. But we can look at what and why happened in the past, try to learn something and steer things in the direction we prefer. It's not like that future happens on its own.

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 16d

Agree. Russia will be around one way or another. It makes sense to invest some effort into making sure that it's not aggressive, and/or armed. It's not easy, of course, but trying to build a wall and hide behind the nuclear umbrella is probably the worst strategy.

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 16d

I am all for Russia without nuclear weapons. But it's not that simple. I don't think it's realistic to expect that it would disarm being impressed by the US or NATO.

Pavel Podvig @russianforces.org · 16d

thebulletin.org/2009/05/what...

What if North Korea were the only nuclear weapon state?

North Korea's nuclear test will almost certainly fuel skepticism about the nuclear disarmament agenda. If no country has nuclear weapons, skeptics will ask, then how can “nuclear renegades” such as No...

thebulletin.org