Experimental Philosophy
@xphilosopher.bsky.social
An account for experimental philosophy - an interdisciplinary field at the intersection of philosophy and psychology https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Experimental_philosophy#:~:text=Experimental%20philosophy%20is%20an%20emerging,inform%20research%20on%20phi
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
Flanagan & de Almeida on Cognitive Science and the Hart-Dworkin Debate
Brian Flanagan (National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Faculty of Law) & Guilherme F. C. F. de Almeida (Yale University) have posted What Cognitive Science says about the Hart-Dworkin Debate on SSRN. Here is…
Brian Flanagan (National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Faculty of Law) & Guilherme F. C. F. de Almeida (Yale University) have posted What Cognitive Science says about the Hart-Dworkin Debate on SSRN. Here is…
Flanagan & de Almeida on Cognitive Science and the Hart-Dworkin Debate
Brian Flanagan (National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Faculty of Law) & Guilherme F. C. F. de Almeida (Yale University) have posted What Cognitive Science says about the Hart-Dworkin Debate on SSRN. Here is the abstract: Hard cases generate disputes in which judges insist that fidelity to law sometimes requires departing from its letter. Ronald Dworkin argued that this phenomenon poses a distinctive challenge to legal positivism.
legaltheoryblog.com
January 14, 2026 at 12:30 PM
Flanagan & de Almeida on Cognitive Science and the Hart-Dworkin Debate
Brian Flanagan (National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Faculty of Law) & Guilherme F. C. F. de Almeida (Yale University) have posted What Cognitive Science says about the Hart-Dworkin Debate on SSRN. Here is…
Brian Flanagan (National University of Ireland, Maynooth (NUI Maynooth) - Faculty of Law) & Guilherme F. C. F. de Almeida (Yale University) have posted What Cognitive Science says about the Hart-Dworkin Debate on SSRN. Here is…
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
I am talking about experimental philosophy of medicine on Thursday. ruhr-uni-bochum.zoom.us/j/67803558818
January 6, 2026 at 2:30 AM
I am talking about experimental philosophy of medicine on Thursday. ruhr-uni-bochum.zoom.us/j/67803558818
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
New paper from the IMC lab! I am very excited about this one. For years, I have been arguing that one of the main claims of the so-called "simulation heuristic" is likely not true for episodic counterfactual thinking, namely that the harder it is to mentally simulate it, the less plausible (1/n)
January 7, 2026 at 11:11 PM
New paper from the IMC lab! I am very excited about this one. For years, I have been arguing that one of the main claims of the so-called "simulation heuristic" is likely not true for episodic counterfactual thinking, namely that the harder it is to mentally simulate it, the less plausible (1/n)
Meta-analysis: After correcting for publication bias, there is no effect of “social norm messaging” nudges on health behavior
We need theories that explain *why* these interventions don’t work
www.nature.com/articles/s41...
We need theories that explain *why* these interventions don’t work
www.nature.com/articles/s41...
A systematic review and meta-analysis of the effectiveness of social norms messaging approaches for improving health behaviours in developed countries - Nature Human Behaviour
Social norms approaches are widely applied in health promotion. This pre-registered systematic review and meta-analysis of RCTs using social norms messaging in developed countries aimed to evaluate th...
www.nature.com
January 7, 2026 at 3:56 PM
Meta-analysis: After correcting for publication bias, there is no effect of “social norm messaging” nudges on health behavior
We need theories that explain *why* these interventions don’t work
www.nature.com/articles/s41...
We need theories that explain *why* these interventions don’t work
www.nature.com/articles/s41...
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
🧵New preprint: Adults often agree with their ingroup even when evidence says otherwise. Why?
To find out, we studied kids, who show the same tendency but *before* political identities take hold. With developmental data, we can see the basic psychological ingredients.
doi.org/10.31234/osf...
1/11
To find out, we studied kids, who show the same tendency but *before* political identities take hold. With developmental data, we can see the basic psychological ingredients.
doi.org/10.31234/osf...
1/11
OSF
doi.org
January 6, 2026 at 3:03 PM
🧵New preprint: Adults often agree with their ingroup even when evidence says otherwise. Why?
To find out, we studied kids, who show the same tendency but *before* political identities take hold. With developmental data, we can see the basic psychological ingredients.
doi.org/10.31234/osf...
1/11
To find out, we studied kids, who show the same tendency but *before* political identities take hold. With developmental data, we can see the basic psychological ingredients.
doi.org/10.31234/osf...
1/11
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
A fascinating new paper by Amanda Royka and colleagues explores why monkeys fail false belief tasks.
A natural explanation would be that monkeys wrongly assume that other agents share their own knowledge.
Royka et al. find that this is NOT the case...
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
A natural explanation would be that monkeys wrongly assume that other agents share their own knowledge.
Royka et al. find that this is NOT the case...
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
Exploring the evolutionary roots of theory of mind: Primate errors on false belief tasks reveal representational limits
Human adults flexibly reason about others' unobservable mental states, a capacity known as Theory of Mind (ToM). Unfortunately, the roots of this capa…
www.sciencedirect.com
January 2, 2026 at 5:21 PM
A fascinating new paper by Amanda Royka and colleagues explores why monkeys fail false belief tasks.
A natural explanation would be that monkeys wrongly assume that other agents share their own knowledge.
Royka et al. find that this is NOT the case...
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
A natural explanation would be that monkeys wrongly assume that other agents share their own knowledge.
Royka et al. find that this is NOT the case...
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
Beautiful experimental philosophy paper on what people ordinarily mean when they say that a statement is “true”
Turns out it’s not always about corresponding correctly to the facts. Sometimes it’s more closely related to a moral ideal of “truthfulness”
philarchive.org/archive/ZYGTJN
Turns out it’s not always about corresponding correctly to the facts. Sometimes it’s more closely related to a moral ideal of “truthfulness”
philarchive.org/archive/ZYGTJN
January 1, 2026 at 6:31 PM
Beautiful experimental philosophy paper on what people ordinarily mean when they say that a statement is “true”
Turns out it’s not always about corresponding correctly to the facts. Sometimes it’s more closely related to a moral ideal of “truthfulness”
philarchive.org/archive/ZYGTJN
Turns out it’s not always about corresponding correctly to the facts. Sometimes it’s more closely related to a moral ideal of “truthfulness”
philarchive.org/archive/ZYGTJN
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
@xphilosopher.bsky.social and I tried to study what beliefs do (or at least, what people think they do).
Across hundreds of participant generated beliefs and first/third party ratings, we found they express identity and/or represent facts, in the pattern described in this post.
1/
Across hundreds of participant generated beliefs and first/third party ratings, we found they express identity and/or represent facts, in the pattern described in this post.
1/
Maybe there are two distinct kinds of belief: they either represent facts (It's rainy) or express identity (My son is the best). We find instead that many beliefs simultaneously represent facts and express identity (but few beliefs do neither).
December 26, 2025 at 6:29 PM
@xphilosopher.bsky.social and I tried to study what beliefs do (or at least, what people think they do).
Across hundreds of participant generated beliefs and first/third party ratings, we found they express identity and/or represent facts, in the pattern described in this post.
1/
Across hundreds of participant generated beliefs and first/third party ratings, we found they express identity and/or represent facts, in the pattern described in this post.
1/
In this new paper, we look at some different dimensions on which beliefs vary:
- Is the belief deeply important to your identity?
- Would you change your mind if you got evidence against it?
- Is it best described in terms of credences (“pretty sure”), or is it more yes/no?
1/
- Is the belief deeply important to your identity?
- Would you change your mind if you got evidence against it?
- Is it best described in terms of credences (“pretty sure”), or is it more yes/no?
1/
Maybe there are two distinct kinds of belief: they either represent facts (It's rainy) or express identity (My son is the best). We find instead that many beliefs simultaneously represent facts and express identity (but few beliefs do neither).
December 22, 2025 at 6:28 PM
In this new paper, we look at some different dimensions on which beliefs vary:
- Is the belief deeply important to your identity?
- Would you change your mind if you got evidence against it?
- Is it best described in terms of credences (“pretty sure”), or is it more yes/no?
1/
- Is the belief deeply important to your identity?
- Would you change your mind if you got evidence against it?
- Is it best described in terms of credences (“pretty sure”), or is it more yes/no?
1/
“Children enter from the door on the left.”
This sentence is what’s called a GENERIC… but it isn’t saying anything general about the nature of children. What then makes it generic?
New theory from @kateritch.bsky.social and Ny Vasil
philpapers.org/archive/RITG...
This sentence is what’s called a GENERIC… but it isn’t saying anything general about the nature of children. What then makes it generic?
New theory from @kateritch.bsky.social and Ny Vasil
philpapers.org/archive/RITG...
December 14, 2025 at 2:47 PM
“Children enter from the door on the left.”
This sentence is what’s called a GENERIC… but it isn’t saying anything general about the nature of children. What then makes it generic?
New theory from @kateritch.bsky.social and Ny Vasil
philpapers.org/archive/RITG...
This sentence is what’s called a GENERIC… but it isn’t saying anything general about the nature of children. What then makes it generic?
New theory from @kateritch.bsky.social and Ny Vasil
philpapers.org/archive/RITG...
New experimental paper on intuitions about whether people have obligations *to themselves*
From philosopher Laura Soter (@laurasoter.bsky.social) in JPSP
psycnet.apa.org/record/2027-...
From philosopher Laura Soter (@laurasoter.bsky.social) in JPSP
psycnet.apa.org/record/2027-...
December 12, 2025 at 4:28 PM
New experimental paper on intuitions about whether people have obligations *to themselves*
From philosopher Laura Soter (@laurasoter.bsky.social) in JPSP
psycnet.apa.org/record/2027-...
From philosopher Laura Soter (@laurasoter.bsky.social) in JPSP
psycnet.apa.org/record/2027-...
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
This is a fascinating new experimental jurisprudence paper from Chris Jaeger on what is "reasonable."
For laypeople's judgments of reasonableness, the probability of harm (P) has an important effect beyond its role in the B
yalelawjournal.org/article/the-...
For laypeople's judgments of reasonableness, the probability of harm (P) has an important effect beyond its role in the B
yalelawjournal.org/article/the-...
The Hand Formula’s Unequal Inputs | Yale Law Journal
Tort law’s famous Hand Formula does not align with how laypeople judge whether conduct is reasonable. Five original experiments demonstrate that the Hand...
yalelawjournal.org
December 5, 2025 at 1:38 PM
This is a fascinating new experimental jurisprudence paper from Chris Jaeger on what is "reasonable."
For laypeople's judgments of reasonableness, the probability of harm (P) has an important effect beyond its role in the B
yalelawjournal.org/article/the-...
For laypeople's judgments of reasonableness, the probability of harm (P) has an important effect beyond its role in the B
yalelawjournal.org/article/the-...
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
The new journal *Experimental Philosophy* is now open for submissions! Very glad to serve as an AE and looking forward to seeing this take off. #philsky
December 8, 2025 at 6:17 PM
The new journal *Experimental Philosophy* is now open for submissions! Very glad to serve as an AE and looking forward to seeing this take off. #philsky
“Murder is wrong, but I don’t disapprove of it”
Expressivist theories of moral language seem to suggest that this sentence should make no sense — but a new paper in Cognition finds that people actually *do* find this sentence largely acceptable
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
Expressivist theories of moral language seem to suggest that this sentence should make no sense — but a new paper in Cognition finds that people actually *do* find this sentence largely acceptable
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
November 28, 2025 at 4:39 PM
“Murder is wrong, but I don’t disapprove of it”
Expressivist theories of moral language seem to suggest that this sentence should make no sense — but a new paper in Cognition finds that people actually *do* find this sentence largely acceptable
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
Expressivist theories of moral language seem to suggest that this sentence should make no sense — but a new paper in Cognition finds that people actually *do* find this sentence largely acceptable
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
Get your papers ready!
The journal's homepage is now live: journals.ub.uni-koeln.de/index.php/xphi
We will soon also be found under xphi.eu.
Accepting submissions in about 2 weeks.
We will soon also be found under xphi.eu.
Accepting submissions in about 2 weeks.
Experimental Philosophy
journals.ub.uni-koeln.de
November 13, 2025 at 9:13 PM
Get your papers ready!
The new journal EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY will soon be accepting submissions!
The journal's homepage is now live: journals.ub.uni-koeln.de/index.php/xphi
We will soon also be found under xphi.eu.
Accepting submissions in about 2 weeks.
We will soon also be found under xphi.eu.
Accepting submissions in about 2 weeks.
Experimental Philosophy
journals.ub.uni-koeln.de
November 13, 2025 at 7:43 PM
The new journal EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY will soon be accepting submissions!
I appreciated the debate yesterday about how to interpret the results of the cognitive dissonance replication study
Scroll up to read the points made by researchers on both sides
Scroll up to read the points made by researchers on both sides
The whole idea about the paradigm we tested is that manipulation choice rules out the alternative explanations, so it can provide support for the theory, but we didn't find that. We only found effects that can be explained by alternative processes. (Also, I read the paper since I wrote it)
November 7, 2025 at 6:50 PM
I appreciated the debate yesterday about how to interpret the results of the cognitive dissonance replication study
Scroll up to read the points made by researchers on both sides
Scroll up to read the points made by researchers on both sides
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
Maybe a good time to share my favorite critique of When Prophecy Fails (from 1965!)
November 6, 2025 at 2:16 PM
Maybe a good time to share my favorite critique of When Prophecy Fails (from 1965!)
There’s growing evidence that something was going seriously wrong in the classic early work on cognitive dissonance
Latest revelation: The story in When Prophecy Fails seems to have been fabricated in the most egregious way
But this is not the only one…
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
Latest revelation: The story in When Prophecy Fails seems to have been fabricated in the most egregious way
But this is not the only one…
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
Debunking “When Prophecy Fails”
In 1954, Dorothy Martin predicted an apocalyptic flood and promised her followers rescue by flying saucers. When neither arrived, she recanted, her group dissolved, and efforts to proselytize ceased....
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
November 6, 2025 at 2:06 PM
There’s growing evidence that something was going seriously wrong in the classic early work on cognitive dissonance
Latest revelation: The story in When Prophecy Fails seems to have been fabricated in the most egregious way
But this is not the only one…
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
Latest revelation: The story in When Prophecy Fails seems to have been fabricated in the most egregious way
But this is not the only one…
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
There’s a deep difference between sentences like:
(1) Jane caused the glass to break.
vs.
(2) Jane broke the glass.
A surge of experimental philosophy research has led to some surprising discoveries about sentences like (2)
[Thread]
(1) Jane caused the glass to break.
vs.
(2) Jane broke the glass.
A surge of experimental philosophy research has led to some surprising discoveries about sentences like (2)
[Thread]
October 27, 2025 at 1:49 PM
There’s a deep difference between sentences like:
(1) Jane caused the glass to break.
vs.
(2) Jane broke the glass.
A surge of experimental philosophy research has led to some surprising discoveries about sentences like (2)
[Thread]
(1) Jane caused the glass to break.
vs.
(2) Jane broke the glass.
A surge of experimental philosophy research has led to some surprising discoveries about sentences like (2)
[Thread]
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
Ryan Doran is getting to the philosophical bottom of true beauty in this open access 🔓 advance article...
...by ranking the most beautiful philosophers' bottoms 🍎. (You'll never believe who made number 5 😱).* doi.org/10.1093/aest...
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*might be bollocks.
...by ranking the most beautiful philosophers' bottoms 🍎. (You'll never believe who made number 5 😱).* doi.org/10.1093/aest...
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*might be bollocks.
![[P]rettiness is often described as ‘shallow’, but beauty is described as ‘deep’. Depth seems to be primarily intended in its metaphorical sense in this context, as referring to importance or significance, but at times also has intimations of its literal meaning of referring to spatial depth. It is common to hear prettiness spoken of as a property of mere sensory surfaces and appearances, and as trivial, and of beauty as somehow reaching beyond appearances, and as being significant or even profound.
- Ryan P Doran, True Beauty](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:chsp27b6x6v5fyeqzazfpspx/bafkreifu5r44lxke5qv3dyxofvxmf6xqkpflzlxgj4rhjqv3wz7mfvbj5e@jpeg)
October 26, 2025 at 8:54 PM
Ryan Doran is getting to the philosophical bottom of true beauty in this open access 🔓 advance article...
...by ranking the most beautiful philosophers' bottoms 🍎. (You'll never believe who made number 5 😱).* doi.org/10.1093/aest...
ㅤㅤ
ㅤ
ㅤ
ㅤ
ㅤ
ㅤ
*might be bollocks.
...by ranking the most beautiful philosophers' bottoms 🍎. (You'll never believe who made number 5 😱).* doi.org/10.1093/aest...
ㅤㅤ
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*might be bollocks.
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
We're excited to announce that Cognitive Science at Dartmouth is recruiting PhD students to work collaboratively with me, Steven Frankland, and Fred Callaway. Come study the principles and mechanisms that enable us to understand, plan, and act in the world! Info: sites.dartmouth.edu/cogscigrad/
Cognitive Science Graduate Admissions – Information about graduate admissions from the cognitive science faculty
sites.dartmouth.edu
October 23, 2025 at 5:30 PM
We're excited to announce that Cognitive Science at Dartmouth is recruiting PhD students to work collaboratively with me, Steven Frankland, and Fred Callaway. Come study the principles and mechanisms that enable us to understand, plan, and act in the world! Info: sites.dartmouth.edu/cogscigrad/
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
New paper in Synthèse. Open access.
Concepts of health and disease: insights from experimental philosophy of medicine - Synthese
Synthese - The aim of the paper is to explore how people understand the concepts of health and disease, including the factors that influence their judgments about whether a condition is a disease...
link.springer.com
October 20, 2025 at 8:28 PM
New paper in Synthèse. Open access.
Reposted by Experimental Philosophy
"...the “problem of perception” needs to be reconceptualized as arising not from a challenge to our ordinary understanding of vision, but from a patent conflict within this understanding."
That is the central thought of Mike Martin's defense of disjunctivism
That is the central thought of Mike Martin's defense of disjunctivism
In philosophy of perception, we find different intuitions pulling people in opposing directions
New studies from Eugen Fischer et al. show something important about that opposition:
It is not different people having different intuitions; it's each individual person having *conflicting intuitions*
New studies from Eugen Fischer et al. show something important about that opposition:
It is not different people having different intuitions; it's each individual person having *conflicting intuitions*
Scientific or naïve? Perceptions of direct and indirect realism, and why they matter
Philosophical debates about the nature of perception are standardly informed by an empirical assumption about folk beliefs: They assume there is such a thing as “the” common-sense conception of visio...
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
October 15, 2025 at 7:39 PM
"...the “problem of perception” needs to be reconceptualized as arising not from a challenge to our ordinary understanding of vision, but from a patent conflict within this understanding."
That is the central thought of Mike Martin's defense of disjunctivism
That is the central thought of Mike Martin's defense of disjunctivism
In philosophy of perception, we find different intuitions pulling people in opposing directions
New studies from Eugen Fischer et al. show something important about that opposition:
It is not different people having different intuitions; it's each individual person having *conflicting intuitions*
New studies from Eugen Fischer et al. show something important about that opposition:
It is not different people having different intuitions; it's each individual person having *conflicting intuitions*
Scientific or naïve? Perceptions of direct and indirect realism, and why they matter
Philosophical debates about the nature of perception are standardly informed by an empirical assumption about folk beliefs: They assume there is such a thing as “the” common-sense conception of visio...
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
October 15, 2025 at 7:34 PM
In philosophy of perception, we find different intuitions pulling people in opposing directions
New studies from Eugen Fischer et al. show something important about that opposition:
It is not different people having different intuitions; it's each individual person having *conflicting intuitions*
New studies from Eugen Fischer et al. show something important about that opposition:
It is not different people having different intuitions; it's each individual person having *conflicting intuitions*