Tales Tomaz
@talestomaz.bsky.social
240 followers 310 following 40 posts
Apenas um rapaz latino-americano | Ass. Prof of Media Policy & Economics at the Universiy of Salzburg | Manager of the Euromedia Ownership Monitor (https://media-ownership.eu) | Parenting | Global South
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Reposted by Tales Tomaz
rodneybenson.bsky.social
Glad to see our findings in How Media Ownership Matters confirmed and extended - will read this closely ! global.oup.com/academic/pro...
Reposted by Tales Tomaz
turnbulldugarte.com
The takeaway:

👉 Accommodating the radical right on immigration doesn’t win back voters.
👉 It alienates the progressive base.
👉 And it raises the salience of the very issue the radical right owns.
In short: it’s electoral self-harm.
talestomaz.bsky.social
Network Analysis for Media Ownership: A Methodological Proposal, in Media and Communication: doi.org/10.17645/mac...

It's part of a special issue by @sfuerst.bsky.social, Florian Muhle, and @cporlezza.bsky.social, and we are very grateful for the guidance of this wonderful editing team!
Network Analysis for Media Ownership: A Methodological Proposal | Article | Media and Communication
Mariia Aleksevych, Tales Tomaz
doi.org
talestomaz.bsky.social
One policy implication:
Moving beyond cross-ownership caps, regulators should adopt network-based assessments to identify actual loci of influence in hybrid media systems.
talestomaz.bsky.social
Key insight: Concentration is not inherently detrimental.
Institutional logic of ownership matters:

* Public/foundation ownership → pluralism & press freedom
* Private/family ownership → risks of instrumentalization

@rodneybenson.bsky.social's works have been an inspiration, of course
talestomaz.bsky.social
Case study: 🇩🇰 🇬🇷

* Denmark: concentrated (CR4 = 66%, HHI = 1376), but ownership influence dispersed via public service media & foundations
* Greece: fragmented, yet ultimate control consolidated in families/individuals with political & industrial ties
talestomaz.bsky.social
Our proposal rests on 3 pillars:
1️⃣ Trace full ownership chains to ultimate beneficial owners
2️⃣ Weight markets by audience attention shares
3️⃣ Apply network centrality (esp. Katz centrality) to assess influence distribution
talestomaz.bsky.social
We advance a combined approach:
🔹 Economic concentration measures
🔹 Network analysis of ownership relations

This allows us to interrogate both market structure AND relational power.
talestomaz.bsky.social
Standard metrics (CRn, HHI) remain useful but insufficient. They capture market shares, yet overlook:

* Cross-sector integration
* Beneficial ownership structures
* Owners’ power over audiences
talestomaz.bsky.social
How should we measure media power and concentration in hybrid media systems?

Mariia Aleksevych and I just published a new open-access article in Media and Communication @cogitatiomac.bsky.social with a methodological proposal: www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcomm...
Journalism in the Hybrid Media System
Thematic Issue, Vol 13 (2025)
www.cogitatiopress.com
talestomaz.bsky.social
Key insight: Concentration is not inherently detrimental.
Institutional logic of ownership matters:

* Public/foundation ownership → pluralism & press freedom
* Private/family ownership → risks of instrumentalization

Rodney Benson's works have been an inspiration, of course
talestomaz.bsky.social
Case study: 🇩🇰 🇬🇷

* Denmark: concentrated (CR4 = 66%, HHI = 1376), but ownership influence dispersed via public service media & foundations
* Greece: fragmented, yet ultimate control consolidated in families/individuals with political & industrial ties
talestomaz.bsky.social
Our proposal rests on 3 pillars:
1️⃣ Trace full ownership chains to ultimate beneficial owners
2️⃣ Weight markets by audience attention shares
3️⃣ Apply network centrality (esp. Katz centrality) to assess influence distribution
talestomaz.bsky.social
We advance a combined approach:
🔹 Economic concentration measures
🔹 Network analysis of ownership relations

This allows us to interrogate both market structure AND relational power.
talestomaz.bsky.social
Standard metrics (CRn, HHI) remain useful but insufficient. They capture market shares, yet overlook:

* Cross-sector integration
* Beneficial ownership structures
* Owners’ power over audiences
talestomaz.bsky.social
Network Analysis for Media Ownership: A Methodological Proposal, in Media and Communication: doi.org/10.17645/mac...

It's part of a special issue by @sfuerst.bsky.social, Florian Muhle, and @cporlezza.bsky.social, and we are very grateful for the guidance of this wonderful editing team!
Network Analysis for Media Ownership: A Methodological Proposal | Article | Media and Communication
Mariia Aleksevych, Tales Tomaz
doi.org
talestomaz.bsky.social
One policy implication:
Moving beyond cross-ownership caps, regulators should adopt network-based assessments to identify actual loci of influence in hybrid media systems.
talestomaz.bsky.social
Key insight: Concentration is not inherently detrimental.
Institutional logic of ownership matters:

* Public/foundation ownership → pluralism & press freedom
* Private/family ownership → risks of instrumentalization

Rodney Benson's works have been an inspiration, of course.
talestomaz.bsky.social
Case study: 🇩🇰 🇬🇷

* Denmark: concentrated (CR4 = 66%, HHI = 1376), but ownership influence dispersed via public service media & foundations
* Greece: fragmented, yet ultimate control consolidated in families/individuals with political & industrial ties
talestomaz.bsky.social
Our proposal rests on 3 pillars:
1️⃣ Trace full ownership chains to ultimate beneficial owners
2️⃣ Weight markets by audience attention shares
3️⃣ Apply network centrality (esp. Katz centrality) to assess influence distribution
talestomaz.bsky.social
We advance a combined approach:
🔹 Economic concentration measures
🔹 Network analysis of ownership relations

This allows us to interrogate both market structure AND relational power.
talestomaz.bsky.social
Standard metrics (CRn, HHI) remain useful but insufficient. They capture market shares, yet overlook:

* Cross-sector integration
* Beneficial ownership structures
* Owners’ power over audiences
Reposted by Tales Tomaz
kowisalzburg.bsky.social
In einem Sammelwerk (im Nomos Verlag) zum Thema "Medienregulierung" haben Mitarbeiter (J. Trappel, St. Gadringer, Th. Steinmaurer, T. Tomaz) des FB KoWi einen Buchbeitrag geschrieben:

bit.ly/buchbeitrag_...

@nomosverlag.bsky.social @jotbox.bsky.social @talestomaz.bsky.social
Reposted by Tales Tomaz
leonido.bsky.social
Noch nie habe ich das von Piketty beschriebene Problem r > g anschaulicher erklärt gesehen als in diesem Video von Gary Stevenson:
Reposted by Tales Tomaz
slack2thefuture.bsky.social
A reminder that the only reason Iran is a theocratic authoritarian regime is that in 1953, the US and UK (via the CIA and MI-6) decided to do a “regime change.”
megancnbc.bsky.social
VANCE: "Our view has been very clear that we don't want a regime change."
 
HEGSETH: "This mission was not and has not been about regime change."
 
RUBIO: Regime change is "certainly not the goal of what we're working on here."
 
TRUMP: