Daniel Wurgaft
@danielwurgaft.bsky.social
120 followers 190 following 26 posts
PhD @Stanford working w Noah Goodman Studying in-context learning and reasoning in humans and machines Prev. @UofT CS & Psych
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Reposted by Daniel Wurgaft
tobigerstenberg.bsky.social
🚨 NEW PREPRINT: Multimodal inference through mental simulation.

We examine how people figure out what happened by combining visual and auditory evidence through mental simulation.

Paper: osf.io/preprints/ps...
Code: github.com/cicl-stanfor...
Reposted by Daniel Wurgaft
linasnasvytis.bsky.social
🚨New paper out w/ @gershbrain.bsky.social & @fierycushman.bsky.social from my time @Harvard!

Humans are capable of sophisticated theory of mind, but when do we use it?

We formalize & document a new cognitive shortcut: belief neglect — inferring others' preferences, as if their beliefs are correct🧵
Reposted by Daniel Wurgaft
mcxfrank.bsky.social
*Sharing for our department’s trainees*

🧠 Looking for insight on applying to PhD programs in psychology?

✨ Apply by Sep 25th to Stanford Psychology's 9th annual Paths to a Psychology PhD info-session/workshop to have all of your questions answered!

📝 Application: tinyurl.com/pathstophd2025
Flyer for the event!
Reposted by Daniel Wurgaft
lampinen.bsky.social
In neuroscience, we often try to understand systems by analyzing their representations — using tools like regression or RSA. But are these analyses biased towards discovering a subset of what a system represents? If you're interested in this question, check out our new commentary! Thread:
What do representations tell us about a system? Image of a mouse with a scope showing a vector of activity patterns, and a neural network with a vector of unit activity patterns
Common analyses of neural representations: Encoding models (relating activity to task features) drawing of an arrow from a trace saying [on_____on____] to a neuron and spike train. Comparing models via neural predictivity: comparing two neural networks by their R^2 to mouse brain activity. RSA: assessing brain-brain or model-brain correspondence using representational dissimilarity matrices
Reposted by Daniel Wurgaft
nogazs.bsky.social
Super excited to have the #InfoCog workshop this year at #CogSci2025! Join us in SF for an exciting lineup of speakers and panelists, and check out the workshop's website for more info and detailed scheduled
sites.google.com/view/infocog...
Reposted by Daniel Wurgaft
ekdeepl.bsky.social
Submit your latest and greatest papers to the hottest workshop on the block---on cognitive interpretability! 🔥
jennhu.bsky.social
Excited to announce the first workshop on CogInterp: Interpreting Cognition in Deep Learning Models @ NeurIPS 2025! 📣

How can we interpret the algorithms and representations underlying complex behavior in deep learning models?

🌐 coginterp.github.io/neurips2025/

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First Workshop on Interpreting Cognition in Deep Learning Models (NeurIPS 2025)
coginterp.github.io
Reposted by Daniel Wurgaft
jennhu.bsky.social
Excited to announce the first workshop on CogInterp: Interpreting Cognition in Deep Learning Models @ NeurIPS 2025! 📣

How can we interpret the algorithms and representations underlying complex behavior in deep learning models?

🌐 coginterp.github.io/neurips2025/

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Home
First Workshop on Interpreting Cognition in Deep Learning Models (NeurIPS 2025)
coginterp.github.io
Reposted by Daniel Wurgaft
gershbrain.bsky.social
A bias for simplicity by itself does not guarantee good generalization (see the No Free Lunch Theorems). So an inductive bias is only good to the extent that it reflects structure in the data. Is the world simple? The success of deep nets (with their intrinsic Occam's razor) would suggest yes(?)
danielwurgaft.bsky.social
Hi thanks for the comment! I'm not too familiar with the robot-learning literature but would love to learn more about it!
Reposted by Daniel Wurgaft
lampinen.bsky.social
Really nice analysis!
danielwurgaft.bsky.social
🚨New paper! We know models learn distinct in-context learning strategies, but *why*? Why generalize instead of memorize to lower loss? And why is generalization transient?

Our work explains this & *predicts Transformer behavior throughout training* without its weights! 🧵

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
On a personal note, this is my first full-length first-author paper! @ekdeepl.bsky.social and I both worked so hard on this, and I am so excited about our results and the perspective we bring! Follow for more science of deep learning and human learning!

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
💡Key takeaways:
3) A top-down, normative perspective offers a powerful, predictive approach for understanding neural networks, complementing bottom-up mechanistic work.

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
💡Key takeaways:
2) A tradeoff between *loss and complexity* is fundamental to understanding model training dynamics, and gives a unifying explanation for ICL phenomena of transient generalization and task-diversity effects!

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
💡Key takeaways:
1) Is ICL Bayes-optimal? We argue the better question is *under what assumptions*. Cautiously, we conclude that ICL can be seen as approx. Bayesian under a simplicity bias and sublinear sample efficiency (though see our appendix for an interesting deviation!)

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
Ablations of our analytical expression show the modeled computational constraints, in their assumed functional forms, are crucial!

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
And reveals some interesting findings: MLP width increases memorization, which is captured by our model as a reduced simplicity bias!

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
Our framework also makes novel Predictions:
🔹**Sub-linear** sample efficiency → sigmoidal transition from generalization to memorization
🔹**Rapid** behavior change near the M–G crossover boundary
🔹**Superlinear** scaling of time to transience as data diversity increases

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
Intuitively, what does this predictive account imply? A rational tradeoff between a strategy's loss and complexity!

🔵Early: A simplicity bias (prior) favors a less complex strategy (G)
🔴Late: reducing loss (likelihood) favors a better-fitting, but more complex strategy (M)

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
Fitting the three free parameters of our expression, we see that across checkpoints from 11 different runs, we almost perfectly predict *next-token predictions* and the relative distance maps!

We now have a predictive model of task diversity effects and transience!

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
We assume two well-known facts about neural nets as computational constraints (scaling laws and simplicity bias). This allows writing a closed-form expression for the posterior odds!

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
We model our learner as behaving optimally in a hypothesis space defined by the M / G predictors—this yields a *hierarchical Bayesian* view:

🔹Pretraining = updating posterior probability (preference) for strategies
🔹Inference = posterior-weighted average of strategies

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
We now have a unifying language to describe what strategies a model transitions between.

Back to our question:*Why* do models switch ICL strategies?! Given M / G are *Bayes-optimal* for train / true distributions, we invoke the approach of rational analysis to answer this!

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danielwurgaft.bsky.social
By computing the distance between a model’s outputs and these predictors, we show models transition between memorizing and generalizing predictors as experimental settings are varied! This yields a unifying view on known ICL phenomena of task diversity effects and transience!

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