Train Money Brain
@trainmoneybrain.bsky.social
至道無難 唯嫌揀擇(信心銘 )
Also:
"There is no right and no wrong.
But right is right, and wrong is wrong." (Seung Sahn)
Train Money Brain
Private investment coaching based on experience games
Also:
"There is no right and no wrong.
But right is right, and wrong is wrong." (Seung Sahn)
Train Money Brain
Private investment coaching based on experience games
Reposted by Train Money Brain
3/4
Because bigger banks were safer and more convenient, the only way smaller banks could grow was by offering higher deposit rates. If they switch to lower deposit rates, they are likely to contract both sides of their balance sheets.
Because bigger banks were safer and more convenient, the only way smaller banks could grow was by offering higher deposit rates. If they switch to lower deposit rates, they are likely to contract both sides of their balance sheets.
June 18, 2025 at 3:52 AM
3/4
Because bigger banks were safer and more convenient, the only way smaller banks could grow was by offering higher deposit rates. If they switch to lower deposit rates, they are likely to contract both sides of their balance sheets.
Because bigger banks were safer and more convenient, the only way smaller banks could grow was by offering higher deposit rates. If they switch to lower deposit rates, they are likely to contract both sides of their balance sheets.
Reposted by Train Money Brain
3/7
I would add that it also confirms what some of us have known for over a decade—a large and growing share of infrastructure investment simply does not make economic sense, and has been pursued mainly to generate economic activity.
I would add that it also confirms what some of us have known for over a decade—a large and growing share of infrastructure investment simply does not make economic sense, and has been pursued mainly to generate economic activity.
June 18, 2025 at 4:29 AM
3/7
I would add that it also confirms what some of us have known for over a decade—a large and growing share of infrastructure investment simply does not make economic sense, and has been pursued mainly to generate economic activity.
I would add that it also confirms what some of us have known for over a decade—a large and growing share of infrastructure investment simply does not make economic sense, and has been pursued mainly to generate economic activity.
Reposted by Train Money Brain
6/6
It leads instead to lower savings elsewhere in the economy, either in the form of higher unemployment, as Marriner Eccles explained in the 1930s, or of higher household and fiscal debt, as Atif Mian, Ludwig Straub and Amir Sufi show.
straub.scholars.harvard.edu/sites/g/file...
It leads instead to lower savings elsewhere in the economy, either in the form of higher unemployment, as Marriner Eccles explained in the 1930s, or of higher household and fiscal debt, as Atif Mian, Ludwig Straub and Amir Sufi show.
straub.scholars.harvard.edu/sites/g/file...
straub.scholars.harvard.edu
June 18, 2025 at 5:15 AM
6/6
It leads instead to lower savings elsewhere in the economy, either in the form of higher unemployment, as Marriner Eccles explained in the 1930s, or of higher household and fiscal debt, as Atif Mian, Ludwig Straub and Amir Sufi show.
straub.scholars.harvard.edu/sites/g/file...
It leads instead to lower savings elsewhere in the economy, either in the form of higher unemployment, as Marriner Eccles explained in the 1930s, or of higher household and fiscal debt, as Atif Mian, Ludwig Straub and Amir Sufi show.
straub.scholars.harvard.edu/sites/g/file...
Reposted by Train Money Brain
5/6
When the constraint is whether or not businesses can sell their products, however, income inequality, by reducing total demand, actually reduces investment needs. In that case pushing up the savings of the rich does not lead to more investment.
carnegieendowment.org/china-financ...
When the constraint is whether or not businesses can sell their products, however, income inequality, by reducing total demand, actually reduces investment needs. In that case pushing up the savings of the rich does not lead to more investment.
carnegieendowment.org/china-financ...
straub.scholars.harvard.edu
June 18, 2025 at 5:15 AM
5/6
When the constraint is whether or not businesses can sell their products, however, income inequality, by reducing total demand, actually reduces investment needs. In that case pushing up the savings of the rich does not lead to more investment.
carnegieendowment.org/china-financ...
When the constraint is whether or not businesses can sell their products, however, income inequality, by reducing total demand, actually reduces investment needs. In that case pushing up the savings of the rich does not lead to more investment.
carnegieendowment.org/china-financ...
"China could get what it says it wants, but only if it stops doing what it insists on doing."
1/8
Pan Gongsheng is right to warn of the dangers to the global economy posed by fiscal and regulatory problems in the country issuing the world’s main currency, but the two ways for China to protect itself from running those risks are pretty obvious.
www.nytimes.com/2025/06/18/b...
Pan Gongsheng is right to warn of the dangers to the global economy posed by fiscal and regulatory problems in the country issuing the world’s main currency, but the two ways for China to protect itself from running those risks are pretty obvious.
www.nytimes.com/2025/06/18/b...
Aiming at the Dollar, China Makes a Pitch for Its Currency
www.nytimes.com
June 18, 2025 at 10:58 AM
"China could get what it says it wants, but only if it stops doing what it insists on doing."
Reposted by Train Money Brain
WSJ: "In volume terms, which adjust for the effect of exchange rates, Chinese imports through March haven’t grown at all since the end of 2022—while exports have rocketed 33% higher."
www.wsj.com/economy/trad...
www.wsj.com/economy/trad...
Trade With China Is Becoming a One-Way Street
President Trump is trying to further open up China’s market to U.S. companies as Beijing’s appetite for the rest of the world’s exports is diminishing
www.wsj.com
June 14, 2025 at 3:13 PM
WSJ: "In volume terms, which adjust for the effect of exchange rates, Chinese imports through March haven’t grown at all since the end of 2022—while exports have rocketed 33% higher."
www.wsj.com/economy/trad...
www.wsj.com/economy/trad...
Reposted by Train Money Brain
8/17
pace with productivity growth, and it is easy to see why the household savings rate remained high even as the household share of GDP declined consistently, both of which pushed up the national savings rate and pushed down the household consumption share.
pace with productivity growth, and it is easy to see why the household savings rate remained high even as the household share of GDP declined consistently, both of which pushed up the national savings rate and pushed down the household consumption share.
June 16, 2025 at 10:43 AM
8/17
pace with productivity growth, and it is easy to see why the household savings rate remained high even as the household share of GDP declined consistently, both of which pushed up the national savings rate and pushed down the household consumption share.
pace with productivity growth, and it is easy to see why the household savings rate remained high even as the household share of GDP declined consistently, both of which pushed up the national savings rate and pushed down the household consumption share.
Reposted by Train Money Brain
7/17
This, in turn, explains most of the decline in the consumption share of GDP during that period. Add to this the fact that the hukou system prevented the social safety network from keeping pace with GDP growth even as it prevented wages from keeping...
This, in turn, explains most of the decline in the consumption share of GDP during that period. Add to this the fact that the hukou system prevented the social safety network from keeping pace with GDP growth even as it prevented wages from keeping...
June 16, 2025 at 10:43 AM
7/17
This, in turn, explains most of the decline in the consumption share of GDP during that period. Add to this the fact that the hukou system prevented the social safety network from keeping pace with GDP growth even as it prevented wages from keeping...
This, in turn, explains most of the decline in the consumption share of GDP during that period. Add to this the fact that the hukou system prevented the social safety network from keeping pace with GDP growth even as it prevented wages from keeping...
Reposted by Train Money Brain
5/17
But these low rates represented transfers from household savers to banks and borrowers that equalled roughly 5% or more of GDP. Not surprisingly, during this time household consumption dropped from a very low 48% of GDP to an astonishingly low 34% of GDP.
But these low rates represented transfers from household savers to banks and borrowers that equalled roughly 5% or more of GDP. Not surprisingly, during this time household consumption dropped from a very low 48% of GDP to an astonishingly low 34% of GDP.
June 16, 2025 at 10:43 AM
5/17
But these low rates represented transfers from household savers to banks and borrowers that equalled roughly 5% or more of GDP. Not surprisingly, during this time household consumption dropped from a very low 48% of GDP to an astonishingly low 34% of GDP.
But these low rates represented transfers from household savers to banks and borrowers that equalled roughly 5% or more of GDP. Not surprisingly, during this time household consumption dropped from a very low 48% of GDP to an astonishingly low 34% of GDP.
Reposted by Train Money Brain
4/17
At that time, the GDP deflator was 8-10%, and nominal GDP growth was 16-20%, but lending rates were 7-8% and deposit rates were 3-4%. This allowed the AMCs that had purchased bad debts from the banking system to resolve these bad debts over 10-20 years with minimum losses.
At that time, the GDP deflator was 8-10%, and nominal GDP growth was 16-20%, but lending rates were 7-8% and deposit rates were 3-4%. This allowed the AMCs that had purchased bad debts from the banking system to resolve these bad debts over 10-20 years with minimum losses.
June 16, 2025 at 10:43 AM
4/17
At that time, the GDP deflator was 8-10%, and nominal GDP growth was 16-20%, but lending rates were 7-8% and deposit rates were 3-4%. This allowed the AMCs that had purchased bad debts from the banking system to resolve these bad debts over 10-20 years with minimum losses.
At that time, the GDP deflator was 8-10%, and nominal GDP growth was 16-20%, but lending rates were 7-8% and deposit rates were 3-4%. This allowed the AMCs that had purchased bad debts from the banking system to resolve these bad debts over 10-20 years with minimum losses.
Strongly recommended
“The Origins of the Platonic Approach to Monetary Systems: Retracing European and Chinese Monetary Thoughts on Chartalism, Nominalism, and the Origins of Monetary Systems” is now on EconPapers at econpapers.repec.org/paper/prampr...
EconPapers: The Origins of the Platonic Approach to Monetary Systems: Retracing European and Chinese Monetary Thoughts on Chartalism, Nominalism, and the Origins of Monetary
By Eric Tymoigne; Abstract: A monetary approach that combines Chartalism, Nominalism, and Command origins of monetary systems is often deemed to
econpapers.repec.org
June 14, 2025 at 9:25 PM
Strongly recommended
Reposted by Train Money Brain
4/5
Total loans in the first five months of 2025 were up RMB 10.68 trillion, of which 92% went to businesses and 5% to households. Beijing wants banks to make more consumer loans to households, and while the increase in...
Total loans in the first five months of 2025 were up RMB 10.68 trillion, of which 92% went to businesses and 5% to households. Beijing wants banks to make more consumer loans to households, and while the increase in...
June 14, 2025 at 4:15 AM
4/5
Total loans in the first five months of 2025 were up RMB 10.68 trillion, of which 92% went to businesses and 5% to households. Beijing wants banks to make more consumer loans to households, and while the increase in...
Total loans in the first five months of 2025 were up RMB 10.68 trillion, of which 92% went to businesses and 5% to households. Beijing wants banks to make more consumer loans to households, and while the increase in...
Reposted by Train Money Brain
2/5
Year to date, financing rose by RMB 18.63 trillion, equal to 34% of the period's GDP. If roughly RMB 4-5 trillion of this increase represents the rolling over of interest, this suggests that it takes around RMB 6-7 in new financing to generate each RMB 1 in GDP growth.
Year to date, financing rose by RMB 18.63 trillion, equal to 34% of the period's GDP. If roughly RMB 4-5 trillion of this increase represents the rolling over of interest, this suggests that it takes around RMB 6-7 in new financing to generate each RMB 1 in GDP growth.
June 14, 2025 at 4:15 AM
2/5
Year to date, financing rose by RMB 18.63 trillion, equal to 34% of the period's GDP. If roughly RMB 4-5 trillion of this increase represents the rolling over of interest, this suggests that it takes around RMB 6-7 in new financing to generate each RMB 1 in GDP growth.
Year to date, financing rose by RMB 18.63 trillion, equal to 34% of the period's GDP. If roughly RMB 4-5 trillion of this increase represents the rolling over of interest, this suggests that it takes around RMB 6-7 in new financing to generate each RMB 1 in GDP growth.
Reposted by Train Money Brain
4/8
Why? Mainly because, as Wu indirectly suggests, China was able to externalize the cost of the slowdown to its trade partners. As property investment in China dropped sharply, subtracting from GDP growth, it was balanced by a surge in manufacturing investment.
Why? Mainly because, as Wu indirectly suggests, China was able to externalize the cost of the slowdown to its trade partners. As property investment in China dropped sharply, subtracting from GDP growth, it was balanced by a surge in manufacturing investment.
May 30, 2025 at 6:56 AM
4/8
Why? Mainly because, as Wu indirectly suggests, China was able to externalize the cost of the slowdown to its trade partners. As property investment in China dropped sharply, subtracting from GDP growth, it was balanced by a surge in manufacturing investment.
Why? Mainly because, as Wu indirectly suggests, China was able to externalize the cost of the slowdown to its trade partners. As property investment in China dropped sharply, subtracting from GDP growth, it was balanced by a surge in manufacturing investment.
MUST READ.
1/11
SCMP: "Beijing is doubling down on efforts to create a stronger domestic market, as it focuses on reducing China’s vulnerability to external tariff shocks. Premier Li Qiang said on Thursday that...
www.scmp.com/economy?modu...
SCMP: "Beijing is doubling down on efforts to create a stronger domestic market, as it focuses on reducing China’s vulnerability to external tariff shocks. Premier Li Qiang said on Thursday that...
www.scmp.com/economy?modu...
China Economy News & Analysis | South China Morning Post
Latest China economic news, including trade with the US and Australia, manufacturing, jobs, inflation, GDP statistics and other key economic data.
www.scmp.com
May 25, 2025 at 1:20 AM
MUST READ.
Reposted by Train Money Brain
I'd say partly ideology and partly the need for formal economics to be easy to model.
May 22, 2025 at 8:39 AM
I'd say partly ideology and partly the need for formal economics to be easy to model.
Reposted by Train Money Brain
6/12
In that case it is the US economy that must adjust. This is incredibly hard for many Americans to understand, but the US is not the only country to have agency, and in fact many other countries have greater control over their external accounts than the US does.
In that case it is the US economy that must adjust. This is incredibly hard for many Americans to understand, but the US is not the only country to have agency, and in fact many other countries have greater control over their external accounts than the US does.
May 22, 2025 at 6:18 AM
6/12
In that case it is the US economy that must adjust. This is incredibly hard for many Americans to understand, but the US is not the only country to have agency, and in fact many other countries have greater control over their external accounts than the US does.
In that case it is the US economy that must adjust. This is incredibly hard for many Americans to understand, but the US is not the only country to have agency, and in fact many other countries have greater control over their external accounts than the US does.
Reposted by Train Money Brain
3/3
According to the article, the plan is to take idle land from developers struggling with cashflow problems so as to "revitalize" the land "and ease the financial pressure on developers".
Basically local governments are taking on debt to relieve developer debt burdens.
According to the article, the plan is to take idle land from developers struggling with cashflow problems so as to "revitalize" the land "and ease the financial pressure on developers".
Basically local governments are taking on debt to relieve developer debt burdens.
May 23, 2025 at 3:40 AM
3/3
According to the article, the plan is to take idle land from developers struggling with cashflow problems so as to "revitalize" the land "and ease the financial pressure on developers".
Basically local governments are taking on debt to relieve developer debt burdens.
According to the article, the plan is to take idle land from developers struggling with cashflow problems so as to "revitalize" the land "and ease the financial pressure on developers".
Basically local governments are taking on debt to relieve developer debt burdens.
Reposted by Train Money Brain
8/9
While this might seem like an argument against a world of multiple currencies, it's actually a stronger argument against a world of unfettered capital, which also characterized the 1920s and 1930s. Keynes, among others, opposed a world in which the needs of speculative...
While this might seem like an argument against a world of multiple currencies, it's actually a stronger argument against a world of unfettered capital, which also characterized the 1920s and 1930s. Keynes, among others, opposed a world in which the needs of speculative...
May 21, 2025 at 10:05 AM
8/9
While this might seem like an argument against a world of multiple currencies, it's actually a stronger argument against a world of unfettered capital, which also characterized the 1920s and 1930s. Keynes, among others, opposed a world in which the needs of speculative...
While this might seem like an argument against a world of multiple currencies, it's actually a stronger argument against a world of unfettered capital, which also characterized the 1920s and 1930s. Keynes, among others, opposed a world in which the needs of speculative...
"The role the dollar has played since the 1970s is one never before played by any other currency, largely because the US role in accommodating global savings imbalances is also unprecedented."
1/9
Martin Wolf says the world has three options in considering the future of the hegemonic role of the dollar. One is "continued domination by the dollar". Another is that some other currency, perhaps the euro or even the renminbi, replace it as hegemon.
www.ft.com/content/d965...
Martin Wolf says the world has three options in considering the future of the hegemonic role of the dollar. One is "continued domination by the dollar". Another is that some other currency, perhaps the euro or even the renminbi, replace it as hegemon.
www.ft.com/content/d965...
Trump’s assault on the global dollar
The difficulty is that, however unsatisfactory the hegemon might be, the alternatives look worse
www.ft.com
May 22, 2025 at 1:08 AM
"The role the dollar has played since the 1970s is one never before played by any other currency, largely because the US role in accommodating global savings imbalances is also unprecedented."
The appraoch has been coercion (including allies) so far
The better action would address capital flows
This may be coming now
The better action would address capital flows
This may be coming now
9/9
China's trade surplus, in other words, is a structural problem. What Dombrovskis asks in the name of "self restraint" is actually a major voluntary restructuring of the Chinese economy. I think that is unlikely to happen except over many years and even decades.
China's trade surplus, in other words, is a structural problem. What Dombrovskis asks in the name of "self restraint" is actually a major voluntary restructuring of the Chinese economy. I think that is unlikely to happen except over many years and even decades.
May 19, 2025 at 8:58 PM
The appraoch has been coercion (including allies) so far
The better action would address capital flows
This may be coming now
The better action would address capital flows
This may be coming now
Reposted by Train Money Brain
7/9
The only way it can "show self restraint" (i.e. reduce its net exports) is by boosting domestic consumption, which it is finding extremely hard to do, boosting investment in infrastructure, of which it already has...
The only way it can "show self restraint" (i.e. reduce its net exports) is by boosting domestic consumption, which it is finding extremely hard to do, boosting investment in infrastructure, of which it already has...
May 19, 2025 at 4:48 AM
7/9
The only way it can "show self restraint" (i.e. reduce its net exports) is by boosting domestic consumption, which it is finding extremely hard to do, boosting investment in infrastructure, of which it already has...
The only way it can "show self restraint" (i.e. reduce its net exports) is by boosting domestic consumption, which it is finding extremely hard to do, boosting investment in infrastructure, of which it already has...
Reposted by Train Money Brain
3/9
It is not as if China is running huge trade surpluses out of malice. It is a structural problem. A high-savings high-investment economy must always run trade surpluses to balance its high savings once it begins to reach the limit of the investment it can productively absorb.
It is not as if China is running huge trade surpluses out of malice. It is a structural problem. A high-savings high-investment economy must always run trade surpluses to balance its high savings once it begins to reach the limit of the investment it can productively absorb.
May 19, 2025 at 4:48 AM
3/9
It is not as if China is running huge trade surpluses out of malice. It is a structural problem. A high-savings high-investment economy must always run trade surpluses to balance its high savings once it begins to reach the limit of the investment it can productively absorb.
It is not as if China is running huge trade surpluses out of malice. It is a structural problem. A high-savings high-investment economy must always run trade surpluses to balance its high savings once it begins to reach the limit of the investment it can productively absorb.
Reposted by Train Money Brain
A possible sequence of events is that conventional power plants providing voltage control dropped off the grid which meant that there wasn't enough capacity in the grid to absorb a subsequent voltage spike.
May 18, 2025 at 4:56 PM
A possible sequence of events is that conventional power plants providing voltage control dropped off the grid which meant that there wasn't enough capacity in the grid to absorb a subsequent voltage spike.
Reposted by Train Money Brain
9/11
shift employment out of manufacturing and into infrastructure investment, Germany has a lot of room to improve its infrastructure, so it can manage the transition with less disruption to employment and growth.
shift employment out of manufacturing and into infrastructure investment, Germany has a lot of room to improve its infrastructure, so it can manage the transition with less disruption to employment and growth.
May 18, 2025 at 3:51 AM
9/11
shift employment out of manufacturing and into infrastructure investment, Germany has a lot of room to improve its infrastructure, so it can manage the transition with less disruption to employment and growth.
shift employment out of manufacturing and into infrastructure investment, Germany has a lot of room to improve its infrastructure, so it can manage the transition with less disruption to employment and growth.