Andrei Sterescu
@andreisterescu.bsky.social
320 followers 350 following 190 posts
Economist @ec.europa.eu ECFIN | Formerly @ecb.europa.eu | European 🇪🇺 and International Economic Policy | Views are my own and do not represent those of my employer
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andreisterescu.bsky.social
I made a list of academics, policy analysts, and journalists that I regularly follow who post on EU affairs, politics, and economics.

bsky.app/profile/did:...
Reposted by Andrei Sterescu
jacobedenhofer.bsky.social
3. Delgado-Vega, Álvaro, and @bartonelee2.bsky.social. 2024. ‘When Growth Leads to Zero-Sum Conflict’. t.co/MjBZ9BUCI3
Reposted by Andrei Sterescu
andreisterescu.bsky.social
The authors are agnostic about the origins of trade imbalances and rather ask what they do inside gravity models when tradables have external economies of scale, but also conclude that persistent trade imbalances are beggar-thy-neighbour.
andreisterescu.bsky.social
…by suppressing household income and boosting saving/investment at home and pushing their excess production and capital abroad. Trade partners then absorb the demand shortfall via higher debt/un employment or by shrinking their tradables base.
andreisterescu.bsky.social
The most recent discussion between @martinsandbu.ft.com and @michaelpettis.bsky.social also explains this distributional mechanism i.e. surpluses redistribute income and jobs toward surplus economies and away from deficit ones…

on.ft.com/4nSEjAk What we get wrong about China
What we get wrong about China
An interview with Michael Pettis
on.ft.com
andreisterescu.bsky.social
Trade deficits on the other hand push resources toward local non-tradables, shrinking the traded base and dragging on productivity. Sectorally, that means export-oriented manufacturing and tradable services tend to expand in surplus economies and contract in deficit ones.
andreisterescu.bsky.social
The main channel is that surpluses pull workers and capital into tradables (manufacturing and other exportable activities), which scales up those industries and lifts productivity and income.
andreisterescu.bsky.social
A new IMF study shows trade surpluses tend to raise incomes in surplus countries and lower them in deficit countries.

doi.org/10.5089/9798...
Reposted by Andrei Sterescu
mcopelov.bsky.social
🇫🇷's debt/GDP ratio is not "soaring." It is than in 2020, & it's borrowing costs are lower than in 2023.

I know that The Narrative™️ cannot fail & everyone has their own political preferences over arbitrary debt levels (bsky.app/profile/mcop...), but don't print lies in the newspapers, etc.
Reposted by Andrei Sterescu
nvondarza.bsky.social
For a (healthy?) dose of Euro-pessism, here is an interesting look by @codendahl.bsky.social on the economic policies of the far/hard right and what their increasing access to power might mean for Europe:
The hard right’s plans for Europe’s economy
It has moderated, but offers little hope of growth-boosting reform
www.economist.com
Reposted by Andrei Sterescu
fbermingham.bsky.social
The EU's strategic foresight report 2025 is out and it rings the bell for a "change in the global order"

"We're witnessing the erosion of the rules-based international order & fracturing of the global landscape... a return to the previous status quo seems increasingly unlikely"
Reposted by Andrei Sterescu
sandertordoir.bsky.social
Not sure that some in Germany understood that more issuance of their own would imply more market discipline on France.

Not sure some in France fully realised that Germany's big fiscal experiment also has sharp downsides for them.
sandertordoir.bsky.social
Scenario on.

Part of France’s fiscal woes: more German bund supply potentially means less OAT demand: investors often bought the latter to get core eurozone exposure — bunds were scarce.

Not as scarce anymore going forward as Germany issues more debt.

Profligate Germany disciplines France.
Reposted by Andrei Sterescu
andreisterescu.bsky.social
Overall, the EU-financed/EU-coordinated fiscal policy yields larger and more even GDP and convergence effects than nationally financed/managed variants precisely because it moves resources to where multipliers are highest and chooses projects whose payoffs don’t stop at the border.
andreisterescu.bsky.social
Shared EU financing implicitly equalises across countries (richer members shoulder more of the bill), which boosts the overall macro impact and helps poorer regions catch up. EU-level coordination also internalises cross-border spillovers.
andreisterescu.bsky.social
Authors simulate fiscal interventions under different “who-pays/ who-coordinates” setups over a 20-year horizon for a portfolio of cohesion policy-type investments (EU-wide financing vs. each country pays its own bill and EU-level allocation that internalises spillovers vs. national allocation).
Reposted by Andrei Sterescu
isabellamweber.bsky.social
Germany inscribed austerity in its constitution. The “debt brake” is so rigid that The Economist has called it an instrument of “self harm”. Reform is overdue.

I’m honored to be appointed by the Finance Ministry to serve on the expert commission in charge of fiscal rules.
Reposted by Andrei Sterescu
sandertordoir.bsky.social
Europe negotiated the EU-US deal from weakness—and it shows.

The 15% tariff was already the de facto rate for the past few months (10% Liberation Day tariffs + ~5% MFN). It beats 25% on key sectors.

But locking it in permanently? What was unthinkable a year ago is now the new baseline.

1/
Reposted by Andrei Sterescu
nvondarza.bsky.social
I think European leaders - both national and in the EU - are underestimating what it will do to their publics to be humilated by Trump.

Like the NATO summit and Rutte's 'Daddy' strategy, mabye the outcome could have been worse. But losing pride and being humilated is also a price that is paid.
andreisterescu.bsky.social
The EU should have been in a position to extract more meaningful concessions. If it never probes the limits of its strength it will never discover where they truly lie and it will continue to be outmaneuvered on the international stage.
andreisterescu.bsky.social
The EU is the world’s second-largest economy and the leading exporter and importer of manufactured goods and services. It also accounts for some 16% of global trade and nearly 21% of global GDP with EFTA.
andreisterescu.bsky.social
By failing to test and push the boundaries of our market power, the EU risks perpetually seeing itself and being seen by others as lacking both the will and the ability to defend its interests.
andreisterescu.bsky.social
The trade “deal” with the US is a missed opportunity for the EU to leverage the full extent of the regulatory and institutional capacity it has built in the past few years to exert economic influence on the world stage.