Fabian Hoffmann
@frhoffmann.bsky.social
Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project, University of Oslo. Defense policy, missile technology, and nuclear strategy.
Weekly analysis of missile tech, nuclear strategy, and European deterrence 👇
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Weekly analysis of missile tech, nuclear strategy, and European deterrence 👇
https://missilematters.substack.com/subscribe
That is the core issue with Oreshnik. The missile itself is operationally unimpressive.
But it exposes broader gaps in Europe's deterrence posture, which lacks credible counterstrike capabilities and remains too dependent on the United States in the nuclear domain.
5/5
But it exposes broader gaps in Europe's deterrence posture, which lacks credible counterstrike capabilities and remains too dependent on the United States in the nuclear domain.
5/5
January 11, 2026 at 2:14 PM
That is the core issue with Oreshnik. The missile itself is operationally unimpressive.
But it exposes broader gaps in Europe's deterrence posture, which lacks credible counterstrike capabilities and remains too dependent on the United States in the nuclear domain.
5/5
But it exposes broader gaps in Europe's deterrence posture, which lacks credible counterstrike capabilities and remains too dependent on the United States in the nuclear domain.
5/5
Non-nuclear Oreshniks are best deterred through Europe’s own deep strike capabilities, which are currently not available in sufficient numbers.
Nuclear Oreshniks are covered under NATO’s nuclear deterrent, which, however, remains overly dependent on the U.S. contribution.
4/5
Nuclear Oreshniks are covered under NATO’s nuclear deterrent, which, however, remains overly dependent on the U.S. contribution.
4/5
January 11, 2026 at 2:14 PM
Non-nuclear Oreshniks are best deterred through Europe’s own deep strike capabilities, which are currently not available in sufficient numbers.
Nuclear Oreshniks are covered under NATO’s nuclear deterrent, which, however, remains overly dependent on the U.S. contribution.
4/5
Nuclear Oreshniks are covered under NATO’s nuclear deterrent, which, however, remains overly dependent on the U.S. contribution.
4/5
From a missile defense perspective, it may be preferable for NATO to ignore the threat altogether and focus on higher-priority targets.
Politically, however, this may not be an option, as leaders & publics may demand interception attempts even if they are cost-ineffective.
3/5
Politically, however, this may not be an option, as leaders & publics may demand interception attempts even if they are cost-ineffective.
3/5
January 11, 2026 at 2:14 PM
From a missile defense perspective, it may be preferable for NATO to ignore the threat altogether and focus on higher-priority targets.
Politically, however, this may not be an option, as leaders & publics may demand interception attempts even if they are cost-ineffective.
3/5
Politically, however, this may not be an option, as leaders & publics may demand interception attempts even if they are cost-ineffective.
3/5
In short, I continue to view the Oreshnik as barely operationally useful. It can effectively be employed only against large area targets, including industrial sites, residential areas, and air bases.
Higher-value military point targets cannot be engaged effectively.
2/5
Higher-value military point targets cannot be engaged effectively.
2/5
January 11, 2026 at 2:14 PM
In short, I continue to view the Oreshnik as barely operationally useful. It can effectively be employed only against large area targets, including industrial sites, residential areas, and air bases.
Higher-value military point targets cannot be engaged effectively.
2/5
Higher-value military point targets cannot be engaged effectively.
2/5
That would imply ~20% systemic error rate, which should be above the expected threshold.
December 28, 2025 at 12:41 PM
That would imply ~20% systemic error rate, which should be above the expected threshold.
I was just making an argument about systemic error rate, not overall effectiveness of the strike.
December 28, 2025 at 12:41 PM
I was just making an argument about systemic error rate, not overall effectiveness of the strike.
Tomahawk has ended up in China a long time ago. JASSM would be much worse.
December 28, 2025 at 10:51 AM
Tomahawk has ended up in China a long time ago. JASSM would be much worse.
Destinus is incredibly underrated. I recently visited their production facility in Hengelo. Extremely impressive what they've been doing.
December 28, 2025 at 10:40 AM
Destinus is incredibly underrated. I recently visited their production facility in Hengelo. Extremely impressive what they've been doing.
Ukrainian manufacturers could eventually play a role as well, offering combat-proven systems, though export capacity remains unlikely in the near term.
6/6
6/6
December 28, 2025 at 10:21 AM
Ukrainian manufacturers could eventually play a role as well, offering combat-proven systems, though export capacity remains unlikely in the near term.
6/6
6/6
American and European manufactures, including established firms and new market entrants, are competing for market share in Europe.
Given the state of transatlantic relations, European suppliers may have an advantage. American competitors try to counter by offering localization of production.
5/6
Given the state of transatlantic relations, European suppliers may have an advantage. American competitors try to counter by offering localization of production.
5/6
December 28, 2025 at 10:21 AM
American and European manufactures, including established firms and new market entrants, are competing for market share in Europe.
Given the state of transatlantic relations, European suppliers may have an advantage. American competitors try to counter by offering localization of production.
5/6
Given the state of transatlantic relations, European suppliers may have an advantage. American competitors try to counter by offering localization of production.
5/6
An exception may apply to their role in the arsenals of smaller states with constrained defense budgets.
Mini cruise missiles may allow states that were previously priced out of the missile market to acquire deep missile arsenals. Here, the capability is not merely complementary but enabling.
4/6
Mini cruise missiles may allow states that were previously priced out of the missile market to acquire deep missile arsenals. Here, the capability is not merely complementary but enabling.
4/6
December 28, 2025 at 10:21 AM
An exception may apply to their role in the arsenals of smaller states with constrained defense budgets.
Mini cruise missiles may allow states that were previously priced out of the missile market to acquire deep missile arsenals. Here, the capability is not merely complementary but enabling.
4/6
Mini cruise missiles may allow states that were previously priced out of the missile market to acquire deep missile arsenals. Here, the capability is not merely complementary but enabling.
4/6
Mini cruise missiles fill the gap between affordable, expendable long-range drones and costly, high-end missile systems, including heavy cruise and conventional ballistic missiles.
In this regard, they primarily serve complementary purposes.
3/6
In this regard, they primarily serve complementary purposes.
3/6
December 28, 2025 at 10:21 AM
Mini cruise missiles fill the gap between affordable, expendable long-range drones and costly, high-end missile systems, including heavy cruise and conventional ballistic missiles.
In this regard, they primarily serve complementary purposes.
3/6
In this regard, they primarily serve complementary purposes.
3/6
Mini cruise missiles are distinct from long-range drones.
In fact, they share more in common with heavier legacy cruise missiles, although they are offered at substantially lower price points (around 150-300k per unit), which in turn shapes their capability profile.
2/6
In fact, they share more in common with heavier legacy cruise missiles, although they are offered at substantially lower price points (around 150-300k per unit), which in turn shapes their capability profile.
2/6
December 28, 2025 at 10:21 AM
Mini cruise missiles are distinct from long-range drones.
In fact, they share more in common with heavier legacy cruise missiles, although they are offered at substantially lower price points (around 150-300k per unit), which in turn shapes their capability profile.
2/6
In fact, they share more in common with heavier legacy cruise missiles, although they are offered at substantially lower price points (around 150-300k per unit), which in turn shapes their capability profile.
2/6
Too early, would have been later.
December 7, 2025 at 7:32 PM
Too early, would have been later.