Matt Korda
@mattkorda.bsky.social
4.3K followers 1.7K following 22 posts
I count nukes for the Federation of American Scientists + the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 🇨🇦 Views my own.
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mattkorda.bsky.social
congrats king 👑👑👑
Reposted by Matt Korda
mlbbot.bsky.social
The AL East standings look a little different tonight 👀
A screenshot of the AL East standings over a photo of Vladimir Guerrero Jr. and Bo Bichette celebrating sweeping the Yankees.
The standings are:
TOR - 49-38 - .563
NYY - 48-39 - .552 - 1 GB
TB - 48-39 - .552 - 1 GB
mattkorda.bsky.social
It’s truly so bizarre! Thank you for the kind words!
Reposted by Matt Korda
nuclearanthro.bsky.social
:D

HOW DID I MISS THIS GETTING RELEASED?!?

I love nuclear weapon targeting planning!

It’s so baroque & detailed and bizarre!

Am going to read today.

Nicely done @mattkorda.bsky.social @nukestrat.bsky.social
scientistsorg.bsky.social
🆕 Planning for the Unthinkable: the targeting strategies of nuclear-armed states

Intense secrecy around nuclear targeting means that most individuals—including lawmakers—do not have much understanding of how fateful decisions about what to target during wartime are made.
Planning for the Unthinkable: The targeting strategies of nuclear-armed states The quantitative and qualitative enhancements to global nuclear arsenals in the past decade—particularly China’s nuclear buildup, Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling, and NATO’s response—have recently reinvigorated debates about how nuclear-armed states intend to use their nuclear weapons, and against which targets, in what some describe as a new Cold War. 

Details about who, what, where, when, why, and how countries target with their nuclear weapons are some of states’ most closely held secrets. Targeting information rarely reaches the public, and discussions almost exclusively take place behind closed doors—either in the depths of military headquarters and command posts, or in the halls of defense contractors and think tanks. The general public is, to a significant extent, excluded from those discussions. This is largely because nuclear weapons create unique expectations and requirements about secrecy and privileged access that, at times, can seem borderline undemocratic. Revealing targeting information could open up a country’s nuclear policies and intentions to intense scrutiny by its adversaries, its allies, and—crucially—its citizens. 

This presents a significant democratic challenge for nuclear-armed countries and the international community. Despite the profound implications for national and international security, the intense secrecy means that most individuals—not only including the citizens of nuclear-armed countries and others that would bear the consequences of nuclear use, but also lawmakers in nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states that vote on nuclear weapons programs and policies—do not have much understanding of how countries make fateful decisions about what to target during wartime, and how. When lawmakers in nuclear-armed countries approve military spending bills that enhance or increase nuclear and conventional forces, they often do so with little knowledge of how those bills could have implications for nuclear targeting plans.
Reposted by Matt Korda
elianajjohns.bsky.social
📌 ICYMI, @nukestrat.bsky.social, @mattkorda.bsky.social, @mknight.bsky.social, and I just released a pretty cool report on the targeting strategies of nuclear-armed states.

Check it out!
scientistsorg.bsky.social
🆕 Planning for the Unthinkable: the targeting strategies of nuclear-armed states

Intense secrecy around nuclear targeting means that most individuals—including lawmakers—do not have much understanding of how fateful decisions about what to target during wartime are made.
Planning for the Unthinkable: The targeting strategies of nuclear-armed states The quantitative and qualitative enhancements to global nuclear arsenals in the past decade—particularly China’s nuclear buildup, Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling, and NATO’s response—have recently reinvigorated debates about how nuclear-armed states intend to use their nuclear weapons, and against which targets, in what some describe as a new Cold War. 

Details about who, what, where, when, why, and how countries target with their nuclear weapons are some of states’ most closely held secrets. Targeting information rarely reaches the public, and discussions almost exclusively take place behind closed doors—either in the depths of military headquarters and command posts, or in the halls of defense contractors and think tanks. The general public is, to a significant extent, excluded from those discussions. This is largely because nuclear weapons create unique expectations and requirements about secrecy and privileged access that, at times, can seem borderline undemocratic. Revealing targeting information could open up a country’s nuclear policies and intentions to intense scrutiny by its adversaries, its allies, and—crucially—its citizens. 

This presents a significant democratic challenge for nuclear-armed countries and the international community. Despite the profound implications for national and international security, the intense secrecy means that most individuals—not only including the citizens of nuclear-armed countries and others that would bear the consequences of nuclear use, but also lawmakers in nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states that vote on nuclear weapons programs and policies—do not have much understanding of how countries make fateful decisions about what to target during wartime, and how. When lawmakers in nuclear-armed countries approve military spending bills that enhance or increase nuclear and conventional forces, they often do so with little knowledge of how those bills could have implications for nuclear targeting plans.
Reposted by Matt Korda
nukestrat.bsky.social
Impressive piece of work by my colleagues @mattkorda.bsky.social and @mknight.bsky.social on the extraordinary mess in the new Sentinel ICBM program: The Two-Hundred Billion Dollar Boondoggle. 👇
mattkorda.bsky.social
An administration that claims to be obsessed with eliminating waste should look no further than the Sentinel ICBM program.

@mknight.bsky.social and I have done a deep dive into the system; we explore why the program is so behind schedule, over-budget, and poorly managed. 👇

fas.org/publication/...
The Two-Hundred Billion Dollar Boondoggle - Federation of American Scientists
Nearly one year after the Pentagon certified the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program to continue after it incurred critical cost and schedule overruns, the new nuclear missile could on...
fas.org
Reposted by Matt Korda
cockremover.bsky.social
can someone make xcom 3 pls
mattkorda.bsky.social
An administration that claims to be obsessed with eliminating waste should look no further than the Sentinel ICBM program.

@mknight.bsky.social and I have done a deep dive into the system; we explore why the program is so behind schedule, over-budget, and poorly managed. 👇

fas.org/publication/...
The Two-Hundred Billion Dollar Boondoggle - Federation of American Scientists
Nearly one year after the Pentagon certified the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program to continue after it incurred critical cost and schedule overruns, the new nuclear missile could on...
fas.org
Reposted by Matt Korda
mknight.bsky.social
🚀In our latest @scientistsorg.bsky.social report, @mattkorda.bsky.social & I spill all things Sentinel:

✅ How did we get here?
📈 Why does the cost keep rising?
🤷‍♀️ Where's the program at now?
🕳️ What's up with the new silo situation??

Read here ⬇️⬇️
fas.org
Reposted by Matt Korda
jonatomic.bsky.social
I was honored for our team at @scientistsorg.bsky.social to be online in the @postopinions.bsky.social this week. But I never imagined we would be two pages in print. Truly speechless. @davidehoffman.bsky.social @nukestrat.bsky.social @mattkorda.bsky.social
Reposted by Matt Korda
Reposted by Matt Korda
hatr.bsky.social
SPIEGEL and „Danwatch“ analyzed two million docs on procurement data (filtered for biggest military contractors), detailing specific needs, e.g. type of steel, insulation thickness.

Shows how systematically Russia is ramping up nuclear weapons architecture

www.spiegel.de/ausland/russ...
(S+) Russland modernisiert Atomwaffensilos und setzt dabei auf deutsche Marken
Dokumente aus Russland zeigen, dass für den Ausbau von Atomwaffenstützpunkten Material westlicher Konzerne geordert wurde. Auch vom fränkischen Gipshersteller Knauf.
www.spiegel.de
Reposted by Matt Korda
themountaingoats.bsky.social
anything that at any point you loved but then became too cool for, know that someday you will turn back to that thing and say "oh. no. you were fine, you were more than fine. it is I who was cringe"
Reposted by Matt Korda
nukestrat.bsky.social
Our new FAS Nuclear Notebook on Russian nuclear forces is now available. We estimate a stockpile of just over 4,300 warheads, modernizations, but also delays. Earlier STRATCOM projection of significant increase in tac nukes has not yet materialized. www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10....
Reposted by Matt Korda
ameliamar.bsky.social
Gasping at straws. they're just so beautiful
Reposted by Matt Korda
mehdirhasan.bsky.social
‘Fetterman went on to make statements that shocked people. In opposing a cease-fire, he said, “Let’s get back to killing.” A person who heard the conversation told me, “He said, ‘Kill them all.’”’
John Fetterman’s Struggle
The senator insists he is in good health. But staffers past and present say they no longer recognize the man they once knew.
nymag.com
Reposted by Matt Korda
scientistsorg.bsky.social
Follow along with us to see how we’re building bridges between science and innovative public policy. It’s the only way forward.
Reposted by Matt Korda
jcsalterego.bsky.social
ok i give up. are canadians voting for a new pope
Reposted by Matt Korda
depthsofwikipedia.bsky.social
Wikipedia editors on the Katy Perry talk page came to a resounding conclusion against calling her an astronaut
Reposted by Matt Korda
nukestrat.bsky.social
I’m bummed illness prevents me from attending @carnegieendowment.org #NUKECON next two days. But if you’re going, make sure to check in with my colleagues @mknight.bsky.social @mattkorda.bsky.social @elianajjohns.bsky.social @jonatomic.bsky.social from the @scientistsorg.bsky.social nuke team! 👋
carnegieendowment.org
PROGRAMMING UPDATE | #NUKECON kicks off at 9am EDT with George Perkovich moderating a panel discussion on what lessons can be learned from nuclear manipulators & their targets, featuring Mariana Budjeryn, Paul Zajac, & Colin Kahl.

Updated agenda: carnegieendowment.org/events/2024/...
2025 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference
For over 35 years, experts, officials, executives, journalists, and students from across the globe have come together to debate—and explore solutions for—the most pressing challenges in nuclear nonpro...
carnegieendowment.org