Doctoral Researcher @PRIF.org // former Nuclear Scholar @poni.csis.org and Project Coordinator @cntrarmscontrol.org // Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control // Cold War History // Military Technology, Operations and Strategy // Opinions my own // .. more
Doctoral Researcher @PRIF.org // former Nuclear Scholar @poni.csis.org and Project Coordinator @cntrarmscontrol.org // Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control // Cold War History // Military Technology, Operations and Strategy // Opinions my own //
Reposted by Frank Kühn
![In my four years as Chairman, I don’t think a Chief ever, in writing, went to the Secretary or the President to disagree with a judgment I had made, except for one time where I needed to get some information in and I didn’t check with him. In the heat of battle, I don’t think I’ve ever had to go in and say to the President, "The Chiefs don’t agree with me," or, "There’s a disagreement here."
There were some programmatic issues where we had disagreements. The one I had the most fun with was nuclear weapons. I felt that we were wasting a lot of money on nuclear weapons. We really didn’t need any more. The Army did not need to have nuclear weapons. We could make the rubble bounce everywhere now. I was pushing Secretary Cheney to eliminate nuclear weapons in the Army. The Marine Corps was already getting rid of them and some of the Air Force weapons and all of the tactical nuclear weapons aboard the ships, not the boomers. Cheney is more conservative than I am on these sorts of matters. There’s always a Soviet Union lurking somewhere. Even if it’s going away, it’s lurking somewhere.
So the Army decided to fight me on it and they got the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General [John R.] Galvin, my dear friend, to say we’ve got to have these things. They finessed me by getting not only the Chiefs to agree—the Army Chief went and got all the other Chiefs to agree with him, a brilliant piece of work and I missed it—and then they got Galvin, one of the CINCs [Commander in Chief], the SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe], to come in and say he needed it. We had a big meeting in Cheney’s office and we discussed it, and then his staff, Paul Wolfowitz and company, agreed with that point of view.
I kind of enjoyed it because it was good to be overruled. I can say to people, "Oh, they overruled me. I was overruled." I still remember saying to Secretary Cheney, Dick, as it was happening, "Okay, agreed, done.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:wwn73hq2lxabfqqgespjimt5/bafkreiaaxy4npofvfzn5igrokl3gllffxt3qgjivwbr2ew5gmwxdoq7vuy@jpeg)
Reposted by Frank Kühn
President Bush: The Cold War was a time of suspicion, competition and diminishing each other.
President Putin: You did the diminishing part very well.
📂 nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/337...
Reposted by Frank Kühn
Reposted by Frank Kühn
Asking for a few friendly continents.
via @stollmeyer.bsky.social
Reposted by Marc Lynch, Kim L. Scheppele, Elizabeth Saunders , and 13 more Marc Lynch, Kim L. Scheppele, Elizabeth Saunders, Paul E. Smaldino, Frédéric Mérand, Jonathan Hopkin, Andrew S. Crines, James Scott, Frank Kühn, Michael Jones‐Correa, Naazneen H. Barma, Steffen Ganghof, Johannes Kiess, Jay Shambaugh, Xavier Molénat, Nathan P. Kalmoe
abcnews.go.com/Internationa...
Reposted by Frank Kühn, Nicolai von Ondarza
Reposted by Edgar Morgenroth, Frank Kühn, James Cameron
Reposted by Edgar Morgenroth, Frank Kühn
Russland bereitet sich auf einen Angriff gegen die NATO vor. Der Kreml schlägt alle diplomatischen Angebote aus. Dieses Russland ist unser Feind.
Read it here: www.csis.org/analysis/hor...
@doreenhorschig.bsky.social for @poni.csis.org is finally out! 📘
I take a look at how DoD could use existing elements of the joint targeting process to reduce the risk of unintentional nuclear escalation.
Reposted by Frank Kühn
Reposted by Frank Kühn
Read it here: www.csis.org/analysis/hor...
Reposted by Frank Kühn
Letzte Meldung vor Weihnachten von @tobiaspfella.bsky.social und mir.
www.ipg-journal.de/rubriken/aus...
Reposted by Frank Kühn
