Fabian Hoffmann
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frhoffmann.bsky.social
Fabian Hoffmann
@frhoffmann.bsky.social
Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project, University of Oslo. Defense policy, missile technology, and nuclear strategy.

Weekly analysis of missile tech, nuclear strategy, and European deterrence 👇
https://missilematters.substack.com/subscribe
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Hi all,

I published my latest Missile Matters post earlier today, examining the challenge the Oreshnik missile poses to European defense.

You can access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/oreshnik-i...

Short summary below.

1/5
The Oreshnik Problem for Europe
Technical constraints, opportunity costs, and Europe’s unresolved deterrence deficits
missilematters.substack.com
Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann
Hi all,

I published my latest Missile Matters post earlier today, examining the challenge the Oreshnik missile poses to European defense.

You can access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/oreshnik-i...

Short summary below.

1/5
The Oreshnik Problem for Europe
Technical constraints, opportunity costs, and Europe’s unresolved deterrence deficits
missilematters.substack.com
January 11, 2026 at 2:14 PM
Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann
Das russische Raketensystem Oreshnik stellt @frhoffmann.bsky.social zufolge eine Herausforderung für die europäische Sicherheit dar. Diese Herausforderung ergibt sich jedoch weniger aus den technischen Eigenschaften der Rakete, die nach wie vor überbewertet werden.

www.hartpunkt.de/europas-ores...
Europas Oreshnik-Problem: Technische Einschränkungen, Opportunitätskosten und ungelöste Abschreckungsdefizite
In der Nacht vom 8. auf den 9. Januar 2026 startete Russland den zweiten bestätigten Oreshnik-Raketenangriff gegen die Ukraine.
www.hartpunkt.de
January 11, 2026 at 1:43 PM
That is the core issue with Oreshnik. The missile itself is operationally unimpressive.

But it exposes broader gaps in Europe's deterrence posture, which lacks credible counterstrike capabilities and remains too dependent on the United States in the nuclear domain.

5/5
January 11, 2026 at 2:14 PM
Non-nuclear Oreshniks are best deterred through Europe’s own deep strike capabilities, which are currently not available in sufficient numbers.

Nuclear Oreshniks are covered under NATO’s nuclear deterrent, which, however, remains overly dependent on the U.S. contribution.

4/5
January 11, 2026 at 2:14 PM
From a missile defense perspective, it may be preferable for NATO to ignore the threat altogether and focus on higher-priority targets.

Politically, however, this may not be an option, as leaders & publics may demand interception attempts even if they are cost-ineffective.

3/5
January 11, 2026 at 2:14 PM
In short, I continue to view the Oreshnik as barely operationally useful. It can effectively be employed only against large area targets, including industrial sites, residential areas, and air bases.

Higher-value military point targets cannot be engaged effectively.

2/5
January 11, 2026 at 2:14 PM
Hi all,

I published my latest Missile Matters post earlier today, examining the challenge the Oreshnik missile poses to European defense.

You can access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/oreshnik-i...

Short summary below.

1/5
The Oreshnik Problem for Europe
Technical constraints, opportunity costs, and Europe’s unresolved deterrence deficits
missilematters.substack.com
January 11, 2026 at 2:14 PM
Looks like Russia ordered the Tiktok shop version of a Ukrainian mini cruise missile lmao.
‼️ GUR: In early 2026, the Russians first flew the new Geran-5 jet-powered UAV.

The UAV is approximately 6 meters long, with a 5.5-meter wingspan and a warhead weight of 90 kg.

An airborne version is also being developed, specifically for launches from the Su-25, and equipped with R-73 missiles.
January 11, 2026 at 8:56 AM
I'm not one to cite Thucydides all the time, but the saying "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" bears repeating these days.

Europe's decisionmakers should take note.
Turns out defending international law in a world of predators is impossible if you don't have sufficient force to defend yourself.
European weakness on full display by these horribly contorted responses from Merz, Macron and Starmer - neither condoning nor condemning US actions in Venezuela

Such weakness only risks making the Europeans more vulnerable (ie Greenland)
January 5, 2026 at 2:55 PM
Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann
The war in Ukraine has highlighted the significant utility of so-called mini cruise missiles.

In my last Missile Matters post in 2025, I provide an overview of the European mini cruise missile market in 2026.

Access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/2026-the-y...

Summary below.

1/6
2026: The Year of the Mini Cruise Missile?
How low cost cruise missiles are reshaping arsenals, procurement, and market competition after Ukraine
missilematters.substack.com
December 28, 2025 at 10:21 AM
Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann
Thread. NB: “Mini cruise missiles may allow states that were previously priced out of the missile market to acquire deep missile arsenals.”
The war in Ukraine has highlighted the significant utility of so-called mini cruise missiles.

In my last Missile Matters post in 2025, I provide an overview of the European mini cruise missile market in 2026.

Access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/2026-the-y...

Summary below.

1/6
2026: The Year of the Mini Cruise Missile?
How low cost cruise missiles are reshaping arsenals, procurement, and market competition after Ukraine
missilematters.substack.com
December 28, 2025 at 1:50 PM
That would imply ~20% systemic error rate, which should be above the expected threshold.
December 28, 2025 at 12:41 PM
I was just making an argument about systemic error rate, not overall effectiveness of the strike.
December 28, 2025 at 12:41 PM
Tomahawk has ended up in China a long time ago. JASSM would be much worse.
December 28, 2025 at 10:51 AM
How bad this is really depends on how many Tomahawks were launched.

If it's on the order of 30, it's in line with a 10 percent systemic error rate which is rather typical for most conventional long-range strike weapons.

Anyone has the number?
🇺🇸🇳🇬🚀 At least three Tomahawk missiles from the US's strike on ISIS targets in Nigeria fell short of their targets: the morning after the attack, locals found missile debris and unexploded warheads, - Militarnyi
December 28, 2025 at 10:48 AM
Destinus is incredibly underrated. I recently visited their production facility in Hengelo. Extremely impressive what they've been doing.
December 28, 2025 at 10:40 AM
Reposted by Fabian Hoffmann
"In Europa levert Destinus [uit 🇳🇱 Hengelo] de beproefde Ruta mini-kruisraket, die veelvuldig is gebruikt in Oekraïne."
The war in Ukraine has highlighted the significant utility of so-called mini cruise missiles.

In my last Missile Matters post in 2025, I provide an overview of the European mini cruise missile market in 2026.

Access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/2026-the-y...

Summary below.

1/6
2026: The Year of the Mini Cruise Missile?
How low cost cruise missiles are reshaping arsenals, procurement, and market competition after Ukraine
missilematters.substack.com
December 28, 2025 at 10:30 AM
Ukrainian manufacturers could eventually play a role as well, offering combat-proven systems, though export capacity remains unlikely in the near term.

6/6
December 28, 2025 at 10:21 AM
American and European manufactures, including established firms and new market entrants, are competing for market share in Europe.

Given the state of transatlantic relations, European suppliers may have an advantage. American competitors try to counter by offering localization of production.

5/6
December 28, 2025 at 10:21 AM
An exception may apply to their role in the arsenals of smaller states with constrained defense budgets.

Mini cruise missiles may allow states that were previously priced out of the missile market to acquire deep missile arsenals. Here, the capability is not merely complementary but enabling.

4/6
December 28, 2025 at 10:21 AM
Mini cruise missiles fill the gap between affordable, expendable long-range drones and costly, high-end missile systems, including heavy cruise and conventional ballistic missiles.

In this regard, they primarily serve complementary purposes.

3/6
December 28, 2025 at 10:21 AM
Mini cruise missiles are distinct from long-range drones.

In fact, they share more in common with heavier legacy cruise missiles, although they are offered at substantially lower price points (around 150-300k per unit), which in turn shapes their capability profile.

2/6
December 28, 2025 at 10:21 AM
The war in Ukraine has highlighted the significant utility of so-called mini cruise missiles.

In my last Missile Matters post in 2025, I provide an overview of the European mini cruise missile market in 2026.

Access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/2026-the-y...

Summary below.

1/6
2026: The Year of the Mini Cruise Missile?
How low cost cruise missiles are reshaping arsenals, procurement, and market competition after Ukraine
missilematters.substack.com
December 28, 2025 at 10:21 AM
Too early, would have been later.
December 7, 2025 at 7:32 PM
Extremely nerdy missile question, but maybe someone can help out:

What is the first 3M-54 variant that features satellite-assisted midcourse guidance and when did it enter into service with the Russian Navy?
December 7, 2025 at 7:14 PM