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blsphmr.bsky.social
partisan of hate
@blsphmr.bsky.social
140 followers 110 following 1.7K posts
defiled, beaten, molested; tranquil without light.

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blsphmr.bsky.social
partisan of hate @blsphmr.bsky.social · 10d
Whatever the reason, it is not the imago of the Negro that makes the colon into a fetishist, but her obedience to a phantasm; it is not the phantasm or imago that is traumatic, but the interpellation it later calls forth and that is unconsciously displaced as such. Whether that passion or obedience is moved by love, or compelled by fear, or moved (as is more common) by hatred and fear commingled, Fanon insists that the myth of the Negro necessarily extends to all aspects of life in the colony and that people submit to it whether they choose to or not. Accordingly, we should not immediately infer that Mlle B. is a racial fetishist out of sexual perversity rather than out of cultural obedience. If it is true that the phobic object forms itself out of the stereotype (with the ambiguity that that implies—the stereotype as the material from which desire is built, and the stereotype as the disfiguring of desire by culture), only to find the stereotype returning to haunt this fantasy of the black object at its root—then it is reasonable to suppose that the stereotype, the one that returns to the ego its own murderous-shameful attachment, is in fact standing for a fear of disintegration that is the originary trace of the other within us. And if the contingency and violence of the stereotype is already occupied by the returning violence of the ego, Fanon makes it clear that the ego’s neurosis just is where the stereotype returns—and the stereotype just is the real occupying the ego. The enemy attacking the ego from within and against which it seeks to indemnify itself using phobia is, then, the ego, for whom the contingency and violence of the other is intolerable precisely because it originates in its own fetishistic attachments. We must therefore distinguish the determination of the fetish-as-stereotype from the fantasies that sustain it, which derive pleasure from the mortification so consecrated, but which leave us undisturbed in our everyday relationships, allowing us to explore our relations to feelings of insecurity, but only in the absence of any crisis of self-relation or dissolution. The fetish is our way of enjoying—or consuming—our own acts of sublation. And this concealed unconcealment is both enjoyed and, in the end, necessarily repeated. We are fetishists not in our relation to forms of appearance, but in relation to what is always missing from appearance, which we metaphorically assume to be masked. We act as if this absence is inscribed on the surface of appearance but its meaning lies elsewhere. Racial fetishism, in other words, points to an illusion at work in social reality itself: people are racial fetishists in how they act, and not necessarily in how they think. If the fetish is a defense against uncertainty, a defense crucial to the belief that it is possible to draw a veil over the (misrecognized) implications of castration, this is because psychically it represents a cultural disciplining of (egoic) enjoyment through (racial) splitting and displacement. Politically, fetishism leaves us unfree within our representations, but frees us from the presuppositions and outcomes (the compensations and the punishments) of mutual exposure to ourselves and others.
blsphmr.bsky.social
we can’t (all) be fags (forever) etc. somebody will have to be the Man (eventually) etc.
December 1, 2025 at 7:01 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
talvez seja proposital mas não deixa de ser curioso pra mim como ele narra a trajetória de um eu racializado que insiste “corajosamente” em “continuar olhando com olhares desejosos” pro corpo branco (e portanto ativamente), um eu que aceita o risco de sua própria obliteração…
December 1, 2025 at 6:30 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
esses momentos do haunted life onde marriott debate masoquismo, narciso/poça e olhar [gaze] deixaram bastante claro pra mim o pq benedicto realiza diálogo com esse livro pra pensar sua própria ética/erótica.
By taking the lid off, Wright allows others to see how they too are propelled by the implacably hostile but seductive forces of racism which increase in severity with each black demand for equality, with each black demand for the desirable and respectable goal of citizenship. These demands should not, however, be confused with a simple masochistic relation to superegoic law. For Wright, black masochism comes into being as the demand that blacks have a right to enjoy the obscene pleasures of the law that whiteness forbids them from having: the black masochist, far from being a nonviolent subject who gladly submits to the law, demands that the law punish him severely so that he too can then experience the satisfaction of desire that derives from the law’s forbidden intimacy to himself. What Wright is describing here—in dialogue with Wertham—is a temptation that takes the form of a violent seduction in which the black sacrifices himself. This is the meaning of his unconscious guilt—he needs to be punished so that he can proclaim himself a citizen with access to the forbidden pleasures of freedom. It is because he is deprived of being and forced to renounce desire that the black experiences the whiteness of the law in terms of what both allows and commands his rebellious servility. Rather than reflecting Narcissus, the pool sees itself reflected by him, but the transfer offers no secure, or stable, site of reflection: the reflector is always in need of reflection. Ask the pool what it sees and it will answer: a beauty mirrored, yes, but also a reflector in mourning; the pool realizes that behind the image which now fails to appear there is, in fact, nothing. The critical intervention of the story, part of its shock, is that Narcissus, and we as readers of the myth, have not considered the pool as anything other than a means to reflection. This realization derives from the nonidentity between the visible (the object seen) and the visual (the experience of seeing): both Narcissus and the pool are the mirror reflection of each other; they reflect the other’s act of looking in ways which suggest mimetic reflection but subvert it. It’s an experience that confounds pleasure and loss with the threat of annihilation. Endowed with a fleeting life that appears to be the double of both the subject reflected and the image received, a dissemblance seems to have slipped into the pool’s resemblance: “But was Narcissus beautiful?” asks the pool. For a moment it sees itself through Narcissus’s eyes, but then something else—a grief born out of loss, an unwillingness to abandon its former semblance, takes over. But what this illusion veils is the absence lurking behind the mirror—the lack in whose vision the gaze of the other can be seen. What is terrible about this, however, is that this is all one sees. […] the pool in Wilde’s “The Disciple” is mournful not because Narcissus has died, but because of the loss of Narcissus’s capacity to reflect back the pool’s own image, a loss valued more than the original which cast it; and even here desire is stricken not by death but by the deathliness of the reflected image whose reflection is so beautiful because so deadly. That is, what is mournable about the image is that it can only be secured against an always absent world, and hence its forming is always the experience of an endless dying, and that in some ways the image reveals what it necessarily lacks, because loss and absence is the quintessence of its being. Looking back, the pool mourns what is lost in the loss of this object—that is, the capacity of the object to reflect what gives it “life”; but what the pool also loses is the fiction, or at least the fantasy, that the beauty reflected was its and its alone. That is, what is lost is the fiction that the image permits a relationship (of identity and not alterity) of the pool to itself. Narcissus has died, but it is the loss of the reflected image—not the image itself, the image of the self when it was there in his eyes—that is dreadful (and deadly). It is this awareness—of the mirror, or image, as an insubstantial resemblance of life as lived; the mirror, or image as inseparable from its eidolon (from this body whose reflection or simulacrum it is)—that also recurs in endless stories of blacks pursued by persecutory doubles or imagoes. One soon becomes aware of how racism is experienced as an encounter with a mirror image in which one sees one’s double, one’s simulacrum, one’s ghostly semblance—a specter which you greet with frustration and impotence, because of its inseparable hold on one’s life. I would suggest that if Looking for Langston is compelling it is because what we see is a screen in mourning, a screen on which the looker finds himself having to offer atonement for, or denial of, or excuse for, what is unobtainable and lost, a game in which the desire to look—gay and interracial—finds itself mirrored by the seductive, ultimately vicious, lure of racist reflections.
December 1, 2025 at 11:57 AM
blsphmr.bsky.social
e isso tem a ver com a escolha de objetos de análise tbm… seria bastante corajoso da parte de acadêmicos que enaltecem race/slave play deixar um pouco de teorizar em cima de porra de performance artística e analisar trabalhadores sexuais digitais p.ex. oq exigiria uma compreensão do race play…
blsphmr.bsky.social partisan of hate @blsphmr.bsky.social · 1d
eh um livro que constantemente coloca freios em si mesmo pq no fundo sabe as possíveis implicações (políticas) daquilo que afirma.
November 30, 2025 at 4:07 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
o livro da saketopoulou faz três coisas: 1. entende racialização e a temporalidade incessante de passados coloniais/escravagistas como traumáticos no presente; 2. afirma que traumas não podem coagular: devemos colocá-los em circulação como parte de uma estratégia terapêutica…
November 30, 2025 at 3:53 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
[…] a child who has little or no resistance to the hateful pleasures of culture. a child who is so catathymic, so rigid, in the contentments of his fantasy life he can only block the path to the emotional “balance” (Wertham’s word) of a fully integrated ego. this is a child who yields…
November 30, 2025 at 12:34 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
semana.
November 29, 2025 at 12:27 AM
blsphmr.bsky.social
morto que a mona deletou o post e reclamou do quão horrível se sente por ter saído do seu círculo pqp vcs são mt doentes, sério, e não por terem kinks mas por investirem ansiosamente em uma imagem idealizada daquilo que são no mínimo contato com qualquer opinião menos passiva em relação a vcs.
November 28, 2025 at 8:50 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
[…] in sum, the issue is this: even when pushed to its limit, does masochism allow us to understand the relation of jouissance to the non-being of the black? if only to distinguish blacksexe from the readings of Bersani, Laplanche, and Lacan, we needed to ask this question.
November 28, 2025 at 8:25 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
it will always depend on the kink and/or the discourse and how it relates to or contradicts with whatever “coalition” is being asserted. if you genuinely consider every kink to have the exact same sociopolitical connotation (radical/anti-normative) this image can easily be read as a disavowal.
November 28, 2025 at 6:19 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
algumas threads do twitter são literatura sim, sinto mt, devemos nos educar com o arquivo que temos.
November 27, 2025 at 2:03 AM
blsphmr.bsky.social
síntese útil para mim no momento.
tweets de @jatella no x: “black porn studies and the more general turn to pleasure, en-joy-ment, and leisure have furnished the rather quixotic and circular idea that sex, on one hand, is a racial affair and that for that very reason it should be beholden to no further political obligation.” “that is, it assumes the race-sex nexus is so overladen w/ political meaning that the radical gesture could only be concession to the terms of engagement set forth (porno-troping) in some disidentificatory way, which frees itself *from* by freeing itself *to* the sexually abject.”
November 27, 2025 at 1:16 AM
blsphmr.bsky.social
[…] jouissance is just as shattering within the context of a theory of masochism as it is within the fiction of a masterful sovereign life. […] if people are murderous by way of drives and not by specific desires, it is because the law of their being is at one with the excitements of jouissance.
blsphmr.bsky.social partisan of hate @blsphmr.bsky.social · 5d
me pergunto se ele já leu esse texto pós-hl do marriott tho onde ele critica diretamente bersani e (self-)shattering. me pergunto oq ele faria com o texto.
November 26, 2025 at 1:12 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
me pergunto se ele já leu esse texto pós-hl do marriott tho onde ele critica diretamente bersani e (self-)shattering. me pergunto oq ele faria com o texto.
primeira página do ensaio ‘no second chances’ de david s. marriott. Bersani’s attempt to exclude borders from the reimagining of a queer, impersonal intimacy is perhaps doomed by the very nature of futurity itself. The future has no borders; it can only be recognized through untoward happenings that we neither know nor understand until afterwards; in any case, the virtual is no better a defense of contingency than is a bug chaser’s desire to be possessed unto death. That the logic of virtuality renders some kind of discontinuity between narcissism and desire absolutely inescapable is in fact demonstrated by Bersani’s attempt to rescue some notion of “universal singularity.” But the very word he uses to name this singularity, the very name he gives to that from which he excludes the ego’s warlike frontier, is none other than the word that most commonly names violent confrontation: the word shattering. As if this were not ironic enough, exactly the same split can be found in Bersani’s other favorite word: virtual. How is it that a word that expresses most simply the redemption of malign narcissism should be also the one most impervious to shattering? How is it possible to discuss the question of impersonal intimacy when that question already subverts the very term of the virtual used to discuss it? Is it inevitable that the same split that divides the ego from itself the moment jouissance comes near it should divide the virtual from itself in the very same way? And can the virtual actually be shattered by that very split? If Bersani’s unstated question was, “What are we really doing when we love others?” it becomes clear that, whatever else we may be doing, we are at any rate being done in by more than our own words.
November 26, 2025 at 11:17 AM
blsphmr.bsky.social
deve ser a parte que mais me incomoda no ensaio, onde ele deixa explícito sua demanda ética/erótica. eh difícil não reduzir esse texto ao anedótico por causa da forma como foi escrito; pra mim se as coisas só se dão dessa forma, necessariamente e nesses termos, eh pq o texto eh um set fechado.
Indeed, for the queer of color to indulge the call to self-annihilation might be for him to fulfill the master’s wish to see his obliteration; for him to stare the would-be agent of his death in the face would be for him to find himself reflected in the other’s executioner’s eyes and thus for him to discover himself as nothing but absence. “To recognize that I resemble the white racist other, that I resemble myself in him even in my own desire,” writes David Marriott, “would be tantamount to admitting the inadmissible: that I am not myself and that my most proper being is over there, in that reflecting double who enrages (shames, despoils) me.” To admit as much would be to run the risk of affirming the racist orders that would predestine some for death and, thus, “that past ruination may be repeated.” This risk, however, is also “the risk of the other to oneself, a threat that must be embraced and borne precisely because sexuality is the meaning of this risk”. To do the contrary, to look away, to eschew the risk that sexuality is would be to succumb, like Magnotta, and like the boyfriend twin, to fantasies of being predicated on the unending pursuit of an image we might call our own.
November 26, 2025 at 11:07 AM
blsphmr.bsky.social
correção: não eh o outro (mestre branco) que confronta seu próprio narcisismo, eh o outro (mestre branco) que testemunha o narcisismo do eu (escravo negro), erro meu de tradução. acho que faz diferença pq a satisfação de fisher não depende de qualquer noção de interioridade ou self-awareness branco,
blsphmr.bsky.social partisan of hate @blsphmr.bsky.social · 6d
nisso, eh um desejo que demanda que o outro confronte seu próprio narcisismo branco, a ideia de ser açoitado sendo o prazer em testemunhar a crueldade desse outro sendo revelada: oq fisher quer, em seu masoquismo racial, eh ser abolido pra além da representação, estilhaçado pra além do medo.
November 25, 2025 at 10:34 PM
Reposted by partisan of hate
kamaufranklin.bsky.social
Jamil Al Amin, formerly known as H. Rap Brown has passed. Jamil was a political prisoner, an Imam & leader in the Islamic community, chairman of SNCC, Minster of Justice in the Black Panther Party. A revolutionary & a target of COINTELPRO and U.S. police agencies. Rest in Power
November 23, 2025 at 10:50 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
[…] neither Jew—of the two types—has all that much choice when it comes to enjoying freedom. pain or delusion, resistance or assimilation: the semblance of the choice expressed really concerns how one accepts anti-Semitism. “Sartre is not offering a choice in action,” Rosenberg adds.
What the “authentic” Jew has to achieve—“in pride and humiliation,” “in horror and hate”—is what may, at first, seem deeply inappropriate: to make the Anti-Semite into a witness of his refusal to be nothing more nor less than a Jew. “Jewish authenticity consists in choosing oneself as Jew,” Sartre writes, “[the authentic Jew] knows that he is one who stands apart, untouchable, scorned, proscribed—and it is as such that he asserts his being. His freedom lies in the affirmation of who he is; it is a kind of freedom in which he consents, says yes to the hate that defines him—and nothing more. There is something incongruous in this freedom, or at least its desire, that resembles an impulse to be the Other in me; this impulse is as nothing compared to what Sartre calls Jewish inauthenticity: the wish to be me in the Other. The inauthentic Jew is always “possessed by the consciousness of being a Jew”; it is his fervent wish that passers-by take him for “only one man among others, and like others,” yet he feels himself “compromised by the demeanor of the first passer-by, if that passer-by is a Jew”. For Sartre, such shame and trauma is the evidence of a betrayal; it is an attempt to run away from himself. But there is an ambiguity here: if Jewishness is, in essence, always mediated by the gaze of the Other, and the Jew can only see himself as others see him, why is the wish to see oneself as only one man among others condemned as masquerade, while the other wish, the wish to become a pariah, is seen as a result of knowledge and conscious choice? (This question anticipates Fanon’s reading of René Maran’s novel Un homme pareil aux autres.) Racial inauthenticity, as far as I am concerned, is no worse a choice if the question is how one lives in a state or culture driven by a wish for racial separation and/or compassionate pity for racial differences (am I alone in seeing the deeper antipathy in the latter?). Or, as Rosenberg puts it, why should we be “willing to lose ourselves as we were for the sake of the men we might become”? Further, why is the wish to stand apart, to be untouchable and scorned, distinguished as the work of commitment, while the wish to belong is, at best, an irreal and deluded desire for freedom? Why is chosen pain and suffering a sign of more personal responsibility rather than less? And finally, what, after all, does Sartre’s Hegelian motif of experience as negation have to say to the ethics of being Jewish? Part of Rosenberg’s dismay at Anti-Semite and Jew may be related to the fact that neither Jew—of the two types—has all that much choice when it comes to enjoying freedom. Pain or delusion, resistance or assimilation: the semblance of the choice expressed really concerns how one accepts anti-Semitism. “Sartre is not offering a choice in action,” Rosenberg adds. The Jew, he continues, can no more “choose” his situation than Oedipus: the gaze that defines who one is is always hidden; one approaches it as one approaches absence—it is an emptiness that is both unforeseeable and unknowable. The choice to be or not to be a Jew—the words recall Hamlet—only delivers one to the interminability of not knowing; the choice itself can never begin or end for it represents “the way of despair”.
November 25, 2025 at 5:59 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
oq me ajudou a entender suas intenções com o texto foi assistir ao painel em que a primeira versão do ensaio foi lida e onde ele respondeu algumas perguntas. ao mesmo tempo me frustrou um pouco; acho que a maior parte das pessoas não fez jus à severidade do ensaio, temendo interrogar…
Discussion · ICI Berlin Repository
Does the present moment require a more honest reckoning with the central role of the couple in queer politics and everyday life? Or do we need, now more than ever, to revitalize our commitment to the production of a sexual politics that would resist the ideology of the couple?
www.press.ici-berlin.org
November 25, 2025 at 4:15 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
nem li o capítulo inteiro ainda mas acho que já entendi o pq desse diálogo e eh meio óbvio na vdd: a queeridade relevante pra benedicto não eh a homossexual restritamente, mas o s&m. as fantasias de fisher, pra marriott, se diferenciam da representação s&m de um isaac julien p.ex.
blsphmr.bsky.social partisan of hate @blsphmr.bsky.social · 7d
ainda vou ver de que maneira marriott lê as fantasias de race/slave play de gary fisher especificamente, mas eh curioso que o texto de benedicto entre em diálogo com haunted life pra postular uma *reivindicação* do risco da aniquilação (não-branca) na relação sexual interracial…
November 25, 2025 at 2:11 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
pior não eh nem querer se matar, não poderia mesmo ser de outra forma, o pior eh não ter ninguém que importe pra dividir isso. quer eu aceite ou não a solitude não eh uma vida.
November 24, 2025 at 11:51 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
ainda vou ver de que maneira marriott lê as fantasias de race/slave play de gary fisher especificamente, mas eh curioso que o texto de benedicto entre em diálogo com haunted life pra postular uma *reivindicação* do risco da aniquilação (não-branca) na relação sexual interracial…
November 24, 2025 at 2:49 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
Authentic manhood: isn’t this an embarrassing expression?
November 24, 2025 at 12:45 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
[…] Paul recollects being forced to see himself in the dereliction his imago unleashes, while Chantal, hoping somehow to escape that ruination, ends up confirming her conformity to it (her refusal of white privilege something *more* than shame but something *less* than dereliction).
November 24, 2025 at 12:14 PM
blsphmr.bsky.social
tô muito na merda #pqp
carolis.bsky.social Carolis @carolis.bsky.social · 8d
Saiu o calendário da sorte japonês para 2026! 138ª posição. Não tá tão ruim assim, nem bom! Só vamos !

Ordem é mês/dia
November 24, 2025 at 12:08 AM